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Lamm v. City of Danville

Stamper Q. Lamm v. The City of Danville

Lamm v. City of Danville, 77 N.E. 422 (Ill. 1906)
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Court
Illinois Supreme Court · State Highest Courts
Decided
April 17, 1906
Judges
Scott
Citations
77 N.E. 422221 Ill. 119
Headnotes
1. Municipal corporations—"fire limits” ordinance must fix definite boundaries. An ordinance extending the fire limits of the city is void where the description of the boundaries is an impossible one or is so defective that an expert surveyor could not locate the boundaries of the district as extended. 2. Same—when a description in fire limits ordinance cannot be aided by extrinsic evidence. A description of fire limits contained in an ordinance which uses a wrong name for one of the streets designated as a boundary cannot be aided, and the ordinance thereby rendered valid, by extrinsic evidence showing that such street commonly bears the name used but which is not the name fixed in accordance with law, as shown by the plat of the city. 3. Same—the name of street can be changed only by ordinance. The provision of the statute requiring a city plat to show the names of the streets is mandatory, and the power to change the name of a street so shown must be exercised by ordinance.
Summary
Writ op Error to the Circuit Court of Vermilion county; the Hon. James W. Craig, Judge, presiding. This was an action of debt, brought by the city of Dan-ville in the circuit court of Vermilion county against Stamper Q. Lamm and Edward C. Lamm, partners doing business as S. Q. & E. C. Lamm, to recover certain penalties for the violation of an ordinance of said city. This ordinance, which was passed by the city council on December 23, 1903, and published on December 25, 1903, provided that on and after March 1, 1904, it should be unlawful to erect, maintain, build, operate or use any planing mill, sash, door or blind factory, chair or furniture factory, lumber yard, wood yard, oil mill or paper mill within the fire limits of said city, and declared each and every one of the enumerated occupations to be a nuisance if within the fire limits. The ordinance provided a fine of not less than $50 nor more than $200 for a violation thereof, and the further sum of $25 for each -day such planing "mill, etc., should be allowed to remain within the fire limits. The declaration consisted of four counts. The first of these charged the defendants with maintaining, operating and using a lumber yard within the fire limits of the city on April i, 1904, and the second charged them with maintaining, operating and using a planing mill therein on the same date. Each of these two counts sought to recover the penalty of $200. The third and fourth counts declare on the penalty of $25 per day from March 1, 1904, to April 1, 1904, for allowing the lumber yard and planing mill, respectively, to remain within said fire limits contrary to the terms of the ordinance. The defendants pleaded the general issue. At the conclusion of all the evidence the court denied defendants’ motion for a peremptory instruction directing a verdict in their favor and gave to the jury an instruction to find for the plaintiff under the first.and second counts. The jury accordingly returned a verdict for $50 under each of those counts. After overruling a motion for a new trial the court entered judgment upon the verdict for $100. The defendants bring the record to this court by a writ of error.. The plaintiff on the trial below introduced in evidence the ordinance fixing the fire limits and that prohibiting lumber yards and planing mills within those limits, and proved that the defendants’ lumber yard and planing mill were within the fire limits, and that both were maintained subsequent to March 1, 1904. The plaintiffs in error contend that the court erred in excluding evidence proffered by them, and their position is that the city council cannot arbitrarily fix fire limits, but that the courts have a right, in each instance, to investigate the question whether the limits as fixed are reasonable, and whether the territory embraced within the fire limits requires the protection afforded by an ordinance fixing such limits. They further insist that the city council has no power to exclude lumber yards and planing mills from the fire limits if it be proven that the business as conducted is, in fact, not a nuisance, and that the danger of fire is no greater than from other kinds of business not prohibited but which are located in the same vicinity as that prohibited, and that the determination of these questions of fact must be submitted to a jury. It is also claimed that the statute under which the ordinance excluding lumber yards and planing mills from the fire limits was passed, under the construction given it by the circúit court, violates sections 2, 5 and 13 of article 2 and section 22 of article 4 of the constitution of Illinois, and also violates the fourteenth amendment to the constitution of the United States. An amendatory ordinance, passed April 9, 1903, extending the fire limits so as to bring the property of plaintiffs in error within those limits, is attacked on the ground that in describing the course of the boundary line of the limits a street is designated by the name under which it is generally known among the residents of Danville instead of by the name by which it was platted.

