Minnehaha County v. Boyce

1. Limitation of Actions — Support of Insane Persons — Liability of lístate — When Statute Begins to Bun — Construction of Statute. Under Laws 1895, ch. 98 (Pol. Code, Sec. 544,) concerning maintenance of insane persons in the hospital for insane, out of the estate of such person, and exempting such estate, as to dependent heirs, from liability therefor, and concerning sale of property of such estate to provide a fund for payment of charges incurred by a .county for treatment and such maintenance, held, that no cause of action accrued to the county for such maintenance until her death; that the statute of limitations did not commence to run against the county on its claim against the state for such charges incurred until an action would lie to enforce such claim; that, gathering the1 legislative intent from the language andc general purpose of that section, it was the intent not to demand payment out of an “estate” upon which certain heirs might be dependent for support, and not to appropriate any property of such insane person during her life; and, held, further, that not until her death did an “estate” exist which matured the statutory liability; and the trial court erred in holding that payments made by plaintiff county, for such maintenance, more than six years before her death, were barred by the statute of limitations. 2. Insane Persons — Liability of “Estate” for Maintenance — Dependent “Heirs.” Under Laws 1895, ch. .8 (Pol. Code, Sec. 544,) .providing for and limiting the liability of the estate of an insane person for maintenance in the hospital for insane, and containing a proviso exempting the estate from such liability as to the interest of dependent heirs resident in the United States, held, that the statute does not exempt the whole estate where only part of the heirs were dependent on the insane person; the term “estate,” as used therein, not being equivalent to “property,” and the words “heirs dependent” mot being equivalent to "persons dependent,” etc.; and.where only one heir was sa dependent, the remainder of the estate left after such insane person’s death was liable to county’s claim for maintenance. Haney, J., dissenting.

Appeal from Circuit 'Court, Minnehaha County. Hon. Joseph W. Jones, Judge. Action by Minnehaha County against J. W. Boyce, administrator of the estate of Anna C. Phillips, deceased, to recover for the amount paid out by plaintiff for treatment and maintenance of deceased as a patient in the State Hospital for the Insane. From a judgment in part for plaintiff, and from air order denying a new trial, it appeals. It will be seen from' an examination of Secs. 544, 532, 336, 538 and Subd. 2 of Sec. 2137, Pol. Code, that after such indebtedness has been incurred by a county, it will require several months’ time for it to collect and pay the same, if -the statutory method is pursued. But Minnehaha county, in common with other counties in the state, anticipates the amount of money that may be required annually to pay for its insane patients in the state hospital, by providing a fund for that purpose every year in its estimates of county expenses in the .tax levy for the next year. So. the hills of the state auditor are paid promptly upon presentation each quarter. Still, these accounts must naturally overlap each other as to time, and when one quarter has been paid for, another has begun to run, and while a person is confined in the asylum his account is constantly running against the county and there is no space of time when the county is free from debt on his account. Especially will this be .true when pa}rments are made but once a year, which is all the law requires. This account between the county and the state is obviously a continuous and continuing one, beginning with the sending of the insane person to the hospital, and ending with her death, discharge or removal. In the case at bar, Anna C. Phillips was an insane patient in the state hospital for seven years continuously. The payments made for her by Minnehaha county, while thus cared for, constitute the account between the county and the state, the payment of which by the county is made obligatory upon it by the laws of the state. Neither the personal representative nor the family of.the insane person had anything- to do therewith, either as to the amount or time of payment. The county could not terminate the obligation or. prevent the account from running, and it must continue to run until the death or removal of the patient. The obligation of her estate to now reimburse the county for this expense is a single one, based upon the total amount that had been paid