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Tyner v. United States

TYNER v. UNITED STATES BARRETT v. UNITED STATES

Tyner v. United States, 23 App. D.C. 324 (D.C. Cir. 1904)
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Court
Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit · U.S. Courts of Appeals
Decided
April 5, 1904
Docket
Nos. 1396 and 1397
Judges
Shepard
Citations
23 App. D.C. 3241904 U.S. App. LEXIS 5258
Disposition
Affirmed.
Syllabus
•Criminal Law; Conspiracy- to Defraud the United States; Misconduct in Office; Indictment. 1. The gist of the offense defined in U. S. Rev. Stat. § 5440, U. S. Comp. Stat. 1901, p. 3676, being a conspiracy to commit an offense against or to defraud the United States, notwithstanding it remains incomplete until the commission of some act to effect its object, it must be charged in the indictment against the alleged conspirators with that degree of certainty requisite in all indictments under the laws of the United States; and such charge cannot be aided in respect of its certainty by the necessary additional averments of the overt act or acts. 2. All the material facts and circumstances embraced in the definition of the offense charged in an indictment, must be stated, and if any essential element of the crime is omitted such omission, cannot be supplied by intendment or implication. The charge must be made directly, and not inferentially or by way of recital. 3. Indictments against two government officials for conspiracy to defraud the United States, which in their introductory part charge the defendants with certain duties under certain departmental regulations, and also with certain additional duties not prescribed by such regulations but not inconsistent with any provisions of law, and which are reasonable and natural extension of the duties so prescribed, sufficiently charge a violation of duty; but under such circumstances such duties as are prescribed by the regulations require no proof, while such additional duties must be proved like other facts. 4. In indictments against the Assistant Attorney General and Assistant Attorney for the Postoffice Department for conspiracy to defraud the United States in violation of U. S. Rev. Stat. § 5440, U. S. Comp. Stat. 1901, p. 3676, by failing to report the conclusions arrived at by them upon consideration of schemes for the misuse of the mails and defrauding the public, referred to them for investigation and report, it is not necessary to allege and prove that any such scheme was within the prohibition of the law, the duty to so report existing whether the scheme was lawful or unlawful. 5. Such indictments are not demurrable which, after sufficient averment of the official duty imposed upon the defendants, charge, with no lack of certainty in respect to time, place, and circumstances, that the defendants conspired not to discharge such duty, but instead to substitute a general opinion as to such alleged fraudulent schemes, artfully planned to secure each of the parties engaged in such schemes in the unobstructed use of the mails, until at least the expiration of the official connection of one of the defendants with the Postoffice Department, and to secure for him thereafter employment by such interested parties as attorney for them, and the collection of large-sums of money as fees. , 6. While it is the general rule that there are no common-law offenses against the United States, such rule does not apply to the District of Columbia (following De Forest v. United States, 11 App. D. C. 458) ; and the common law being in force in the District of Columbia when U. S. Rev. Stat. § 5440, U. S. Comp. Stat. 1901, p. 3676, was enacted, which makes it an indictable offense to conspire to commit any offense against or to defraud the United States in any manner and for any purpose, any common-law offense not repealed, superseded, or plainly inconsistent with existing legislation or necessarily obsolete is an offense against the United States within the meaning of that section. 7. Official misconduct in office, being an offense under the common law, is an offense in the District of Columbia, and is an offense against the United States, whether it is an offense against the United States when committed by Federal officers in any of the States or territories; and it is immaterial that such offense was a misdemeanor at common law while the conspiracy to commit it by reason of the character of the penalty prescribed by U. S. Rev. Stat. § 5440, U. S. Comp. Stat. 1901, p. 3676, becomes an infamous offense. Criminal laws in the various Federal courts are not required to be uniform throughout the territories and districts, whether within or without the restrictions of the Constitution. 8. To defraud means, not only to deprive or withhold from one that which belongs to or is due him, but also to deprive him of any right by artifice or wrong practised upon him. A. To defraud the United States within the meaning of U. S. Rev. Stat. § 5440, U. S. Comp. Stat. 1901, p. 3676, does not necessarily mean to do the United States a pecuniary injury (following Palmer v. Colladay, 18 App. D. C. 426) ; and any wilful or corrupt misconduct on the part of an official of the Postoffiee Department that operates to impair the administration of the affairs of that department, works a wrong to the United States and does them some substantial injury within the meaning of that section. Such injury may be pecuniary in its nature or one of general damage, not of a specific character susceptible of certain ascertainment and pecuniary compensation. 10. A statute which is made for the good of the public ought, although it is penal, to receive equitable construction.
Summary
