Summary
[In Chancery.]
Bill in Chancery. Heard on the report of a special master, September Term, 1882, Rutland County. Yeazey, Chancellor, decreed that defendant Baker should convey by quit claim deed the land in question to the orator. The bill was brought to compel the defendant Baker to deed certain wild lands in Mount Tabor to the orator. The master found in substance :
That the orator, Geo. C. Winchester and Charles Winchester owned certain wild lands, each an undivided third; that the defendant Abbott owned a note executed by said Geo. C.; that the defendant attempted to sell the note to the orator, but the orator declined to buy it, giving as a reason, that he did notwant to bring a suit in his own name against Winchester.
“And I find that as a result of said further conversation and negotiations, it was then and there agreed between Abbott and Griffith, that Abbott should go to Rutland and see Joel C. Baker, Esq., the then attorney of Griffith, and leave the note with said Baker; that Griffith should at once make examination of the record of Winchester’s title to said land, and if he found said title satisfactory, he should go to Rutland and see Baker and direct him to bring suit upon the note in the name of Baker, against Winchester, and attach his interest in the land, obtain judgment in said suit as soon as he could, and proceed to set off the interest of Winchester ih said lands upon execution to be issued upon said judgment; and if the land was not redeemed from said attachment or levy, and the interest or title of Winchester in the land should pass to and vest in Baker, under and by virthe of said proposed attachment, levy and set off, it was agreed that Baker should convey the title and interest in said land, so by him obtained, to Griffith, upon receiving from him (Griffith) for said Abbott, the amount of such judgment, including interest, costs of suit, levy and set off.
I further find that acting upon said agreement, he, Abbott, went to Rutland, saw Baker, made known to him in whole or in part, the arrangement between him and Griffith as to said note and the interest of Winchester in said land, endorsed said note without recourse in blank, and delivered it to and left it with him and said Baker. I further find that immediately after said negotiations were had and said agreement was entered into, Griffith made examination of said records and found the same to show satifactory title of said one-third interest of said tract of land to be in Winchester; and within a very short time thereafter he -went to Eutland, saw Baker, stated to him what the anangement and agreement was between him and Abbott as to said note and land, and directed suit to be brought on said note ; and suit was thereupon commenced in the name of Baker, based upon said note, and thereafterwards prosecuted to final judgment, under the direction of said Griffith.”
Execution was issued in favor of Baker, and a levy duly made.' *
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“ Said land was not redeemed from said levy and set-off, anti after the time of redemption had elapsed, said Baker informed said Griffith of that fact, and that he was ready to convey said land to him upon receipt of the money. And on the 10th day of October, 1881, Griffith went to Eutland, saw Baker and paid him the amount ho claimed under said arrangement and agreement, to wit; the sum of $1,082.45, and at this time said Baker submitted to said Griffith a quit-claim deed from him to Griffith of said lands which he (Baker) had drafted, which was satisfactory to said Griffith. At. this time said Griffith was in haste to leave Eutland, he then being on his way to Bos'ton, and there was no one present to witness the deed, so it was arranged that said Baker should at his convenience execute said deed and forward it to said Griffith. At the same time Griffith informed Baker that he wanted his deed of said land as he wanted to set his help to work lumbering on said land. and Baker told him to go ahead, and go to work; it would make no difference that he did not have deed. And in accordance with this arrangement Griffith entered upon said lands and cut and took off timber therefrom to a greater or less extent; and so continued up to about the time of bringing this action.
The said Baker, without any apparent cause, delayed completing the deed for several days; and before the same was completed the defendant Abbott came to Eutland, saw Baker, and learned from him the then situation of the aforesaid matters; and Baker then offered to pay him the amount of said note, but he (Abbott) refused to accept the money, and forbade Baker executing or delivering the deed to Griffith, and demanded of Baker a deed of the land to himself, claiming that he did not make any such arrangement or agreement with Griffith, as was claimed by Griffith, and that Griffith was not entitled to a deed.of the land; and thereupon Baker notified Griffith of what Abbott claimed, of his refusal to accept the money, and his position and demands and notice aforesaid; and soon after this Baker saw Griffith, and offered to pay the money back, but Griffith refused to accept it, and demanded his deed. Baker declined to deliver deed to Griffith, and the matter has since remained in that condition. Baker has the money, and the title to said land now rests in him.” * * * “ After the set-off and before the six months months allowed for redemption had expired, Griffith' relying on liis parol contract with Abbott and Baker, bought adjacent lands, and built roads, and shanties for choppers to live in.”
Baker has no interest in the land, and claims none. He was merely the agent and attorney of defendant Abbott; and could not, and did not, bind him by contract; nor by accepting the money of the orator. The relation of attorney and client is one of trust and confidence, requiring the utmost fidelity. Weeks Att. at Law, 413 ; Yardly v. Fililí, Hob. 8, a; 1 Berry Trusts, s. 202. Baker held the title in trust for Abbott. Biddings v. Eastman, 5 Baige, 561; Davis v. Smith, 43 Yt. 269. He could not sell it without express authority. Wheeler v. Willard, 44 Yt. 640 ; Ghilds v. Eureka Works, 44 N. H. 354. He could not assign or sell the judgment. 47 Pa. St. 214 ; 5 Yt. 346; 58 Pa. St. 196; 10 Yt. 471. Had no power to compromise. 15 Yt. 314; 55 Mo. 405 ; 39 Md. 485 ; 21 Oonn. 245. It was a parol contract for the sale of real estate. The Statute of Frauds is a defence. 19 Ind. 347; Hibbard v. Whitney, 13 Yt. 21; Buck v. Pichwell, 27 Yt. 157; Dowling v. McKenney, 124 Mass. 478 ; Ballard v. Bond, 32 Yt. 355 ; Whitcher v. Morey, 39 Yt. 459; Davis v. Farr, 26 Yt. 592 ; King v. Smith, 33 Yt. 22. Payment, did not enlarge the rights of the orator. Cobb v. Hall, 33 Yt. 233; Jettison v. Jordon, 68 Me. 373; Oook v. Daggett, 2 Allen, 439. The contract would seem to be obnoxious to the statute: R. L. s. 981, as it could not be performed within one year. It was made September 10, 1879; the writ could not be entered in court till March 9,1880, and then six months to redeem. 1 Yt. 69; 10 Vt. 338; 11 Yt. 428 ; 41 Yt. 541; 28 Yt. 34; 50 Yt. 626.
There has been such a. part performance of the contract as entitles the orator to its specific execution. There lias been a payment and change of possession. Browne Statute Frauds, ss. 465,467; Sutton v. Sutton, 13 Yt. 71; Eaton v. Whitaker, 18 Conn. 222 ; Lacón v. Martins, 3 Atk. 1; L3i7ee v. Morey, 32 Yt. 37; Stark v. Wilder, 36 Yt. 752; Fry Spec. Bei-f. 247, 251, 258; Croker v. Lliggins, 7 Conn. 342; 1 De G. & J. 32; 1 Story Eq. J. ss. 761, 763; Anson Con. 57; Rhodes v. Rhodes, 3 Sand. Cli. 284; Nunn v. Tobin, 1 L. R. Oh. App. Cas. 34; Noyes v. Moor, 1 Root, 142; Matins v. Brown, 4 Conn. 403.
Syllabus and headnotes are prepared by the reporter or publisher, not the court, and are not part of the opinion.