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Welch's Appeal from Probate

Mary L. Welch's Appeal from Probate

Welch's Appeal from Probate, 43 Conn. 342 (1876)
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Court
Supreme Court of Connecticut · State Highest Courts
Decided
February 15, 1876
Judges
Foster
Citations
43 Conn. 342
Headnotes
A husband and wife were divorced upon her petition, and the custody of a child of two years of age was given to the mother. No alimony was prayed for, and the husband, in consideration that none would be claimed, promised to give the wife, and after the divorce gave her, his note for $800. He died a ' year later. Held that his estate was liable to the mother for a fair proportion, according to his pecuniary ability when living, of the expense incurred by her in the necessary support of the child up to the time of his death. The statute (Gen. Statutes, tit. 14, ch. 3, see. 9) which provides that after a divorce the parents of a minor child of the marriage, in need of maintenance, shall contribute according to their respective ability, and that the Superior Court, upon the application of either parent, may make an order for such maintenance, recognizes the duty of the father in the present case to have contributed to the support of the child. This statute was passed since the decision of Finch v. Finch, 22 Conn. B., 411, and has modified the law as laid down in that case. Eight years before the divorce a policy of insurance for $1,000 was issued upon the life of the husband upon the application and for thfe benefit of the wife, ■ the premium being payable in ten yearly installments. The wife held the policy for several years, but at the time of the divorce it was in the husband’s possession. He paid the premiums, she occasionally contributing small sums. Both before and after the divorce he promised her that he would keep up the -policy by paying the premiums, but there was no consideration for his promise except such as grew out of the facts. He however neglected to pay the next premium falling due after the divorce, and she, relying on his promise, reglected herself to provide for it, and the policy lapsed, and soon after he died. If it had been surrendered while in force the wife would have been entitled to a paid-up policy of $800. Held that the husband’s estate was not liable to the wife for the value of the policy.
Summary
Appeal from the doings of commissioners on the insolvent estate of George L. Welch, deceased, in disallowing a claim of the appellant; brought to the Superior Court in Hartford County. The following facts were found by a committee: ' The appellant was, on the 8th day of May, 1860, married to George L. Welch, the decedent, of Berlin in this state, with whom she lived as his wife until the 18th day of May, 1873, when, upon her petition, she was lawfully divorced from him by a decree of the Superior Court. By the decree of divorce, the custody of Howard B. Welch, a child of the parties by the marriage, then of the age of two years and sis months, was awarded to the appellant. No alimony was asked for in the petition or granted in the decree, but in consideration that the petitioner would omit the prayer for alimony in her petition, the said George promised to pay her the sum of eight hundred dollars, for which, after the divorce was granted, he gave his note payable three years from date with interest, which note was allowed by the commissioners and is not the subject of controversy in this appeal. After the divorce was obtained the appellant supported, at her own expense, said minor child, and furnished it with necessary board, clothing, medicine, and nursing, and continued such support from the 13th day of May, 1873, until the 6th day of July, 1874, at which last mentioned date the said George L. Welch died. If, upon the foregoing facts, the court should be of opinion that the estate of the said George L. Welch was liable to pay the appellant a fair proportion of the necessary expense of such support according to his pecuniary ability during his life to contribute to that object, the committee found that one hundred and eighteen dollars would be a just and fair proportion of such expense for his estate to pay. The appellant, on the 2d day of September, 1865, while the marriage existed, made a written application to the Continental Life Insurance Company, located in the city of Hartford, for a policy of insurance upon the life of her husband, then about twenty-eight years of age, in the sum of one thousand dollars, for the whole term of his life. The application was signed by her alone, but the statement of questions and answers annexed to the application was signed by both. Pursuant to the application, the insurance company issued a policy of insurance, bearing date September 4th, 1865, whereby, in consideration of the representations made in the application, and of the sum of $46.62, in the policy acknowledged to have been paid by the appellant, and of the annual premium of $46.62, to be paid on or before the 4th day of September every year during the term of ten years, the company insured the life of said George L. Welch, for the sole use of the appellant, in the sum of one thousand dollars, for the term of his life; which sum, after deducting premium notes unpaid, the company by said policy agreed to pay the appellant, within ninety days after due notice and satisfactory evidence of the death of said George L. Welch and proof of claim. For several years the appellant had the policy in her possession, but afterwards, and before the divorce was granted, said George L. Welch had possession of it and retained it after the divorce. All the annual premiums that were paid were in fact paid by said George, the appellant furnishing him occasionally some money of her own for that purpose. Before the divorce was granted, and also afterwards, said George promised the appellant that he would attend to the payment of the annual premiums himself, so that the amount insured in the policy should be secured to her; and the appellant, relying upon his doing it, neglected to pay the premiums herself; and she did not know that there had been any failure to pay the same till after the decease of said George, and after the policy had been forfeited for non-payment of premiums. The said George paid eight of the annual premiums, but neglected to pay the premium due September 5th, 1873, and the policy thereupon lapsed and determined, and the insurance company was no longer liable to pay the sum insured or any sum thereon. If the policy had been surrendered while in force, the appellant, at the time it was allowed to lapse, would have been entitled to receive, by the conditions of the policy and the rules of the company, a paid-up policy in the sum of $800. And the cash value of the policy on the day it was allowed to lapse, if it had been surrendered, after deducting premium notes outstanding, was $179.24. There was no consideration for the promise on the part of said George L. Welch to pay the premiums himself, unless in the opinion of the court the facts herein found show such consideration^ The amount of money furnished by the appellant to said George to assist him in the payment of the premiums amounted in all to the sum of $77. There was no promise on the part of said George to return this money to the appellant, and no agreement of any kind relative to the money so paid, unless the same can by law be implied from the facts found. Upon these facts the case was reserved for the advice of this court upon the following questions: 1st. Whether the appellant is entitled to recover the expense of supporting the child referred to in the report. 2d. Whether the appellant is entitled to recover upon the facts found relating to the life insurance policy for $1,000, and if so, what is the rule of damages.