Hearing on appeals (specially allowed) from orders of the Supreme Court of the District of Columbia sitting as a criminal court overruling demurrers to two indictments for the crime of conspiracy under U. S. Rev. Stat. § 5440 (U. S. Comp. Stat. 1901, p. 3676). The Court in the opinion stated the case as follows: In each of these cases a special appeal has been allowed from an interlocutory order of the supreme court of the District of Columbia overruling defendant’s demurrer to the indictment which charges them with the crime of conspiracy under Rev. Stat. § 5440 (U. S. Comp. Stat. 1901, p. 3676). The recitals of the indictments are identical, save in respect of the particular offense which is made their predicate. In 1396 the conclusion is that the defendants “unlawfully did conspire, combine, confederate, and agree together to defraud the United States;” whilst in 1397 it is “to commit an offense against the United States, that is to say, the offense of misconduct on the part of him, the said James N. Tyner, in his said office of Assistant. Attorney General for the said Postoffice Department, to be done and committed by him the said James N. Tyner as aforesaid.” The introductory averments of the indictment, after reciting the statutes prohibiting the carriage in the mails of matter in aid of lotteries and other schemes to defraud the public, and prescribing the powers and duties of the Postmaster General, together with the practice of his department in relation thereto, are: (1) That James N. Tyner was the Assistant Attorney General for the Postoffice Department from June 1, 1897, to April 22, 1903; that Harrison J. Barrett, from June 1, 1897, to July 1, 1899, was law clerk in the office of the said Assistant Attorney General, and from July 1, 1899, until January 1, 1901, was Assistant Attorney therein; (2) that it was the duty of the said Tyner, as Assistant Attorney General, to investigate all eases of use of the mails by persons suspected of being engaged in the prosecution of lotteries and fraudulent schemes that might be brought to his attention by reference from the Postmaster General or otherwise; and if, upon such investigation, it appeared to him that any such use of the mails was within the prohibition of the law, it was his duty to report his conclusion and opinion in the case to the Postmaster General with a statement of the facts upon which such conclusion and opinion wore based, together with a recommendation that a “fraud order” should bo issued in such case whereby the misuse of the mails by such persons would be immediately stopped, it being the usual practice of the Postmaster General to issue the order upon such report and recommendation; (3) that said Barrett, whose duty it was to assist said Tyner in the matters aforesaid, had, on July 3, 1900, determined to resign and retire from his said office on December 31, 1900, and had agreed with one J. Henning Nelms to enter into a partnership with him on January 1, 1901, with a view to representing before the Postoffi.ee Department and the said Assistant Attorney General persons using the mails in the prosecution of schemes and plans of business which might then and thereafter be under investigation by said Tyner in tbe course of bis duty aforesaid; (4) that between July 3 and November 1, 1899, there were pending before said Tyner the cases of eighty persons or companies — fifty of these being named and thirty charged as of names unknown — for investigation and report to the Postmaster, General whether their schemes and plans of business were obnoxious to the laws aforesaid, and such, therefore, as to debar them from the use of the mails in the prosecution of the same; (5) that the investigation aforesaid was completed by said Tyner and Barrett, between October 18 and November 1, 1900, and the conclusion arrived at that the schemes of each of said persons were obnoxious to the laws aforesaid, and that matter relating thereto was prohibited from transmission through the mails; (6) that having formed an opinion as aforesaid, it became the duty of said Tyner to report the same to the Postmaster General, together with a statement of the evidence upon which the same was based, and a recommendation that the order issue to prevent the further use of the mails by the said persons; but that, disregarding his duty aforesaid, by reason of the conspiracy, etc., hereinafter charged, the said Tyner did not submit a report of the conclusion and opinion aforesaid, together with a statement of the evidence upon which said opinion was based, and did not recommend the issue of the prohibitory order aforesaid. Following these introductory averments, the charge of conspiracy appears in the following words: “That on the said first day of November, in the year of our Lord one thousand nine hundred, and at the District aforesaid, the said James N. Tyner and the said Harrison J. Barrett did unlawfully conspire, combine, confederate, and agree together in contravention of their duty in the premises, not to report the conclusion and opinion aforesaid to the said Postmaster General, together with a statement of the evidence upon which the same were based, and with a recommendation that such fraud orders be issued by the said Postmaster General against the companies last aforesaid so engaged in the conduct, promotion, and furtherance of each of the schemes and plans of business last aforesaid; and to siibmit to the said Postmaster General an opinion as hereinafter stated, in lieu of such report, statement, and recommendation last aforesaid, and to prevent so far as in them, the said James N. Tyner as such Assistant Attorney General, and the said Harrison J. Barrett as such assistant attorney, the power lay, the enforcement of the laws aforesaid, by the said Postmaster General against the companies last aforesaid, and to keep the question of issuing such fraud orders against the companies last aforesaid, open and undetermined