Summary
Before Gary, J., Union, , 189 .
Action by J. G. Long, as sheriff of Union County, against E. P. McKissick, as administrator of I. G. McKissick, for the amount of a bid by I. G. McKissick for a tract of land. The following is so much of the charge as is necessary:
Now, I charge you as matter of law that where land is sold under an execution regularly issued, and the legal formalities have been observed by the sheriff, and the bidder at such sale has the land struck off or knocked down to him, and an entry of such bid is entered in the salebook which is required by law to be kept by the sheriff, and such bidder refuses or declines to comply with his said bid, the sheriff has one of two courses to pursue: he has a right, under the law, to resell the premises at the risk of this defaulting purchaser, or he has the right to bring his suit against him for the amount of his bid. Now, your first inquiry will be, did Mr. McKissick bid at that sale? Was he the last and highest bidder, and did the sheriff accept his bid? If so, did he decline to give the sheriff the name of the party for whom he was bidding; if he did refuse to disclose the name of his principal, or for whom he was bidding, he was individually liable, and the sheriff had a right, under the law, to sue him for the amount of the bid, • or he had a right to resell the premises at his risk, and hold him responsible for the difference in what the land brought at the second sale and what it was bid off for at the first sale. It is contended by the defendant as a defense to this that he incurred no personal liability, by reason of the fact that he was bidding for some one else. Then it is his duty when the sheriff requested of him to know for whom he was bidding, if he was bidding for any one else, to disclose the fact; and if he failed to disclose the fact, and the sheriff accepted and entered his bid in the book for that purpose, he became personally liable to the amount of that bid, and interest on the same to the present time. That law has been recently settled that I have announced to you, in a recent case that went up from my town. You know some of the litigants, possibly. Lieutenant Governor Timmerman was the president of what he conceived to be a fire insurance company, and they had an organization in Edgefield under that name, and he, as president of that insurance company, issued a policy of insurance to a member of the company, and signed his name to it, “W. H. Timmerman, president,” putting the word “president” after his name. It afterwards developed that the insurance company had no legal existence; although he thought at the time that he issued his policy that he represented the president of the insurance company, it was afterwards developed, as I stated, that the company had no legal existence. A loss occurred under that policy, and a member’s premises were insured and destroyed by fire, and he brought a suit against Dr. Tim-merman for the amount of the value of the policy. The defense was set up that Dr. Timmerman was not liable individually, for the reason that he acted in a representative capacity — that is, as president of this company; and the Circuit Judge instructed the jury as I am going to read to you now, and those instructions were carried to the Supreme Court, and as late as last May they confirmed what was said to the jury in that case, Judge Earle being the Judge, and • settled it as the law of South Carolina; and that I am going to give you as a law, irrespective of any personal feeling or preference that I might have in this case, for I am free to admit to you that if I were allowed to have personal preferences, my preference would be for the defendant in this case, because they were my personal friends, but the law does not sanction such relation in administering justice; the law, as I have stated, is inflexible, and I am to give it to you as I conceive it to be, irrespective of the consequences, and you are expected to find a verdict in accordance with the law and the facts, irrespective of the consequences of your verdict. Now, here is what the Circuit Judge charged the jury in that case: “Did they sign a paper called a policy of insurance, and take his money and deliver him that policy under those circumstances, that led him to believe he was taking out a policy of insurance in a corporation, then I charge that whenever one as an agent assumes to act as another, and that other was not authorized himself to do the act, the agent is personally liable. The law requires every one, when he assumes to act for another, to disclose his principal, to say who his principal is, and if he does not do it, and you make a contract with him, you can sue him, you make him individually liable.” Now, did Mr. McKissick decline or refuse to give the name of his principal to the sheriff? If so, he was individually liable for that bid.
