State v. Bradley

The only ground of challenge to the array at common law is partiality, fraud, or some irregular or corrupt conduct on the part of the returning officers. But under the practice in this state there is so little opportunity for such acts, that there can rarely he any ground for a challenge to the array. Whether there can he a challenge to the array on the ground that the statute under which the jurors were selected is unconstitutional: Qucere. Jurors are not public officers within the meaning of the constitution and law. It follows, therefore, that where jurors have been selected for a year, and an act of the legislature is passed changing the mode of selecting jurors, and talcing effect within the year, they may be superseded by the new jurors appointed under the act. Also that a provision that jurors shall be not less than thirty years of age does not violate the provision of the constitution that “ every elector shall be eligible to any office.” If a juror when in the discharge of his duties in court were to be regarded as an officer, yet an elector whose name is in the jury-box in his town, but lias not been drawn out, would not be an officer. A defendant would have no cause of complaint in the exclusion of a class of persons from, the opportunity to become jurors, so long as the persons serving as jurors were legally qualified. An information charged three defendants with a conspiracy to defraud a person of certain property, and that a forged deed was used as a means of accomplishing it, and that the property was obtained by the fraudulent means used. .Held that the information did not charge the crime of forgery, nor that of getting goods by false pretences, but the crime of conspiracy. It is not necessary to a conviction under a charge of conspiracy to obtain certain real estate by fraud, that it should be proved that the property had value. It is enough if it was property.

Information for a conspiracy to defraud; filed by tbe prosecuting attorney of tbe city of Hartford in thp police court of the city. Tbe information contained three counts, tbe second one being as follows:— That Leonard A. Bradley, Charles E. Gager, and Albert E. Olmstead, of said city of Hartford, at and within said city, on the first day of May, 1878, did, among themselves, wickedly and unlawfully conspire, confederate and agree to cheat and defraud Thomas C. Pease of Enfield in said county, out of certain property, to wit: a certain house and lot situated on Wethersfield Avenue, in said city of Hartford, which was then owned by said Pease, and worth two thousand dollars, by the following false, fraudulent, and wicked representations, 'pretenses, devices, and unlawful means, to wit: that they, the defendants, should induce said Pease to exchange said real estate with the defendants for certain real estate located in Granville, in the state of Massachusetts, and to convey by deed to them his said real estate, and that in order to accomplish said exchange and trade the defendants should falsely, fraudulently and wickedly pretend, represent and say to said Pease that said real estate in Gran-ville was worth four thousand dollars, and was subject only to a mortgage of fourteen hundred dollars; that the same was owned by James Lyon of said Hartford; that it was located only three or four miles from the village of West-field ; that twenty-five acres of said land was well covered with heavy wood and timber; that there was on the same a fine granite house, and other buildings, all of which together could not be built for four thousand dollars; that much of said land was excellent land for raising tobacco; that other portions of said land would produce in a year hay enough to keep thirteen head of cattle, and that part was excellent pasture land; and that said Lyon had well and truly executed to said Pease a good and sufficient deed and conveyance of said real estate situated in said Granville; whereas in truth said last named real estate was not worth four thousand dollars, and not more than said mortgage of fourteen hundred dollars which was an encumbrance thereon, and was located eighteen miles from said Westfield, as the defendants then and there well knew, and no part thereof was covered with heavy wood and timber, or was good tobacco land, or good pasture land, or would produce hay enough in one year to keep thirteen head of cattle, which the defendants then and there well knew; and whereas in truth said James Lyon did not own said last named real estate nor any part thereof, and had not executed and never did execute to said Pease any deed of the same; all which the defendants then and there well knew; and all the buildings thereon were not worth over one hundred dollars, and could be built for less than four thousand dollars, as they then and there well knew. And said Attorney says that, in pursuance of said conspiracy, combination and agreement among them formed and had as aforesaid, they, the said Bradley, Gager and Olmstead, did then and there falsely, fraudulently and wickedly pretend, represent and say to said Pease that said real estate, situated in Granville, Massachusetts, was worth four thousand dollars, and was encumbered by a mortgage of fourteen hundred dollars, that the same was located only three or four miles from said Westfield, and that there was thereon a fine granite house and other buildings, all of which together could not be built for four thousand dollars, that much of the same was-excellent land for raising tobacco, and much of the same was excellent pasture land, that said real estate would produce in a year hay enough to keep thirteen, head of cattle one season, that said James Lyon owned said real estate situated in said Granville, and had well and truly executed a certain deed to said Pease of said real estate, which pretended deed the defendants then and there showed and delivered to said Pease as and for a good and sufficient conveyance to him of said last named real estate, but which deed said Attorney