Wisner v. People ex rel. Kern

1. Public improvement—ordinance for special assessment need not state improvement is in city. An ordinance for the improvement of a designated street, purporting to be passed by the council of a certain city, sufficiently shows that the improvement is within such city, although it does not so state in terms. 2. Same—effect of ordinance directing stay of special assessment. The passage of an ordinance directing the stay of proceedings for a special assessment for a year, will not prevent judgment upon and enforcement of such assessment against a lot owner, where the council subsequently directs the letting of contracts and proceeds under the judgment of confirmation. 3. Same—several judgments for the same assessment. Two or more judgments in relation to the same assessment for a public improvement may be entered, where objections are filed to only part of the real estate assessed. Browning v. City of Chicago, 155 Ill. 314, followed. 4. Courts—two judges of the county court may hold at same time. Two judges may hold different branches of the county court in the same county at the same time. Pike v. City of Chicago, 155 Ill. 656, followed.

Appeal from the County Court of Cook county; the Hon. Prank Scales, Judge, presiding. This is an appeal from the judgment of sale rendered by the county court of Cook county, in favor of the county collector, upon the first and second delinquent installments of the assessment confirmed by the county court of Cook county on the 16th day of May, 1892, in a proceeding to assess the cost of constructing a main sewer, in accordance with the provisions of an ordinance of the city of Chicago adopted by the city council on the 14th day of March, 1892. The petition to assess the cost of said improvement was filed in the county court on the 12th day of April, 1892, and attached thereto was a certified copy of the ordinance. Commissioners to make an assessment of the cost of the improvement were appointed, who made a report, and an assessment roll was filed April 28,1892, and all the preliminary steps required by law to give the court jurisdiction of the property and persons were taken. No objections to the assessment proceedings were filed by appellant, and a default and judgment of confirmation were entered against all not objecting. The judgment order recited “that the commissioners heretofore appointed to make said assessment have complied with all the requirements of law as to posting and sending notices to the owners of the property assessed, and that due notice, as required by law, had been given of this application and of the making and return of the said assessment, and of the time for the final hearing therein, and no objection to said assessment having been filed, except as to the real estate described below,” (which did not include real estate of appellant,) “and no defense thereto made, except on behalf of the owners of the real estate for which objections have been filed, it is ordered and adjudged by the court that a default be, and it is hereby, entered against each and all of the lots, blocks, tracts and parcels of land assessed .and described in said assessment for said improvement, returned and filed in this court, to which no objections have been filed, and that said assessment, and all proceedings therein, be and the same are hereby confirmed, except as to the real estate described in objections on file,” which did not include any objections on behalf of the appellant. Subsequently, on seven different days, there were at least seven judgments entered as to property of objectors other than appellant. The ordinance begins, “Be it ordained by the city council of the city of Chicago,” and recites the names'of the streets through which the sewer was to be laid, and gives the boundaries of the district, but does not state the improvement is within the corporate limits of the city of Chicago. At the time of the hearing, Judge George W. Brown, a county judge of DuPage county, was holding county court in the county of Cook at the same time as was the county judge of Cook county. It is claimed that on the 27th day of July, 1893, the common council of the city of Chicago passed an order staying all proceedings in the above assessment for one year from that date, and that the proceeding for the collection of taxes was within one 3'ear.