Now, I charge you further, that at sheriff’s sales there is no warranty either as to the title or the amount of property sold, and you readily see the reason: that sheriff’s sales differ from other sales — private sales or sales by the Court — in this particular, at a sheriff’s sale they do not sell the land advertised to sell, although that is a common acceptation, but they simply sell what interest in that land the judgment debtor has; and if you buy his interest, and it afterwards develops that he has none, you are still liable on your bid, because you have offered so much for his interest in open market, and it is for you to determine before you bid what his interest is worth. Now, even if it should appear that at a sheriff’s sale one has bought the interest of the judgment debtor in a certain tract of land and paid his money for it, and then suit is brought to recover the land, and he is defeated in the suit, he has no right to recover his money back, because he has paid that much for the interest that this particular judgment debtor had in that tract of land; therefore, there is no warranty in a. sheriff’s sale either as to the title or as to the amount of land bought, because, as I told you, you are not selling the land, but selling the interest of the judgment debtor in that particular tract of land, and if it develops that he has no interest in it, why you are still liable for your bid; and that is why it is that sheriff’s sales, as a common rule, are said to be somewhat shaky. If you go-to a private individual and contract for the sale of so many acres of land, and you pay him his money, and it develops that he has not got that land, why you can go on him and recover the money, because you bought the land; but at a sheriff’s sale, as I have already stated to you, you buy the interest of the man, and it is for you to determine before you bid how much his interest is worth to you.
Now, this looks to me like it is a very plain case. There are no complications, either of law or serious complications, as I take it, of fact. If the sheriff regularly advertised that land, did he sell it in the regular form prescribed by law, in open, public, fair sale? If so, Mr. McKissick bid it off, and said, “charge it to me as attorney,” and does not disclose for whom he is attorney, that would bind him. Fraud is not necessary — he need not have been acting fraudulently; that was the point that counsel made for Dr. Timmerman — that here was an old gentleman who bona fide believed that he was the president of an insurance company, and that he was incapable of committing fraud, and here is what the Supreme Court says upon that, through the Chief Justice, who delivered the opinion in this case: “The Court takes pleasure in saying that the evidence does not justify any imputation of moral fraud or intentional wrong on the part of the defendant, and, indeed, we do not understand that any such imputation is made; but, under the principles laid down in the case above stated, in which cases of the highest authority elsewhere are reviewed, we must hold that the absence of moral fraud or intentional wrong-doing on the part of the defendant is not sufficient to relieve him from liability.” That is the law of the case; that is the law of this State— that is the elementary law. If it were otherwise, a judgment creditor could never sell and collect his debts; if the purchaser were permitted to go to the sheriff’s office when he was crying a sale and say, charge that to me — “attorney,” “doctor” or “agent” — and the agent was not disclosed, and he did not comply, that is a postponement of the sale, the administration of the law to enforce the collection of debts would be blocked in a measure; and hence it is, when parties go to a public sale and they bid at it, they are individually responsible for their bids, unless they state to the sheriff for whom they are bidding; and that is a wise provision of the law, because the sheriff might say, “That party is irresponsible, I wont credit him with this, but I will put up the place and cry it over,’’.and he would cry it over; and it is for that reason that in sheriff’s sales the name of the real purchaser should be disclosed, and if the parties fail to disclose the true principal, they themselves assume the payment of the bid; and the sheriff would have a right, and it would be his duty, either to sue on the bid or put it up and resell it, and then sue for the difference, if there was a difference, in the bid originally and on the second sale — that would be the measure of damages.
The defendant requests the Court to charge the jury:
First. “If the jury find that the plaintiff knew that the defendant’s intestate was bidding for another person, and understood him to refuse to bind himself individually or personally, the verdict should be for the defendant.” I charge you that as law, with this qualification, that if the sheriff asked the question for whom he was bidding, and he declined to give the name of his principal, that would bind him, and he would be bound by the bid, as I have already charged you.
Second. “That if the jury find that the defendant’s intestate did not intend to contract in his personal and individual capacity, but only in his representative capacity, as attorney for another, and the plaintiff knew it, and accepted his offer or bid made in the latter capacity, the defendant’s intestate incurred no personal or individual liability, and the verdict should be for the defendant.” I charge you that is law. What was the contract between the parties? The law presumes a contract when one individual bids at a sheriff’s sale and the sheriff accepts it, that it is a contract — the contract being that “I will pay you so much money and you will give me a deed to that tract of land.”
Third. “That a contract presupposes a meeting of minds, and if the minds of the plaintiff and of the defendant’s intestate did not meet as to the sale, there was no contract, and the verdict should be for the defendant.” With that same qualification that I have indicated all the way through, that if the sheriff asked the question for whom are you bidding, and he does not give it, the sheriff could not charge any one else but the party who bid, if he refused to tell or disclose the name of the person for whom he is bidding.