Syllabus and headnotes are prepared by the reporter or publisher, not the court, and are not part of the opinion.

Opinion of the Court — Foster

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Foster, J.

The first question in this case, reserved for the consideration and advice of this court, is, whether the appellant is entitled to recover the expense of supporting the child referred to in the report.

George L. Welch, against whose estate this claim was presented, died on the 6th of July, 1874. At the April term, 1873, of the Superior' Court for the county of Middlesex, the appellant was divorced from the said George L. Welch, to whom she had previously been lawfully married. The custody of a minor child, Howard B. Welch, of the age of two and a half years, the offspring of the marriage, was by the court awarded to the appellant. No alimony was asked for in the petition, nor was any granted by the court, but in consideration of the omission to ask for alimony, the said George L. Welch promised to pay the appellant the sum of $800, for which sum he gave her his note on the first of July, 1873, and as to the payment of .the same no question is made.

After the divorce was obtained, the appellant supported *350 said minor child at her own expense, from the 18th of May, 1873, till the 6th of July, 1874, when the said George L. Welch died. It is for the support furnished during this period of time that a recovery is sought.

Payment of the claim is resisted on the ground that the father’s liability, to a third person, for support furnished his minor children when taken from him, depends upon a promise, express or implied; that without such promise there is no liability; that the divorce separated the husband from the wife, and terminated all claims which she had upon him by virtue of that relation; that when she applied for the custody of the child and obtained it, without asking for a decree for its maintenance, she must be deemed to have assumed the burden of its support, and relinquished, for the time being, all claim upon the father; that the provision made in lieu of alimony was probably intended and received as sufficient for the child’s support, and that it is not found by the committee that the child was in need of maintenance.

The parental relation is not affected by a decree of divorce, which merely dissolves the marriage. The previous duties and obligations continue as before as between parents and children. In this case the court which granted the divorce, impaired, to some extent, the rights of the father, by giving to the mother the custody of their infant child.

We think the estate of the father is liable for the amount stated in the report. We think the case distinguishable from the case of Finch v. Finch, 22 Conn., 411 , where the right of the mother, after a divorce, to recover against the father for the support of the children, was denied. The principles enunciated by this court in the case of Stanton v. Wilson, 3 Day, 37 , certainly sustain the plaintiff’s claim. Moreover, the statute of 1854 exercises an important, if not a controlling, influence over this case. It was passed since the decision of Finch v. Finch , and provides that, upon the dissolution of a marriage by divorce, the parents of a minor child of such marriage, in need of maintenance, shall maintain it according to their respective abilities, etc. Gen. Statutes, p. 189, sec. 9.

It appearing of record that the Superior Court has found *351 that the sum of $118 would ho, and is, a just and fair proportion of the expense ot supporting the child for said George L. Welch and his estate to pay, we advise judgment for that sum in favor ot the appellant.

The second question, and the only remaining one reserved for our advice, is, whether the appellant is entitled to recover upon the facts found relating to the life insurance policy for $1,000, and if so, what is the rule of damages.

The' policy in question was taken out in 1865, during the continuance ot the marriage, and lapsed for the non-payment of the premium, after the divorce, in 1873. The facts con nected with this matter are set forth in detail in the report, but we deem it unnecessary to recapitulate them, because we think they furnish the appellant no legal grounds of claim against the estate of the deceased.

Upon the two questions thus reserved for onr advice, we advise the court below to answer the first question in the affirmative, and the second in the negative.

In this opinion the other judges concurred.

How later courts describe this case

No later court has written an explanatory parenthetical about this case yet.

Cited by 11 cases

View all citing references →
1896: 11944: 11949: 31950: 41951: 11990: 118962026peak 1950 · 4

Relies on it most ⓘ

  1. Weid v. Weid, No. 045968 (Nov. 13, 1990)1990 Conn. Super. Ct. 3520 (1990)
  2. Shields v. O'Reilly36 A. 49 (Conn. 1896)
  3. White v. White81 A.2d 450 (Conn. 1951)
  4. Burke v. Burke75 A.2d 42 (Conn. 1950)
  5. Castagnola v. Fatool72 A.2d 479 (Conn. 1950)
  6. Castagnola v. Fatool16 Conn. Super. Ct. 119 (1949)

Most recent

  1. Weid v. Weid, No. 045968 (Nov. 13, 1990)1990 Conn. Super. Ct. 3520 (1990)
  2. White v. White81 A.2d 450 (Conn. 1951)
  3. Labarre v. Quinn17 Conn. Super. Ct. 134 (1950)
  4. LaBarre v. Quinn17 Conn. Supp. 134 (1950)
  5. Burke v. Burke75 A.2d 42 (Conn. 1950)
  6. Castagnola v. Fatool72 A.2d 479 (Conn. 1950)

Citing references are not a citator: they show that a later opinion cites this case, not whether it followed, distinguished, or overruled it. Check negative history before relying on this case.

Authorities cited 2

DepthCaseCited by
Finch v. Finch, 22 Conn. 411 (1852) 27
Stanton v. Willson, 3 Day 37 (1808) 32

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