Godeau v. Blood

Keeping of Ferocious Animals. Damages. Charge. In case for the bite of a dog it need not be proved that the dog had previously bitten mankind. It is sufficient to prove that the dog was of a ferocions nature, and that its keeper, from his'Snowledge'tBereof, haif reason to apprehend that under some circumstances it would bite mankind. The evidence tended to prove that the dog was of a ferocious nature, and that its keeper had been told by his neighbors that it was unsafe to allow it to run at large, and had kept it confined a part of the time, and muzzled a part of the time when he had allowed it to run at large. Held, that there was evidence tending to show that the dog had the habit of biting mankind to the knowledge of its keeper. There was no evidence that the dog was rabid, but the court, after charging that plaintiff was entitled to recoverfor all the pain and anguish he had personally suffered, and for that only, charged in effect that one who had been bitten by a dog must lead a considerable portion of his life under an apprehension not pleasant to reflect upon, as one who had been bitten by a dog not known to be rabid, would sometimes, after a considerable time, die of hydrophobia, and that whether there was any indication of such a result in this case, no one could presently tell. JBeld, that all pain and solicitude occasioned by the bite, including apprehension of poison and of evil results therefrom, were proper matters for consideration, and that there was no error.

Case for the bite of a dog. Trial by jury, September Term, 1879, Pierpoint, C. J., presiding. The evidence introduced on the part of the plaintiff tended to show that the dog, a bull-terrier that was being kept by the defendant at his store in the city of Burlington, bit the plaintiff, a lad thirteen or fourteen years of age, in three several places, as he was going along the street in the village of Winooski, jfnd inflicted several troublesome wounds, by which he was incapacitated from work for a considerable space of time. There was no direct evidence that the dog had ever before bitten mankind but there was evidence tending to prove that he had been known in one instance to attack a horse without pi-ovocation, as he was being led from á stable, and to bite him twice in the breast, and there was much evidence tending to prove that he was accustomed to attack other dogs without provocation as they passed the place where he was kept; that the neighbor's and customers of the defendant had frequently called on the defendant to restrain the dog as unfit and unsafe to be at large; that the defendant had kept the dog confined much of the time, and, when he had suffered him to run at large, had kept him muzzled a part of the time ; and that the dog was exceptionally ferocious — one of the witnesses describing him as " the most wickedest kind of a dog.” After the evidence was all in, the defendant requested the court to direct a verdict for him, but the court refused, to which the defendant excepted. The court charged that the plaintiff was- entitled to recover for all the injury he had personally sustained, all the pain and anguish he had personally suffered, by reason of the biting, and for that only. It also charged that it was no slight thing for a lad to be so bitten, such wounds bteing dangerous in a variety of ways; that life was often taken by such injuries, and that when the time would come, could not be told ; that one who had been bitten by a dog " must lead a considerable portion of his life . . . under an apprehension . ... not pleasant to reflect upon,” because one who had received such injuries, inflicted by a dog not known to be rabid, would sometimes after a considerable time die of hydrophobia ; that whether there was any indication of such a result here, no one could tell — at least not until after a considerable lapse of time-. To that portion of the charge embodied in the last sentence the defendant excepted. The court should have directed a verdict as requested. It was not shown that the dog had a propensity to bite mankind, and that the defendant knew it. 1 Ad. Torts, 229 ; Kelly v. Tilton, 42 N. Y. 269; Keightlinger v. Egan, 65 Ill. 235 ; May v. Burdett, •9 A. & E. 101; Smith v. Pelah, 2 Str. 1246. The burden was on plaintiff to prove that, and it could be proved only by proof of instances of an exhibition of a propensity to bite mankind. Arnold v. Norton, 25 Conn. 92 ; Smith v. Pelah, supra. Proof of a propensity to bite others of its kind, or other animals, was not sufficient. Keightlinger v. Egan, supra. That portion of the charge that was excepted to related to a subject not before the jury, and was calculated to raise unwarrantable apprehensions, and was therefore erroneous. The court properly refused to direct a verdict. It was sufficient to show that the dog was of a ferocious nature, and one that would be likely to bite people, if suffered to go at large. Shearm. & Redf. Negl. 231, 234 ; McCoskill v. Elliot, 5 Strob. 196 ; Buehley v. Leonard, 4 Denio, 500 ; Jones v. Perry, 2 Esp. 482. The liability is for keeping such an animal with knowledge of its propensities — not for keeping it negligently. Laverone v. Manginti, 10 Am. 269. Thát part of the charge excepted to was without error.