Fourth. “That the plaintiff has brought his action as upon a contract; that the liability of the defendant’s intestate, if liable at all, was in an action for damages and not in an action upon a contract, unless the jury find that the minds of the parties met upon a contract.” I charge you that the sheriff had a right to bring this action upon that bid. The law, as I say, would imply that there was a contract between the parties; Mr. McKissick by his bid would agree to give so much for the land, and the sheriff as the officer of the law would agree to make a deed to it, or the interest of this party in it. That is a contract.
Fifth. “If the jury find that the defendant’s intestate refuse to contract in his individual capacity, and that the plaintiff understood that he did not intend to contract in his individual capacity, but that he refused to so contract, that he incurred no personal liability, and the verdict should be for the defendant.” That I charge you is the law. If the sheriff knew McKissick was not bidding in his individual capacity, and he knew for whom he was bidding, the agency was disclosed — why then the bid would be the bid of the principal and not the bid of Mr. McKissick.
Sixth. “Before plaintiff can recover, it is necessary for him to show a valid judgment which was a lien upon the land of Joseph Kelly, and the roll introduced by the plaintiff does not contain a judgment which would constitute a lien upon the land of Joseph Kelly unless it was entered in the judgment book; and unless the jury find from the evidence that the judgment was so entered, no lien was obtained upon the land of Joseph Kelly, and no valid sale would have been made without such lien.” That I refuse to charge.
Seventh. “The plaintiff cannot recover unless he has proved that the land was sold under a valid judgment which was a lien upon the land of Joseph Kelly, and that before a judgment or decree of the Court becomes a lien upon land it must have been entered in the abstract of judgments, and if the plaintiff has failed to show that the judgment was so entered, he cannot recover.” I think that is the law: before a judgment becomes a lien it must be regularly entered in the book down here, the levy must be made and advertised; those are the links in the chain of title of the purchaser. At a sheriff’s sale, he must show the judgment, execution, show that it was advertised, and must show that it was sold. That is necessary. You have heard the testimony on that point.
Mr. Hydrick: I wish to make a point. By the Court: I don’t care to hear any’ more points. That is what I conceive to be the law of the case. Take the record. If you find for the plaintiff, say, “We find for the plaintiff the lands in dispute.” If you find for the defendant, simply say, “We find for the defendant,” sign your name, and put the word “foreman” under your name.
Foreman of the jury: In regard to the acreage of the land, does it make any difference; it was advertised 393 acres, more or less, and the tract only contained 243 acres, I think. Has that anything to do with it, whether the party might have been misled by the acreage at that time? By the Court: I undertook to explain that in this way: That at a sheriff’s sale there is no warranty as to the number of acres or as to the validity of the title; that the number of acres is put in it as describing a particular lot or a particular plantation — it is simply descriptive of the plantation which is being sold; and if that tract is being sold, the sheriff does not warrant in that sale that that tract contains the number of acres that it is said to contain, but he simply says, “The interest of the judgment debtor in a certain plantation, containing so many acres, more or less” — it is to give the bidder a description of what land the interest of the judgment debtor is being sold in. So, as I say, there is no warrant by the sheriff that it contains that many acres of land. Now, the question frequently comes up in this way: That where land is sold for so much per acre, if he had advertised it to be sold at so much per acre and it had been bought on the assumption that there was that many acres in it, that would have been an injustice to the bidder; but where it is not sold by the acre, but sold in bulk as containing so many acres, the sheriff does not warrant that it does contain that number of acres.
Mr. Munro: You charge two requests in our favor, and we think those requests decisive of the question, because we say there is no proof; it is for the jury, however, to say whether there was any proof; we think those two requests are decisive of the case, and I don’t think the jury heard your Honor. Mr. Hydrick: That is the point I wanted to state. By the Court: I ask the jury if they heard'it; I am a little hoarse. Foreman: I would like to hear them read again. If we find for the plaintiff, do we have to find interest from the time of the sale? By the Court: Yes, seven per cent., legal rate of interest. I wish to correct what I said as to the form of your verdict. I told jmu, if you find for the plaintiff, to find for the land. If you find for the plaintiff, you find the amount of the bid, with interest from the date of sale. If you find for the defendant, you say: “We find for the defendant.”
Mr. Munro: The fifth and seventh. By the Court: “Before plaintiff can recover, it is necessary for him to show a valid judgment which was a lien upon the land of Joseph Kelly, and that the roll introduced by plaintiff does not contain a judgment.” That I positively refuse to charge.