says was only a false, fraudulent, forged, and pretended instrument, and did thereby induce said Pease to execute, and said Pease did execute and deliver to them a good and sufficient deed of the said house and lot on Wethersfield Avenue in said Hartford; and said defendants, by the aforesaid false, fraudulent, and wicked pretences, representations, devices, and unlawful means, did then and there willfully cheat and defraud him, the said Thomas C. Pease, out of his real estate, situated as aforesaid, on Wethersfield Avenue in said city of Hartford, of the value of two thousand dollars; all which is a high crime and misdemeanor, and against the peace. The defendants were bound over to the Superior Court, and in that court demurred to the information, but the court overruled the demurrer and ordered them to answer over. They then severally pleaded “not guilty,” and the case came to trial before Sanford, J., and a jury. The defendants then filed the following challenge to the' array:— • The defendants challenge the array of jurors summoned for the trial of the above cause, because they say— 1st.- That under the statute laws of this state the justices of the peace, selectmen, constables, and grand jurors in- each town of Hartford County met according to law on the first Monday of January, 1880, and chose by ballot the number of jurors provided by law, to serve until the first Monday of January, 188T; that said jurors so chosen have not resigned their office as jurors, but still continue to be the lawfully chosen jurors of said towns, and that the jurors upon this panel were not drawn or summoned from the jurors chosen as aforesaid, but were drawn and summoned from a body of so-called jurors chosen under the provisions of the eighty-second chapter of the public acts of 1880; and the defendants therefore say that the jurors upon this panel are not entitled to act as jurors in this cause. 2d. That said act of the General Assembly under which the jurors in this panel were chosen, drawn and summoned is unconstitutional and void, and the panel of jurors is therefore irregular and illegal and not qualified to serve in this cause.* The court overruled the challenge, and the jury was empaneled from the jurors present with one talesman. Upon the trial, the state having rested its case, the defendant offered in evidence a deed of the Granville property from Benajah H. Plato to James Lyon. The State’s Attorney objecting to the deed on the ground that there was no proof of the signature, the defendants called Plato to prove his own signature, and asked him the single question whether the signature to the deed was his, to which he replied in the affirmative. The State’s Attorney thereupon cross-examined him, and among other questions put the following: “Where is the property situated that is described in the deed ? What is it, and what does it consist of ?” To both of which the defendants objected^ but the court in the exercise of its discretion overruled the objection, and permitted the Attorney to ask the questions and put in as a part of the evidence in the case the answers made by Plato. The defendants claimed and asked the court to charge the jury, that “ the complaint charges the defendants with cheating and defrauding one Thomas C. Pease of certain property by means of certain false and fraudulent pretences, and the gist" of the complaint is the cheating and defrauding by means of the representations and pretences alleged in the complaint.” The court did not so charge, but charged as follows : “ The complaint contains three counts. The first charges the crime of conspiracy to cheat and defraud Thomas C. Pease. The second count sets out all that is set out in the first count, and in addition sets out the unlawful means. The third count -is for obtaining property by false pretences, but this count has been nolled by the Attorney. The first count is defective, and upon demurrer would have been held by the court insufficient, and no conviction should be had upon it, and your inquiries, therefore, will be confined to the second count. This is a count for conspiracy, and sets forth not only the unlawful means by which the accused proposed to accomplish their purpose, but also their overt acts. It was unnecessary to set forth these overt acts, for without alleging them they might be proved as matter in aggravation of the character of the conspiracy, or as evidence of the conspiracy itself. The conspiracy alleged is a conspiracy to cheat and defraud Pease out of his property. What was done in pursuance of the conspiracy is really of no consequence ; they are not sought to be charged for the actual cheating and defrauding, for the offence is complete when and as soon as the agreement or conspiracy is entered into. The gist of the offense charged is not the cheating and defrauding, but the conspiracy or agreement to cheat and defraud.” The defendants further asked the court to charge the jury that, “ in order to sustain the complaint the state must prove that the thing out of which Pease is alleged to have been cheated had some value, and in the absence of such proof there could be no cheating and no fraud, and the defendants ought not to be convicted.” But the court did not so charge, but charged that, the gist of the complaint being the conspiracy, there could be a conviction without reference to the value of the property sought to be obtained. The defendants further asked the court to charge the jury that “upon this complaint the defendants cannot be convicted of a conspiracy.” But the court did not so charge, hut charged that the second count was sufficient, and that on it the defendants might be so convicted; that it was a good count in conspiracy, notwithstanding the overt acts had been set out. The jury returned a verdict of guilty against the defendants Bradley and Gager, and of not guilty in favor of the defendant Olmstead. Bradley and Gager moved for a new trial for error in the rulings and charge of the court, and also a motion in error.