McDaniel v. Chicago & Northwestern Railway Co.

1. Contract: lex loci. The validity, nature, obligation and interpreta- - tion, of a contract, is, as a general rule, to be governed by the law of the place of performance; but it is also a general rule, that if the contract is void or illegal by the law of the place where made, it will be held void and illegal everywhere. 2. - performance in different places. Where a railway company undertook to transport from the city of Clinton, in this State, and deliver in Chicago a certain lot of cattle, it was held, that the contract, being entire, and made and to be partly performed in this State, must be governed by our law as to its validity and interpretation. 3. -railroad company: restriction of liability. It was accordingly held, where the contract in such case contained a stipulation restricting the liability of the company as common carriers, which, under chapter 113 of the Laws of 1866, was inoperative and of no effect, that the stipulation was void, and that the company were ■liable as common carriers, the same as if no such stipulation had been inserted. 4. Railroad company: liability as carriers. Where a railroad company undertook to transport a lot of cattle for their owner, who was to take care of them, in a car which turned out to be defective, by reason of which the cattle had to be changed to another car, which the owner of the cattle had no opportunity to properly provide with bedding, whereby some of the cattle got down and were injured, it was held, that the company was liable for the loss thus sustained.

Appeal from Clinton District Court. Action by the plaintiffs against the defendant as a common carrier, for carelessly and negligently providing insufficient cars, and negligently managing the same, whereby plaintiffs’ cattle, which were being transported therein, from Clinton, Iowa, to Chicago, 111., were injured, and one of them killed. The cause was tried to the court and judgment rendered for plaintiffs for one hundred and eighteen dollars and costs. The defendant appeals. I. The contract made by the parties eé fendants from liability for the loss and da by the plaintiff. extraterritorial force. It is intended to apply only to the transportation of persons and property in this State, and leave railroad companies and others engaged in the business of transportation in other States to make such contracts in reference thereto as the laws of those States permit. Chapter 113, Laws of 1866, is not intended The statutes of a country have no extrinsic extraterritorial force, they bind only its own citizens and the citizens of other countries while within its jurisdictional limits, and they bind directly only property within these limits. 5 N. Y. 320, 340, 348; 6 Hill, 526. its terms, wholly performed in Illinois. The cattle were received on board the defendants’ cars at Clinton station, at the boundary line between Iowa and Illinois, and were to be delivered at South Branch station, in Chicago, 111. The entire service or duty agreed to be performed by the defendants was to be performed in Illinois. The only stipulation in the receipt or contract to be performed by them was to deliver the property at South Branch station, in Chicago. The agreement is not to receive and transport the cattle- — -the receipt declares that they were already received — but to deli/oer them in Chicago, subject to the conditions specified. The alleged breach of duty is the non-delivery. II. The contract was made in Iowa, but was to be, by It is therefore to be presumed that the intention of the parties was that the contract, as to its validity, nature, obligation and interpretation, was to be governed by the laws of the place of performance — Illinois, and that the same was entered into with reference to those laws. Story on Conflict of Laws, § 280; Andrews v. Pond, 13 Peters, 65. The law of the place where the contract is to be performed, . and not that of the place where it is made, is to govern in determining its validity and effect. Savary v. Savary, 3 Iowa, 272; Boyd v. Ellis, 11 id. 97; Kentucky v. Bassford, 6 Hill, 526. III. By the laws of Illinois, common carriers have the right, by special contract, to restrict their liabilities as such, they still remaining liable for gross negligence or willful misfeasance. Ill. Cent. R. R. Co. v. Morrison, 19 Ill. 136. The same right exists at common law. 2 Parsons on Contracts, 237, 246; 20 N. Y. 232; Redfield on Railways, § 160. The contract in this case is valid and lawful by the laws of Illinois, and exempts the defendant from liability for the injury complained of, there being no allegation or proof of gross negligence or willful misfeasance. IV. The case shows merely a hiring of ears and motive power at special rates — there being no complete delivery of the cattle to the defendants, as one of the owners — Ingwersen — accompanied them and had them in his own charge and keeping, and in such cases the carrier is not so absolutely liable as he otherwise would be. Ill. Cent. R. R. Co. v. Morrison, 19 Ill. 136; White v. Winnissimet Co., 7 Cushing, 155; Smith v. N. H. & N. R. R. Co., 12 Allen, 531. V. The plaintiff is not entitled to recover, even if the special contract is held to be invalid. The testimony shows, that the loss and injury occurred, not from any negligence, unskillfulness or bad management on the part of the defendants’ employees, or from defective or unsafe cars or track. There was no unusual detention of the train before the cattle were injured. It was not thrown from the track, nor did any collision occur to it; the only unusual circumstance connected with the transportation was the heating of a journal of the car in which they were first loaded, and their transfer to another. The testimony further shows, that the cause of the damage was connected with the conduct and propensities of the animals themselves — they were trampled upon, bruised and injured by themselves or by each other. The injuries were clearly occasioned by the faults and vices of the animals to themselves and to each other — by the peculiar risks incident to this mode of carriage of this species of property. Live animals, in the course of -transportation by this kind of conveyance, which is opposed to their habits, may fall down, or lie down, or be thrown down by others in the car, have their horns broken off, get bruised, trampled upon, or killed by each other. “ They often go through quietly and stand up all right; it depends upon the temper of the cattle. They do better if they are acquainted. Some go through quietly and others will not; it depends upon the temper of the animals.” And in all such cases where the accident is attributable to the inherent nature of the animals themselves, their peculiar habits and instincts, their viciousness or way of temper, their unruly behavior, or the peculiar risks to which they are exposed in the course of transportation, the carrier (without a special contract) is exonerated from liability for the injury. Hall v. Renfro, 3 Metc. (Ky.) 51; Smith v. N. H. & H. R. R. Co., 12 Allen, 531; Clark v. R. & S. R. R. Co., 14 N. Y. 570; Angell on Carriers, § 214, note A. (No argument found on file.)