Mr. Munro: The fifth and seventh. By the Court: “If the jury find that the defendant’s intestate refuses to contract in his individual capacity, and that the plaintiff understood that he did not intend to contract in his individual capacity, but that he refused to so contract, then he incurred no personal liability’', and the verdict should be for the defendant.” That, as I say, I charge you, with the modification that if it was demanded of him who his principal was, and he refused to give him, the sheriff in that position could have no one to whom he could'charge the bid, and if the party bidding then did refuse to disclose his principal, he would become personally liable on his bid.
Mr. Munro: Seventh and eighth. By the Court: “The plaintiff can not recover unless he has.proved that the land was sold under a valid judgment which was a lien upon the land of Joseph Kelly, and that before a judgment or decree of Court becomes a lien upon land, it must have been entered in the abstract of judgments; and if the plaintiff has failed to show that said judgment was so entered, he cannot recover.” That is law, as I charge you. I thought I made it plain to you that a judgment must be entered first; upon that judgment an execution must be entered; that is all necessary to the plaintiff’s chain of title; an execution is then handed to the sheriff — “lodged” with the sheriff, it is called; he then levies upon the land under that execution, advertises it and sells it; and all those formalities must be complied with before there is the authority to sell that real estate under a judgment. Mr. Munro: That book, your Honor holds, must be proven?
By the Court: Now the eighth. I refuse the eighth, on the ground that I have explained to you in reference to that as fully as I think it necessary; I think you understand it. Mr. Wallace: May I speak? I would like to, if your Honor will allow me. The judgment while it has to be be entered— By the Court: No, I wont hear you on that. Take the record, Mr. Foreman and gentlemen of the jury, and find a verdict; write your verdict on the complaint. Mr. Wallace: We will take a nonsuit. Mr. Munro: We object. By the Court: I don’t think you can take it at this stage.
The jury came out for information. By the Court: Have you agreed upon your verdict? Foreman: No, sir; one of the jurors asked me to request you to state whether the law requires that Col. McKissick give the name right then and there at that time. By the Court: It requires him to disclose it before the entry is made in the sheriff’s book — that is the contract, that is accepting the bid; when he bids off and he enters in the sheriff’s book, that is the trade, that is the contract, that is the consummation of the contract; and when he says, “Charge it to me as attorney,” if he said that, that was a contract with the party, and if he fails to disclose his principal before that bid was accepted in that condition, he would be personally liable. Mr. Munro: Would your Honor object to instructing the jury that if no evidence has been offered of entering the judgment in the book of abstracts— By the Court: No, sir; because I don’t think that it is material in this case, for this reason: it is not set up as one of the defenses in the answer. Mr. Munro: We deny it. By the Court: You don’t set up that as one of the specific defenses in the answer, and I don’t see how the jury— Mr. Munro: Let me remind your Honor, we deny that there is any record of judgment, and, therefore, he is bound to prove it. Foreman: The jury wanted to know whether the sheriff makes his entry right there at the spot of sale on his book. By the Court: Yes, that is law. The law requires of the sheriff that when he makes a sale of a tract of land he shall have a sales book or a book of sales, in which he is required by law to enter these sales, and while they are out on the steps what is known as a memorandum book that they carry there — the Supreme Court have decided that an entry in that book is simply for the convenience of the sheriff. He must enter in this book of sales, and when that is done that is a memorandum in writing of the contract. It is law with reference to trades in real estate that no agreement, verbal agreement, between parties in reference to the sale of land is binding on the parties; therefore, it must be a written memorandum when it comes to lands. If you make a trade with reference to lands, there must be a written memorandum. The courts have held that the entry in the sheriff’s book is the written memorandum of that sale with reference to real estate, and when that is entered there, that is the consummation of the contract of purchase. Mr. Munro: It is alleged in the complaint that judgment was entered on the abstract of judgments, and we deny it. By the Court: I charge the jury this: That the judgmant roll about which there is so much contention here, is sufficient proof of the existence of the judgment; the complaints and those papers which were offered there is a sufficient proof of the judgment to sustain a sale under.
