Curnane v. Scheidel

In an action of replevin tried upon the general issue, the plaintiff sought to recover the possession of a horse which he claimed belonged to him and had been traded off without his permission by his father-in-law, S, to the defendant. Held that evidence that S had, upon the plaintiff’s suggestion, procured a writ and complaint against the defendant for fraud in making the trade, in which S was described as plaintiff and owner of the horse, and which had been read to the defendant by the officer, was admissible, either for the purpose of discrediting the plaintiff’s claim of title, or, in connection with other evidence, to show a ratification by the plaintiff of the trade made by S with the defendant. The trial court ruled that upon the facts found the plaintiff ratified or affirmed the acts of S in trading horses. Held that this ruling was fully justified by the facts disclosed upon the record.

Action of replevin to recover the possession of a horse, brought to the Court of Common Pleas in Hartford. County and tried to the court, Peck, Associate Judge-; facts found and judgment rendered for the defendant, and appeal by the plaintiff for alleged errors in the rulings of the court. The material facts are as follows: The plaintiff, who was the owner of the hay horse described in the complaint, had for several years permitted his father-in-law, Jeremiah Sullivan, who resided in Burlington in this State, to keep and use it on his farm with his own horses. The plaintiff during this time made his home with said Sullivan, though he only occasionally visited Burlington, passing most of his time in Boston where he was in business. In the early part of February, 1897, Sullivan exchanged the horse in question with the defendant for a black horse and $85. Defendant did not know that Sullivan was not the owner of the horse he so traded. Plaintiff’s horse was worth from $100 to $150, and the black horse about $50. On returning home the following evening, and having learned from Sullivan of the trade, and he and Sullivan having discovered that the horse received from the defendant was blind, the plaintiff was dissatisfied, and told Sullivan he must “ fix it up ” with the defendant. A few days later plaintiff went to defendant’s home to ascertain if he still had the bay horse, and talked with the defendant about the horse, saying it was a good horse; but did not tell defendant that he, the plaintiff, owned it, nor in any manner disavow the trade. Sullivan afterward went to the defendant and complained that he had “ stuck him,” and asked him to trade back, which the defendant refused to do; and on the 19th of February, at the plaintiff’s suggestion, Sullivan caused a writ and complaint to be drawn against the defendant and placed in the hands of an officer for service, in which Sullivan was described as the plaintiff and as the owner of the bay horse, and which alleged that he had been induced to trade by fraudulent representations, and demanded $200 damages. The plaintiff Curnane was present at a conversation with .the officer about serving the writ, and accompanied the officer part way to defendant’s house. The officer did not serve the .writ, but told defendant its nature and advised him to settle ■ the matter; and the plaintiff, Curnane, was present at a conversation at Sullivan’s house where the officer and the defendant had gone, and in which conversation defendant offered to trade back the horse for $10, but Curnane said nothing about owning the horse. The plaintiff and Sullivan afterwards together demanded of the defendant the $35 to be paid by defendant, and on defendant’s claiming that it was not to be paid until March 15th, Curnane urged defendant to pay the money at once, saying: “ Give him the $35 and.it will be all right; ” and that Sullivan wanted the money to buy another horse. On the 26th of February the plaintiff commenced the present action, and at the time of service of the writ brought back to the defendant the black horse, which defendant refused to receive. Previous to the service of the replevin writ plaintiff made no demand upon defendant for the horse, nor had either he or Sullivan informed the defendant, nor had the defendant any knowledge, that the plaintiff owned the horse. On March 15th the defendant tendered to Sullivan the $35, which the latter refused to receive, saying that defendant owed him nothing. During the trial the defendant offered deputy sheriff Morse as a witness, and asked: “ Did you have a writ in your possession in which Sullivan was plaintiff and S cheidel was defendant, with which you went to Scheidel’s house, and which you read to him ? ” To tins question the plaintiff objected, on the ground that it was immaterial and irrelevant. Prior to this both Curnane and Sullivan had testified that Curnane owned the horse (which was a controverted question in the ease), and also that Sullivan procured the writ in question, and that Curnane knew of the existence and intended service of the writ. The court admitted the question as tending to contradict Sullivan’s testimony that the horse belonged to Curnane, and also as tending, in connection with the other evidence, to show a ratification by Curnane of Sullivan’s act in trading the horse. To the admission of this question the plaintiff excepted. The answer was: “ I did. I read it in part, and told him what the rest was.” Morse produced the writ, and the defendant offered it in evidence. The same objection and ruling were made, and the plaintiff excepted to the admission of the writ. This was the writ procured by Sullivan at the suggestion of the plaintiff, before referred to. Upon the above facts the plaintiff claimed that the title and right of possession was in the plaintiff, and that he was entitled to judgment in his favor; but the court held that the acts of the plaintiff and Ms failure to disavow Sullivan’s trade of the horse, or to assert Ms title, constituted a ratification by Mm of Sullivan’s act in trading the horse, and rendered judgment for the defendant.