by him, the said Postmaster General, until the thirty-first day of December, in the year of our Lord one thousand nine hundred, and for such period of time thereafter as the said Harrison J. Barrett might desire, and in the meantime to permit the unobstructed use of the mails to the companies last aforesaid in the conduct, promotion, and furtherance of their schemes and plans of business aforesaid, to the prejudice of the said United States and the obstruction and prevention of the orderly and due administration of the said laws, and for the advancement of the pecuniary interest of the said Harrison J. Barrett, upon his retirement from the said department, as aforesaid, and the entering upon such practice of the law by him, the said Harrison J. Barrett, as aforesaid; which advancement of such pecuniary interest of him, the said Harrison J. Barrett, should be accomplished in the manner following, as well as by the acts and omissions agreed, upon, as aforesaid, that is to say: That he, the said Harrison J. Barrett, should, at some time prior to such retirement from office by him, the said Harrison J. Barrett, prepare and submit an opinion in writing to the said Postmaster General relating to the schemes and plans of business of the companies last aforesaid, to he signed by him, the said Harrison J. Barrett, as Assistant Attorney and acting Assistant Attorney General for the Postoffice Department, which opinion should be approved in writing by the said J ames N. Tyner, as such Assistant Attorney General, and for which opinion the approval of the said Postmaster General in writing should also be obtained as a matter of official routine by him, the said J ames N. Tyner, as such Assistant Attorney General, and the said Harrison J. Barrett, as such Assistant Attorney; and that in such opinion it should he set forth and stated, in substance, that the schemes and plans of business of a number of companies to he described in said opinion as “so-called bond investment companies,” the names of which should not he mentioned therein (but to meau aud intend by such description the companies in respect to whose schemes and plans of business the said James N. Tyner, as such Assistant Attorney General, and the said Harrison J. Barrett, as such Assistant Attorney, had, upon such investigation as aforesaid, reached the conclusion and opinion aforesaid), had been presented to the said James N. Tyner, as such Assistant Attorney General, by reference from the said Postmaster General, or otherwise, for an expression of opinion as to whether or not the transmission in the mails of matter relating to such schemes and plans of business last aforesaid and the delivery of mail matter and the payment of postal-money orders to such companies last aforesaid, should be forbidden under the laws aforesaid; and that in the opinion aforesaid tire schemes and plans last aforesaid should be divided into ten classes, and each of such classes be held and declared to be obnoxious to the laws aforesaid, and each such scheme and plan of business last aforesaid- be held and declared to fall within one or the other of the said ten classes, as being in each instance a lottery or a scheme to defraud, or both; and that in such opinion it should also be held and declared that the basic principle underlying the schemes and plans of business last aforesaid was sound, and that each of them was susceptible of amendment so and in such manner as to relieve them of their objectionable features under said laws, and to entitle the companies engaged in the conduct, promotion, and furtherance of the same, to the unobstructed use of the mails in such conduct, promotion, and furtherance of the same, refraining, however, from setting forth or stating in such opinion in what particular or in what manner such amendments might be made in any particular case, and leaving that matter open to speculation and conjecture on the part of the companies last aforesaid, and recommending that a reasonable time be given such companies last aforesaid for the abandonment of their said schemes and plans of business or for the making of such amendments before such use of the mails by them, the companies last aforesaid, should be interfered with by the said Postmaster General through the issue by him of such fraud orders against them, such companies last aforesaid; they, the said James N. Tyner and the said Harrison J. Barrett, then well knowing the fact to be that in the usual course of business in the said department the determination of what would be such reasonable time would be a matter resting with, and under the control of him, the said James N. Tyner, as such Assistant Attorney General; and that he, the said J ames N. Tyner, as such Assistant Attorney Genera] would take no action against any of the companies last aforesaid, contrary to the wish and desire of him, the said Harrison J. Barrett, in that behalf; and that when the approval of such opinion by the said Postmaster General had been thus obtained, thereupon said opinion, together with such approvals thereof by the said James N. Tyner, as such Assistant Attorney General, and by the said Postmaster General, should be printed in pamphlet form at the expense of the said United States and sent to ■each of the companies last aforesaid, with a circular letter of the said James N. Tyner, as such Assistant Attorney General, •calling their attention to said opinion and stating that the particular scheme and plan of business of such company last aforesaid fell within one of the said classes; and that upon such sending of such pamphlet opinion and such circular letter to each of said companies, as aforesaid, that the said Harrison J. Barrett should send to each of them, the companies last aforesaid, a printed announcement in which it should be stated in substance that