Wycoff v. Snapp

Homestead—Exemption—Inheritance. 1. Under Sections 221, 226, L. O. L., exempting the homestead from judicial sale, and providing that it shall be exempt after the death of the person entitled thereto from sale for the collection of any debts for which it could not have been sold during his lifetime, but such homestead shall descend as if “death” did not exist, is to be construed as if the word “exempt” appeared in place of the word “death,” and the property descends to the' heirs subject to the widow’s right of dower, exempt from execution for the previous debts of the deceased. [As to right to make a testamentary disposition of a homestead, see note in Ann. Oas. 1914B, 271.] Homestead—Rights of Surviving Spouse—Nature of Estate—“Property.” 2. Under Sections 221, 226, L. O. L., exempting the homestead from sale after the death of the person entitled thereto for his debts, and Section 1234, authorizing the setting aside for the widow or minor children of deceased all the property of the estate exempt from execution, and declaring that the property thus set apart, if there be a widow, is “her property,” she takes a fee-simple estate in such property capable of alienation as well as of personal enjoyment. [As to suits by wives for and concerning homesteads, see note in 76 Am. Dee. 442.]

From Lane: Lawrence T. Harris, Judge. Department 2. Statement by Mr. Chief Justice McBride. This is a suit by Jesse P. Wycoff, Chester A. Wycoff, Etba May Baier, and Chauncey Wycoff and Archie This is a suit by Jesse P. Wycoff, Chester A. Wycoff, Etha May Baier, and Chauncey Wycoff and Archie The circumstances out of which this suit arose are as follows: James W. Wycoff died in 1905, leaving a widow, Emma B. Wycoff, now Emma B. Snapp, and five children, who are the plaintiffs in this suit. At the time of his death the decedent and his family were residing upon the land in dispute as a homestead, and the family continued so residing until February 28, 1908, when the County Court set apart the land to the widow, in accordance with Section 1234, L. O. L., for the use of herself and these plaintiffs. Subsequently, the widow married L. P. Snapp, and thereafter sold the premises to defendant Cook. It is charged that she has failed to use the land or the proceeds for the support of the children, but has wasted and dissipated the money received therefor; and the prayer of the complaint is that the deed to Cook be declared void and canceled. The sections of the statute bearing upon this subject are Sections 221, 226, 1234, L. O. L., which are as follows: ‘ ‘ The homestead of any family shall be exempt from judicial sale for the satisfaction of any judgment hereafter obtained. Such homestead must be the actual abode of, and owned by such family or some member thereof. * * The homestead aforesaid shall be exempt from sale on any judicial process after the death of the person entitled thereto for the collection of any debts for which the same could not have been sold during his lifetime, but such homestead shall descend as if death did not exist. * * Upon the filing of the inventory, the court or judge thereof shall make an order, setting apart, for the widow or minor children of the deceased, if any, all the property of the estate by law exempt from execution. The property thus set apart, if there he a widow, is her property, to be used or expended by her in the maintenance of herself and minor children, if any; or if there be no widow, it is the property of the minor child; or if more than one, of the minor children in equal shares, to be used or expended in the nurture and education of such child or children, by the guardian thereof, as the law directs.”