out by the county when its duty ceased. And this obligation does not rest alone upon the dealings between the county and the state as to how and when the county paid -the state, but upon the existence of an indebtedness as a whole, validated by law as a claim against the estate. There exists but one right to a recovery for the whole, subject to the other provisions of the -statute. See Miner v. Howard, 93 Mo. 569, 67 S. W. Rep. 692. The plaintiff contends that the statute of limitations applying to an action upon a liability created by statute, cannot be held to begin running until the entire -amount of the liability has been established, and that the -statute is not applicable to any part of ■the claim herein sued upon. Whether we figure the date of death of Anna C. Phillips, or the time she left -th-e hospital, as the termination -of the county’-s liability for her proper care, this action was brought -in sufficient time to bring the entire claim within the statute. But the statute under which this action is brought does not fix any time when recovery may be h-ad, except at the death of the insane person. Allen v. Stephens, 102 Ga. 596, 29 S-. E. Rep. 443; Gilbert v. Taylor, 148 N. Y. 298, 42 N. E. Rep. 713- No real property of the insane person could -be sold during her lifetime, under law; and the proceeds of any personal property sold must be invested by the county judge for her benefit. Presumably such investment shall continue until -her -death. What attack the county could make upon any cash, that the guardian might have belonging to the estate, the law does not provide. It is a fair conclusion to draw from the statute, that the law contemplates and intends that the estate of an insane person shall remain intact, as near as may be, until the person’s death. Such interpretation of the law will certainly make the county’s claim an entire one, the final amount of which is to be satisfied out of the estate of the insane person upon death. Where a party’s right depends upon the happening of a certain event in the future, the cause of action accrues and the statute of limitations begins to run only from, the time when the event happens. 25 Cyc. 1067, and cases cited- in notes. These charges of a county in insanity cases often -cover a long period of time. Must the county bring an action every six years and place its claim in judgment in order to be protected against the running of the statute of limitations ? Such course will ■bring on a multiplicity of suits, which is not favored in law, and subject an estate to unnecessary expenses for attorney fees and costs. In the case at bar, two actions would have to have been brought instead of one. So the estate is benefitted by making but one claim. And the judgment or judgments obtained 'by the county in the interim of the patient’s confinement in the state hospital would -be of no benefit to it, but must remain unsatisfied until such time as the estate can be reached for their collection. It cannot be that the law contemplates this, or will permit it. Walker v. Goodrich, 16 Ill. 341; Lamb v. Hanneman, 40 Iowa 41, 43; Moser v. Crooks, 32 Iowa 172, 176; Miller v. Armstrong, 123 Iowa 86, 98 N. W. Rep. 561; Say ward v. Dexter, 72 Fed. Rep. 758; Toland v. Sprague, 12 Pet. 300; Spring v. Gray, 6 Pet. 156; Kellar v. Jackson, 58 Iowa, 629; Union Bank v. Knapp, 6 Pick. 96; Ramchander v. Hammond, 2 Johns. 200; Gill v. Waterhouse, (Wash.-) 175 Fed. Rep. 803; Frankoviz v. Smith, et al. (Minn.) 26 N. W. 225; Big Hlorn Lumber Co. v. Davis, 14 Wyo. 455; 7 Am. & Eng. Ann. Cases, 947, note; Skyrme v. Occidental Mill Co., 8 Nev. 219; See also: O’Leary v. Burns, 53 Miss. 171; Sch-meiding v. Ewing, 57 Mo. 78; Ring v. Jamison-, 2 Mo. App. affirmed in 66 Mo. 424; Wendling v. Bessemer, 31 Iowa, 248; Jackson v. Mull, 6 Wyo. 55, 42 Pac. Rep. 603; Carroll v. McCoy, 40 Iowa, 38; Beeler v. Tinnel; 85 Mo. App. 438; Waldron v. Alexander, 35 Ill. App. 319; Graves v. Pemberton (Ind. App.) 29 N. E. 7; Carter v. Carter, 36 Mich. 207; Taggart v. Tevanny (Ind. App.) 27 N. E. 511; Knight v. Knight (Ind. App.) 33 N. K. 456; Purviance v. Purviance (Inti.- App.) 42 N E. 364; Crampton v. Logan (Ind. App.) .63 N. E. 51; Morrisey v. Faucett (Wash) 68 Pac. 352;. Ah Hfow v. Furth (Wash.) 43 Pac. 639; Moore v. Renick, 95 Mo. App: 202, 68 S. W. 936; Catholic Bishop ■of Chicago¡ v. Bauer, 62 Ill. 188; Eliot v. Lawton, 89 Mass. (7 Allen) 274; Phelps v. Patterson, 25 Ark.