the said Harrison J. Barrett, Assistant Attorney for the Postoffice Department, begged to announce that he would retire from the said department on the first day of January in the year one thousand nine hundred and one, and that he would thereafter be associated with J. Henning Nelms, a member of the Baltimore bar, in the practice of law in Baltimore and Washington; in order that by said opinion in pamphlet form said circular letter and said announcement, and from the previous connection of the said Harrison J. Barrett with the said office of the said Assistant Attorney General, the impression should be made on the companies receiving such opinion, circular letter, and announcement that with the exception of the said James N. Tyner, he, the said Harrison J. Barrett, alone knew in what particulars the schemes and plans of business of the companies last aforesaid required amendment, and the nature of the amendments so required in the said schemes and plans of business of the companies last aforesaid, to relieve such schemes and plans last aforesaid from objection under said laws and to secure for them the approval of the said James N. Tyner, as such Assistant Attorney General, and to secure the companies last aforesaid, in the operation of such schemes and plans as thus amended, the unobstructed use of the mails of the said United States; and by the means and in the manner last aforesaid, and by a refusal of them, the said James N. Tyner, as such Assistant Attorney General, and the said Harrison J. Barrett, as such Assistant Attorney, after such rendering and printing of such opinion, to act upon and consider during the remainder of the said year one thousand nine hundred, any application of the companies last aforesaid, for the approval by him, the said James N. Tyner, as such Assistant Attorney General, of any amended schemes and plans of business which might be submitted by them, the companies last aforesaid, to him the said James N. Tyner, as such Assistant Attorney General, to create the further impression on the companies last aforesaid that it would be greatly to the interest and advantage of them, the companies last aforesaid, to employ them, the said Harrison J. Barrett and the said J. Henning Nelms, rather than other attorneys and agents, for the purpose of making such amendments and of obtaining such approval thereof by the said James N. Tyner, as such Assistant Attorney General, to the end that the companies last aforesaid should be induced to employ the said Harrison J. Barrett to represent them before the said James N. Tyner, as such Assistant Attorney General, and before the said Postóffice Department, in the matter of making such amendments, securing such approval, and obtaining such unobstructed use of the mails for matter relating to the business of the companies last aforesaid and to pay to him, the said Harrison J. Barrett, large sums of money for services to be rendered by him in that behalf; and that upon such employment of him, the said Harrison J. Barrett, he, the said James N. Tyner, as such Assistant Attorney General, should approve any amended schemes or plans of business of the companies last aforesaid, prepared and submitted to him by the said Harrison J. Barrett.” The acts charged as done to effect the object of the conspiracy in each case may be summarized as follows: (1) On December 5, 1900, the said Barrett, under the title of “Assistant Attorney and Acting Assistant Attorney General for the Postoifi.ee Department,” submitted an opinion in writing to the Postmaster General in relation to the cases referred for investigation, wherein he stated substantially “that, in the consideration of the said question, the various plans and schemes of business used by the companies last aforesaid were grouped as nearly as possible into classes, and that he had omitted all reference to any company by name, and had found that the schemes and plans last aforesaid of the companies last aforesaid were either lotteries or similar enterprises for the distribution of prizes by lot or chance, or were fraudulent within the meaning of the statutes forbidding the use of the mails in the promotion of such enterprises; nevertheless, that if changed and modified in some of their features they would not he objectionable to the laws aforesaid, in their operation and conduct, and that he recommended that a reasonable time should be allowed to the companies last aforesaid for the abandonment of their said schemes and plans of business after their attention had been called to the necessity of modifying the same or for making such changes as would eliminate therefrom all objectionable features before action should be taken by the said Postmaster General to deprive them of the use of the mails.” (2) That the said Tyner indorsed his approval of said opinion in writing thereon, and lie and Barrett then, on December 8, 1900, prepared a letter for the signature of the then Postmaster General, approving the said opinion, which said letter they procured him to sign. (3) Defendants next procured the printing, at the Government Printing Office, of 500 copies of said opinion in pamphlet form, one of which was sent to the Southern Mutual Investment Company, of Lexington, Kentucky, together with a printed circular signed by said Tyner officially, advising it that its scheme and plan of business fell within one of the classes mentioned in the said opinion. And it is further alleged that the same course was pursued with each of the persons heretofore named in the indictment. (4) That, on tíre same day the said Barrett mailed to each of said persons and companies a card announcing that he would retire from his. position on January 1, 1901, and then become associated with J. Henning Nelms, a member of the Baltimore bar, in the practice of law in Baltimore and