The defendant requested the Court to charge the seven propositions of law as contained and set forth in his Honor’s charge, and also an eighth request to charge, which was as follows: “The plaintiff had the right to treat and contract with I. G. McKissick in his representative' capacity even though I. G. McKissick declined to give the name of the person whom he represented, and if plaintiff elected to treat and contract with I. G. McKissick in his representative capacity after he had declined and refused to treat and contract in his individual capacity and to give the name of the person for whom he was contracting — trusting that I. G. McKissick would in due time give him the name of the person for whom he was contracting — the plaintiff could not afterwards recover of I. G. McKissick in his individual capacity, if he afterwards, in due time, disclosed his true principal, and if said principal was not insolvent.”
The jury found a verdict for the plaintiff From the judgment entered thereon the defendant appeals, on the ground that his Honor, the presiding Judge, erred in overruling defendant’s demurrer to the complaint on the ground that it does not state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action.
First. Because it appears upon the face of the complaint that there was no meeting of the minds of the plaintiff and the defendant intestate upon any contract upon which the defendant’s intestate is bound in his individual capacity, and because it appears that the plaintiff elected to treat and did treat and contract with the defendant’s intestate in his representative capacity, as the attorney for another, and it is not alleged that he treated or contracted with him in his individual capacity, or that he did not in his representative capacity make a valid binding contract for a solvent principal.
Second. Because it appears upon the face of the complaint that the defendant’s intestate contracted only in his representative capacity as the attorney for another, and he can not be made liable in his individual capacity in this action upon such contract.
Third. In admitting in evidence the sheriff’s sales book, when it appeared that said book was not the book in which the original entry and memorandum of the sales had been made by the plaintiff.
Fourth. In charging the jury if the defendant’s intestate was the highest and last bidder at the sale, and if his bid was accepted and he declined to give the name of the person for whom he was bidding, he was individually liable.
Fifth. In charging the jury that the law as laid down in the case of Lagronev. Timmerman, 46 S. C., 372, is the law applicable to this case.
Sixth. In charging the jury: “Now, did Mr. McKissick decline or refuse to give the name of his principal to the sheriff? If so, he was individually liable for that bid.”
Seventh. In charging the jury as follows: “Now, I charge you further that at sheriff’s sales there is no warranty either as to the title or as to the amount of property sold, and you readily see the reason that sheriff’s sales differ from other sales, private sales or sales by the Court, in this particular: at a sheriff’s sale they do not sell the land advertised to sell, although that is a common acceptation, but they simply sell what interest in that land the judgment debtor has.”
Eighth. In charging the jury as follows: “Now this looks to me like it is a very plain case. There are no complications either of law or serious complications, as I take it, of fact. If the sheriff regularly advertised that land, did he sell it in the regular form prescribed by law, in open, public, fair sale? If so, Mr. McKissick bid it off, and says, ‘charge it to me as attorney,’ and does not disclose for whom he is attorney, that would bind him.”
Ninth. In not charging the defendant’s request to charge number one (to wit: if the jury finds that the plaintiff knew that the defendant’s intestate was bidding for another person, and understood him to refuse to bind himself individually or personally, the verdict- should be for the defendant), without the following qualifications, to wit: “I charge you that this is lafv, with this qualification, that if the sheriff asked the question for whom he was bidding and he declined to give the name of his principal, that would bind him, he would be bound by the bid, as I have already charged you.”
Tenth. In qualifying the defendant’s request to charge, numbered three, to wit: 3d. “That a contract presupposes a meeting of minds, and if the minds of the plaintiff and of the defendant’s intestate did not meet as to the sale, there was no contract, and the verdict should be for the defendant.” By saying: “With that same qualification that I have indicated all the way through, that if the sheriff asked the question, for whom are you bidding? and he does not give it, the sheriff could not charge any one else but the party who bid, if he refused to tell or disclose the name of the person for whom he was bidding.”-
Eleventh. In refusing to charge the defendant’s request to charge numbered four, to wit: 4th. “That the plaintiff has brought this action as upon a contract; that the liability of the defendant’s intestate, if liable at all, was in an action for damages and not in an action upon a contract, unless the jury find that the minds of the parties met upon a contract. I charge you that the sheriff had a right to bring this action upon that bid. The law, as I say, would imply that there was a contract between the parties. Mr. McKissick by his bid would agree to give so much for the land, and the sheriff as the officer of the law would agree to make a deed of it, or the interest of this party in it. That is a contract.”
