Cooper v. Duncan

1. Probate Courts — Jurisdiction and Powers of — Effect and Yaledity of Their Judgments. — The probate courts of this state, in the allowance and classification of demands against estates, are upon the same footing with courts of general jurisdiction; and their judgments possess the same efficacy and solemnity, and the same presumptions of validity attach to them, as to those of circuit courts. 8. - Ground for Setting Aside Judgments. — Wherever inadvertence or mistake is held to be a ground for setting aside a judgment, it is not for a mistake of the law or an inadvertent conclusion of the court; but for a mistake or inadvertence in doing „ something not intended to,be done. Where the action taken by the court was intended, however erroneous the conclusion may have been as to the rights of the parties, and however unjust the decision may have been, the parties are hound, unless there he. an appeal, or other process instituted to bring the matter before an appellate tribunal.

Appeal from Osage Circuit Court, Hon. A. J. Seay, Judge. Statement of case by the court. D. C. Duncan, as administrator of the estate of John B. Cooper, deceased, sold certain real estate belonging to said deceased, pursuant to ■ the order of the probate court, for the payment of debts. James M. Cooper became the purchaser thereof at $2,625. He paid $1,200 of this amount, and died owing the balance. The plaintiffs are the administrators of his estate and were appointed in June, 1877. In the following August (1877), the probate court made an order directing them to pay this balance. This order, not being complied- with, Duncan brought an action on July 24, 1879 (less than two year» after notice of the grant of letters to plaintiffs had been published), to enforce a vendor’s lien against the land which had been so sold, to which these plaintiffs were made defendants — personal service' was had, and an answer was filed by them. On the trial, a decree was ordered for the plaintiff in that case, by which it was adjudged that the balance of said purchase money, amounting to $2,017, remained due the plaintiff; that it-constituted a lien on said real estate, and that unless the defendants paid said amount before a day named, the said lien should be enforced by appropriate process. This payment not being made, the land was sold as directed. It did not realize enough to satisfy the judgment, but left a balance due thereon of about $1,300. Duncan presented a copy of this judgment with the statement of the credit to which it was entitled by the proceeds of the sale to the probate court, which classified it in the fifth class of demands, in November, 1880. Upon the motion and affidavit of these plaintiffs, this classification was set aside, under Revised Statutes, section 216. Tlie matter was'again heard in May, 1881, at which hearing these plaintiffs appeared and resisted by attorney, but the probate court adhered to its former ruling and made the same order as before. This order recites the presentation of a copy of the judgment, “and the court after fully understanding the premises and hearing the evidence, doth order that said sum of $1,386.82, be and the same is placed in the fifth class of claims.” No further efforts to set aside this order were made, nor was any appeal taken from it. After the lapse of a year or more, this suit in equity was brought in the circuit court to set aside the order of the probate court. I. The classification was unquestionably erroneous. Sect. 184, Rev. Stat.; State Bk. ®. Butt, 44 Mo. 366. The record also- shows that if the classification is permitted to stand, the estate will not pay over seventy-five cents on the dollar on claims in fifth class. II. The classification should have been vacated by the circuit court. Accident, fraud and mistake are usual grounds for equitable jurisdiction and relief. Byerly v. Bonlin, 72 Mo. 270; Bobyns v. McGovern, 15 Mo. 662. I. The probate court, was, in respect to the matters Involved, a court of general jurisdiction. Its adjudication had all the elements, force and effect of a judgment of such a court, and as such it was conclusive unless reversed on appeal. Smith v. Sims, 77 Mo. 269; Johnson v. Beazley, 65 Mo. 250; Ilennj v. McKerlie, 78 Mo. 416. II. It is not a special eqioitable ground of interference,. that the party has by his own act or omission failed to effectually avail himself of a valid defence at law, nor that the court of law has decided a question of law or of fact erroneously. 3 Pom. Eq. Juris., sect. 1361; Bateman v. Willoe, 1 Soli. & Lep. 201; French v. Shatton, 79 Mo. 560. III. The party seeking equitable relief must show that he himself has not been in default, and has pursued his legal remedies. 2 Pom. Eq. Jur., sects. 871, 838 ; Pettes v. Bank, 17 Vt. 435 ; Railroad r. Holbrook., 92 111. 297; Lyme v. Allen, 51 N. EL 442; Miller v. Bernecker, 46 Mo. 194. IV. The case of Byerly v. JDonlin (72 Mo. 270), does-not support the claim made by plaintiffs. V. The petition is defective. The facts constituting the alleged mistake are not stated as required by the rules of pleading. Smith v. Sims, 77 Mo. 269.