Washington. (5) That on December 20, 1900, the said Barrett wrote and mailed the following letter to J. P. Williams, at Louisville, who was then the-president of the New Orleans Debenture Company, one of tkeeighty persons before mentioned: My Dear Sir: I have received your favor of the 17 th instant. This is written at home, and as I have not your contracts, at hand I cannot answer you specifically in regard to your 25-per cent and 15 per cent debentures, though from my recollection the principles involved are the same as in other contracts set-out in the opinion. I will, however, ask Gen’l Tyner, the Assistant Attorney General, to write you specifically on these-points. While my work at the department has practically ceased, yet-my official connection will not be severed until Dec. 31, so that I would not feel at liberty to discuss ways and means with you. My associate and 1 will be pleased to act as your attorneys after-Dec. 31, and you could, of course, correspond with Mr. Nelms, now. I believe we can eliminate all the objectionable features in the contracts, and put them in such form that they will meet with the approval of the Department. Our fee would be one-thousand dollars retainer, and one hundred dollars a month for-twelve months. I suggest this latter provision, inasmuch as during the coming year details may have to be adjusted, and new features and improvements in contracts will suggest themselves-, for consideration and submission to the Department. We would render you any service that might be necessary in this conneclion, and communicate to you whatever we might learn of advantage to your company. I may add for your information that the Department does not intend to interfere with the operations of any company until they have had reasonable opportunity to perfect and present new forms of contract which will be approved. I am, very truly yours, Harrison J. Barrutt. P. S. — Our offices will be in the Oalvert Building, Baltimore, though within a short time we may have a branch here. Baltimore, as you know, is only 45 minutes by train from Washington, and telephone connections make them practically one city. (6) That the said agreement between said Barrett and said Nelms was entered into; the said Nelms, who was then the attorney for the Mutual Fidelity Company of Baltimore, agreeing to divide the sum of $2,000 per annum which he was to receive from said company. (7) That said Barrett purposely retained in the office of the Assistant Attorney General aforesaid, without action thereon, a report of an official inspector charging that the said Mutual Fidelity Company of Baltimore was operating a fraudulent scheme within the prohibition of the law, and advising that it be called upon to show cause why a “fraud order” should not be issued against it; which said report had been referred to the said Tyner by the Postoffice Department on November 23, 1900. (8) That on December 18, 1900, certain officers of the Southern Mutual Investment Company called upon said Barrett at his office to ascertain what might be necessary for the amendment of their scheme so as to retain the use of the mails, and were informed by him that his connection with the government would cease on December 31, 1900, and that, in the meantime, he could not give official attention to the matter; and they *were further informed by the said Tyner that he would not take up such matters for consideration until after January 1, 1901. (9) That thereafter, on the same day, said parties called upon said Nelms in Baltimore, and agreed to pay him-the sum of $1,000 in case he would procure the immediate approval, by said Tyner and Barrett, of such amendments to their existing scheme of business as would enable them to continue to enjoy the unobstructed use of the mails. (10) That on December 19, 1900, said parties, with Nelms, had another interview with said Tyner, to whom said Nelms stated a proposed amendment which said Tyner approved. (11) That on December 20, 1900, the said Barrett prepared a written memorandum of the amended scheme for the use of said Tyner in the preparation of a letter approving the same, which letter, embodying the said amendment, was written on January 8, 1901. (12) That on December 21, 1900, one George W. Morgan, president of the Continental Security Redemption Company, of Birmingham, Alabama, called upon said Barrett at the office of said Tyner for the purpose of ascertaining if its scheme could be amended so as to meet with approval, and that said Morgan agreed with said Barrett to pay him the sum of $800 after January 1, 1901, if he would procure the approval of said Tyner of a scheme of business satisfactory to the said company and in the meantime protect it from interference by the Postmaster General in the use of the mails. (13) That on J anuary 3, 1901, one Charles A. Spenny, president of the Equitable Debenture Company, of Columbus, Ohio, called upon said Tyner to ascertain in what particulars it would be necessary to amend said company’s scheme so as to relieve it from objection and secure it the free and unobstructed use of the mails, and was told by said Tyner that it would facilitate his business if lie would, employ an attorney familiar with that kind of business, — the said Tyner then and there recommending said Barrett as such an attorney. (14) That the said Spenny immediately thereafter employed said Barrett, and agreed to pay him a fee of $500 to obtain the approval of said Tyner to a scheme of business satisfactory to said company; and thereupon, on the next day, said Barrett called upon said Tyner in company with Spenny, and submitted to him a scheme amending the existing one of said company, which the said Tyner approved in a letter, without examination and upon the verbal assurance of said Barrett that the same was free from objection.