Twelfth. In qualifying the defendant’s request to charge numbered five, to wit: 5th. “If the jury find that the defendant’s intestate refused to contract in his individual capacity, and that the plaintiff understood that he did not intend to contract in his individual capacity, but that he refused to so contract, that he incurred no personal liability, and the verdict should be for the defendant,” by adding the following: “If the sheriff knew that McKissick was not bidding in his individual capacity, and he knew for whom he was bidding, the agency was disclosed, why then the bid would be the bid of the principal and not the bid of Mr. McKissick;” and by further modifying said request, when reading the same over a second time to the jury, by saying: “If it was demanded of him who his principal was and he refused to give him, the sheriff in that position could have no one to whom he could charge the bid, and if the party bidding then did refuse to disclose his principal, he would become personally liable on his bid.”
Thirteenth. In refusing to charge the defendant’s request to charge numbered six, to wit: “Before plaintiff can recover, it is necessary for him to show a valid judgment which was a lien upon the land of Joseph Kelly, and the roll introduced by plaintiff does not contain a judgment which would constitute a lien upon the land of Joseph Kelly unless it was entered in the judgment- book, and unless the jury find from the evidence that the judgment was so entered, no lien was obtained on the land of Joseph Kelly, and no valid sale could have been made without such lien.”
Fourteenth. In charging in response to the following inquiry from the foreman of the jury, to wit: “In regard to the acreage of the land, does it make any difference if it was advertised 393 acres, more or less, and the tract only contained 243 acres, I think. Has that anything to do with it, whether the party might have been misled by the acreage at that time?” as follows: “at a sheriff’s sale there is no warranty as to tfie number of acres or as to the validity of the title; that the number of acres is put in it as describing a particular lot or particular plantation — it is simply descriptive of the plantation which is being sold, and if that tract is being sold, the sheriff does not warrant in that sale that that tract contains the number of acres that it is said to contain, but he simply says: the interest of the judgment debtor in a certain plantation, containing so many acres, more or less — it is to give to the bidder a description of what land the interest of the judgment debtor is being sold in.”
Fifteenth. In refusing to charge the defendant’s request to the charge numbered eight, which was as follows: “The plaintiff had the right to treat and contract with I. G. Mc-Kissick in his representative capacity, even though I. G. McKissick declined to give the name of the person whom he represented; and if plaintiff elected to treat and contract with I. G. McKissick in his representative capacity after he had declined and refused to treat and contract in his individual capacity and to give the name of the person for whom he was contracting — trusting that I. G. McKissick would in due time give him the name of the person for whom he was contracting — the plaintiff could not afterward recover of I. G. McKissick in his individual capacity, if he afterwards in due time disclosed his true principal, and if said principal was not insolvent.”
Sixteenth. In charging that the law required that defendant’s intestate should disclose the name of his principal before the entry is made in the sheriff’s book, to avoid personal liability.
Seventeenth. In charging the jury as follows: “I charge the jury this: that the judgment roll about which there was so much contention here is sufficient proof of the existence of the judgment; the complaints and those papers which were offered there is a sufficient proof of the judgment to sustain a sale under.”
The latter cite: Memorandum best evidence of sale: 1 Rich., 407. Rule that agent is bound if does not disclose principal, does not always apply: McC., 395; 1 Rich., 504, 506; 36 S. C., 551. Error to charge a correct principle inapplicable to case: 15 S. C., 93. Judgment book evidence of judgment: Rev. Stat., 783; Code, 302, sub. 1, 2; 10 S. C., 278; 19 S. C., 507. Charge on fact: 39 S. C., 281; Code, 300, 301.
cites: Entry in sale book proper evidence of sale: 1 McM., 255; 4 Strob., 213; 1 Rich., 410; 2 Hill Ch., 580; 11 Rich., 396. Bidder held personally zmless he disclose his principal: 4 Strob., 213; 1 McM., 255; 5 Cush., 210; 12 Ves. Jr., 349; 8 M. & W., 834. No warranty of acres when sold in bulk: 4 McC., 434; Harper, 290; 13 S. C., 210; 35 S. C., 405. Charge: 47 S. C., 513. Roll sufficient evidence of judgment: 1 Hill Ch., 369; Code, 289, 310; 13 S. G., 254; 12 Met., 363.
Syllabus and headnotes are prepared by the reporter or publisher, not the court, and are not part of the opinion.