-185; Hancock v. Pio-Pico, 47. Cal. 161; Walker v. Goodrich, 16 Ill. (6 Peck) 341; AVells v. Town of Salina, 71 Hun (N. Y.) 559; Jones v. Lewis, 11 Tex. 359; Leake v. City of Cleburne, (Tex. Civ. App.) 36 S. W. 97; Noble v. Bellows, 53 Vt. ■ 527; Rowan v. Chenoweth (W. Ya.) 38 S. E. 544; McHarry v. Irvin’s Ex’-r, 85 Ky. 322, 3 S. W. 374; Cole v. Baker, (S. D.) 91 N. W. 324; McPherson v. Swift, 22 S. D. 165. Quantum of estate liable is 'subject to payment of entire claim established. There are seven heirs to the estate of said insane person, Anna C. Phillips, deceased, all of whom inherit equally, taking one-seventh part each. It is admitted, and so found by the court, that the part of the estate to which one of the heirs, Plattie C. Phillips, succeeds, is not liable in this action, as she has been found to be dependent upon the estate for her support. The other six heirs are liable. The findings of fact herein establishes the fact tha! they are not dependent upon the estate of said insane person for support. The circuit court decided that only six-sevenths part of the claim of Minnehaha County herein could be collected from the estate by law. - This conclusion of the court is clearly erroneous. While one-seventh part of the estate cannot be' touched for the collection of this debt, the remaining sixth-sevenths part is certainly liable for the payment of the whole thereof. The six heirs who are not exempt-from the operation of Sec. S44, Political Code, which imposes the liability herein, can make no objection to its collection, and in fact do not make any objection. So, whatever sum is found due and -payable for the support of the insane relative, whether the whole sum demanded or the part thereof not excluded by limitation, is a charge in full upon the certain portion of the estate belonging to' the heirs who are not ■exempted by the statute from bearing this obligation. It is undisputed that plaintiff must recover, if at all, by virtue of the provisions of Section 544 of the Political Code, which reads as follows: “The amount incurred by any County of this State for -treatment and maintenance of any insane person in the hospital for the insane shall be a charge against the estate of such insane person. Provided, that the insane person has no heirs within the United States -dependent on said estate for support, and that no real property shall be sold during the life of the insane person; and further, Provided, that no personal property shall be sold under five years from the date of the sending of such person to the asylum, unless by order of the court on the death of the insane person or when such property is liable to deteriorate in value during the time above specified, and when sold as above the county judge shall -safely invest the proceeds thereof for the benefit of the insane person.” The trial court took the view that, inasmuch as there were six heirs who are not dependent and one dependent heir, the estate was in effect -divided into seven parts, six of which would be liable, each for the prorata share of the claim and -that the seventh, belonging -to the dependent heir, would not be liable. It seems clear to us that the trial court has construed this section as though i-t read, “The amount incurred by any County of this State for -treatment and maintenance -of any insane person in a hospital for the insane shall be a charge against the heirs of such insane person to.the extent of the amount inherited from the estate by each heir.” It is evident that the legislature did not intend -that any part of the expenses incurred by the County should be taken from the estate in -such a way as to decrease the amount which would be inherited -by the -dependent heir. The -County is given the right to he re-imbursed -out of the -estate of the insane person provided there are no dependent heirs. Th claim of the County is against the estate, and, if the julgment of the trial court is allowed to stand, it must be paid by the administrator out of the estate, and the entire estate will be thereby diminished by the amount of such payment and the share of the dependent heir will be -diminished in exactly the same proportion as -the shares of the -heirs not dependent. The language -of the -statute makes no exception; the proviso- applies to the én-tire claim. The statute makes the amount paid by the County a charge against the estate, if the insane person has no heirs dependent on the estate for support. If there is no dependent heir the payment is made a charge upon the estate. If there is a dependent heir there can be no charge. This is the plain meaning of the proviso. If the legislature had intended that non-dependent heirs should pay pro rata or that the entire claim should be paid out of the shares of the non-dependent heirs, it could easily have said so. Statute of limitations. The trial court