Syllabus and headnotes are prepared by the reporter or publisher, not the court, and are not part of the opinion.

Opinion of the Court — Scott

Text extracted by OCR from a scanned original; check the original for exact wording.

Mr. Justice Scott delivered the opinion of the court:

We are of the opinion that the ordinance extending the boundaries of the territory within the fire limits so as to include the property of the plaintiffs in error is void for want of accuracy in the description of that territory. The. ordinance attempts to designate a line bounding the territory within the fire limits. There is in the city of Danville a street running east and west, known as North street. Just a half block north of this street, and parallel thereto, is an alley. The ordinance describes the line which, in the northeastern part of the city, runs on the northern boundary of the territory which the ordinance seeks to place in the fire limits, as running “east along the middle of said alley,” (the alley immediately north of North street,) “and said alley extended to the middle line of Hays street; thence south along the middle line of Hays street to the middle of North street; thence west along the middle line of North street,” etc. Hayes street is a street which runs south from the south line- of North street two blocks to the north line of Main street. Hayes street does not extend north of North street at all, and the line bounding the fire limits on the north and running east in the alley next north of North street will never touch the middle line of Hayes street, but will pass more than a half block north of the northern terminus of Hayes street. The following drawing will perhaps better illustrate the situation:

[[Image here]]

The contention of the city is, that this line running east in the alley runs to the middle of Lincoln street and then south, and evidence was offered for the purpose of showing that Lincoln street is commonly known as Hayes street, which, it is said, aids the description, and shows that the city council, in passing the ordinance, had Lincoln street in view in providing that this line should run east to the middle line of Hayes street and thence south. The recorded plat of that addition to the city of Danville in which this street is located, made by direction of the original owner thereof for the purpose of adding to the city, was offered in evidence, and it shows that the name of the street is Lincoln. Section I of chapter 109, Hurd’s Revised Statutes of 1903, provides that the original plat of an addition shall give the names of the streets, and we have held this provision mandatory. (City of Chicago v. Drexel, 141 Ill. 89 .) The power to change the name of a street is lodged in the city council and must be exercised by ordinance. (Hurd’s Stat. 1903, chap. 24, sec. 62, clause 23; Chicago and Northern Pacific Railroad Co. v. City of Chicago, 174 Ill. 439 .) Evidence was offered which shows’ that the name of Lincoln street has never been so changed.

It is apparent that an expert surveyor could not, by the description contained in this ordinance, fix the fire limits of the city of Danville. The description is an impossible one. The course of the boundary line is given, running east through the alley and the alley extended, but the distance which it runs east is not given, nor does it run east to any monument or to any street shown by the plat of the city, and the distance which the line continues east cannot be fixed either by measurement, monument or street.

If this ordinance is otherwise valid it becomes the law of the city, and by that law certain property would be within the fire limits and all other property outside. However the rule may be in reference to aiding such a description in a conveyance, we think where a description of this character is contained in a law or ordinance that it is not competent to aid it, and establish the validity of an enactment otherwise invalid, by extrinsic evidence showing that a street commonly bears a name other than the name of that street fixed in accordance with the law, as shown by the plat of the city. Owing to this defect in the ordinance other questions argued do not properly arise.

The judgment of the circuit court of Vermilion county will be reversed, and as the ordinance of April 9, 1903, extending the fire limits in the city of Danville, is void, the cause will not be remanded.

Judgment reversed.

How later courts describe this case

No later court has written an explanatory parenthetical about this case yet.

1907: 11908: 119072026peak 1907 · 1

Relies on it most ⓘ

  1. People ex rel. Whittock v. Willison86 N.E. 1094 (Ill. 1908)
  2. People v. Davis2 Ill. Cir. Ct. 395 (1907)

Most recent

  1. People ex rel. Whittock v. Willison86 N.E. 1094 (Ill. 1908)
  2. People v. Davis2 Ill. Cir. Ct. 395 (1907)

Citing references are not a citator: they show that a later opinion cites this case, not whether it followed, distinguished, or overruled it. Check negative history before relying on this case.

Authorities cited 2

DepthCaseCited by
Chicago & Northern Pac. R.R. v. City of Chicago, 51 N.E. 596 (Ill. 1898) 56
City of Chicago v. Drexel, 30 N.E. 774 (Ill. 1892) 46

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