Chicago, Milwaukee & St. Paul Railway Co. v. State

Constitutional Law: Actions against the State: Pleading. What actions will lie against the state. Complaint must show claim disalloived by legislature. 1.' Under sec. 27, art. 1Y of the-state constitution (which declares that “the legislature shall direct by law in what manner and in what courts suits may be brought against the state ”), no'aetion can be maintained directly against the state, in any court thereof, unless it is authorized by some statute. 2. phder sec. 3200, R. S., the complaint in an action against the state is bad, on general demurrer, unless it shows that the claim sued upon has been presented to and disallowed by the legislature. 3. Said section relates only to claims which if allowed render the state a debtor to the claimant; and no statute authorizes an equitable action directly against the state to restrain it from perpetrating a threatened injustice.

In the year 1871, the plaintiff company leased a short line of railway in this state of another company for .twenty years, and has ever since operated the same. In 1880 the plaintiff purchased three short lines of railway of other companies by which the same were built, and has ever since owned and operated such lines. The gross earnings of each of these lines of railroad for the year 1880 were less than $3,000 per mile, and of one of them less than $1,500 per mile. The gross earnings of all the lines of railroad of the plaintiff company in this state (including the above lines) exceeded $3,000 per mile in 1880. The license fee which the plaintiff would be required to pay for 1881, computed at four per cent, on the gross earnings of all its lines in this state in 1880, is over $14,000 more than it would be were it computed separately upon the gross earnings of the lines thus leased and purchased, without reference to the plaintiff’s other lines. The license fee was computed by the state treasurer on the former basis, and the plaintiff was compelled to pay, and did pay, one-half the required amount in February, 1881, in order to obtain a license for that year to operate its railways. In August, 1881, the plaintiff paid to the state treasurer, on account of the balance of its license fee for that year, a sum less than it was required to pay in February preceding, and less than the state treasurer demanded, by a little more than $14,000. This alleged deficiency is the difference between the two modes of computing the license fee above mentioned. This action was brought in this court. The complaint states the facts in detail, of which the foregoing is a summary. The prayer for relief is as follows: “Firsts that this honorable court will adjudge and determine that only the sum of $240,931.44 was due from said plainñff to the state for license to operate said several railroads for the calendar year from January 1 to December 31, 1881, and restrain the said state treasurer and attorney general from any and all proceedings to collect any amount for said license in excess of said sums; second, that it will restrain all proceedings on the part of said state to collect the pecuniary penalty of $10,000, mentioned in section 1213, R. S., or from taking any proceedings to have the rights, privileges and franchises of said plaintiff forfeited, as provided in said section; third, and that, until the final hearing of said cause, a preliminary order may be made restraining said treasurer and attorney general from instituting any proceedings or taking any action for the collection of said penalty of $10,000, or the forfeiture of the rights, privileges and franchises of said plaintiff; fourth, for such further relief as may seem meet and proper in the premises.5’ The attorney general demurred to' the complaint, assigning as grounds of demurrer that it appears on the face thereof, “ (1) that the court has no jurisdiction of the person of the defendant or the subject of the action; (2) that the complaint does not state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action.” upon the question of jurisdiction, contended that sec. 27, art. IV of the .state constitution, which provides that “the legislature shall direct by law in what manner and in what courts suits may be brought against the state,” must be construed as establishing the right to sue the state, while imperatively enjoining the legislature to direct the manner and the court in which suits shall be brought. The object of sec. 8200, E. S., is to comply with and carry out these provisions of the constitution. In doing this, it was not competent for the legislature to prescribe that only one particular class of actions should be prosecuted against the state; though it might properly provide, as is done in said section, that pecuniary claims against the state should first be presented to the legislature before suit brought, thus applying in behalf of the state the policy that prevails in behalf of counties and towns. E. S., secs. 676, 824. If the section should be construed as prohibiting all except a limited class of actions against the state, the prohibition would be void as in conflict with the constitution, while the provision as to the manner and court would be valid.- Since the constitution gives the right to sue the state, if the legislature had not acted upon the subject, any person having a cause of action might bring suit in the circuit court as the court of general jurisdiction, and the action would be commenced as other actions are commenced. It is the theory of the constitution that the state may pi’osecute actions in this court to assert, maintain, protect and enforce its sovereignty and prerogative rights or any matter fublici juris (Att'y Gen. v. Blossom, 1 Vis., 317; Attfy Gen. v. B. B. Cos., 35 id.,.425); and as a corrollary the citizen has a right to come into this court for protection against the improper or unjust exercise of any of the sovereign powers and prerogatives,. This is implied in the language of the court in the case last above cited, on pp. 415, 417-23.