held that all items paid by the County prior ■to a date six years before the death of the insane person are barred by the statute of limitations. This finding the plaintiff assigns as error. The sole question therefore, as far as this assignment is concerned, is, when does the statute of limitations begin to run upon the several items in this account. The defendant contends that the statute commenced to run on each- item at the time it was paid by the County. Sections 60, 64, Code of Civil Procedure; Section 544 of the Political Code. The first question to Consider is whether, apart from the peculiar provisions of Section 544, the statute of limitations would run against the separate items of the account sued upon from the time of their payment by the County. . This question has been decided by this court in the case of McArthur v. McCoy, 112 N. W. 155; 21 S. D. 314. Our statutes were taken from New York and are identical with those of California. It would not seem necessary to cite authorities in view of the construction already adopted by this court, but, since appellant has cited numerous authorities, we cite the following from New York and California holding that the statute begins to run from the date of each item: In Re Gardner, 9 N. E. 306 (N. Y.); Davis v. Gerton, 16 N. Y. 255; Gilbert v. Comstock, 93 N. Y. 484; Adams v. Ft. Plain Bank, 36 N. Y. 255; Greene v. Disbrow, 79 N. Y. 1; Norton v. Larco, 30 Cal. 127. The statute, under Sections 59 and 60 must begin to run on items in unilateral accounts at the time each item of indebtedness .is incurred. . Section 544 makes the amount incurred by the county a charge against the estate of the insane person, without limitation as to time when the amount paid shall become a charge, hence each item is due at the time it is paid by the county, unless this construction would be changed by the provisos. The first proviso is that no real property shall be sold during the life of the insane person. This makes it perfectly clear that the word estate, as used in the section, refers to the property 'of the insane person during his lifetime, for, if the claim was only against the estate of deceased insane persons, there would be no necessity for the proviso, that no real property should be sold during the life of the insane person. This construction is strengthened by the second proviso, “That no personal property shall be sold under five years from the date of sending such person to the asylum,” except under certain conditions. The Legislature has in both these provisos plainly intended not to extend the time of maturity of the claim, but only to provide the time within which property may be sold upon execution to satisfy the claim. Neither of these provisos extends the time of maturity of the several accounts. It thus appears perfectly plain that there is nothing in Section 544 to postpone the maturity of the several items, but, on the contrary, its provisos plainly negative any such intention. It follows that the provisions of Sections 6o and 64 of the Code of Civil Procedure must determine the running of the statute of limitations on the several items of this account, and as there were clearly no reciprocal demands between the parties, no item of the account comes within the exception in Section 64 and, by the simplest process of elimination, we have excluded all possible exceptions to the provisions of Section 60, that actions upon unilateral accounts upon liabilities created by statute must be brought within six years after each item of liability is incurred. Praylor v. Sonora Mining Co., 17 Cal. 594; Millet v. Bradbury, 41 Pac. 865 (Cal.); Weatherwax v. Cosumnes Valley Mill Co., 17 Cal. 345; Santa Rosa National Bank v. Barnett, 58 Pac. 85 (Cal.); Adams v. Patterson, 35 Cal. 122. * An examination of the authorities cited by appellant will reveal the fact that any authority which would appear to be in conflict with the decision of this court in McArthur v. McCoy or with the California and New York decisions above cited was under statutes unlike 'those of South Dakota and generally, if not universally, in states where there was no provision even analogous to section 64 of our Code of 'Civil Procedure. The 'supreme court of Iowa has deckled the precise question now before this court under a statute very similar to ours, in the case of Harrison County v. Dunn, 51 N. W. 155. We agree with plaintiff’s counsel, that the court erred in deciding “that plaintiff is entitled to recover six-sevenths of the sum paid by it during said six years” for as we have shown under our first assignment the complaint of the plaintiff should have been dismissed.