Syllabus and headnotes are prepared by the reporter or publisher, not the court, and are not part of the opinion.

Opinion of the Court — Shepard

Text extracted by OCR from a scanned original; check the original for exact wording.

Mr. Justice Shepard

delivered the opinion of the Court:

The indictments in these cases were found under Rev. Stat. § 5440 (U. S. Comp. Stat. 1901, p. 3676), which reads as follows :

“If two or more persons conspire, either to commit any offense .against the United States or to defraud the United States in any manner, or for any purpose, and one or more of such parties do any act to effect the object of the conspiracy, all the parties to such conspiracy shall be liable to a penalty of not more than ten thousand dollars, or to imprisonment for not more than two years, or to both fine and imprisonment in the discretion of the court.”

The conspiracy to commit an offense against or to defraud the United States is the gist of the crime, notwithstanding it remains incomplete until the commission of some act to effect its object, and must, therefore, be charged -with that degree of certainty requisite in all indictments under the laws of the United States.

And this charge cannot be aided in respect of its certainty by the necessary additional averments of the overt act or acts. Pettibone v. United States, 148 U. S. 197, 202 , 37 L. ed. 419, 422, 13 Sup. Ct. Rep. 542.

“The general rule in reference to an indictment,” as stated in that case, “is that all the material facts and circumstances embraced in the definition of the offense must be stated, and that *354 if any essential element of the crime is omitted such omission cannot be supplied by intendment or implication. The charge must be made directly, and not inferentially or by way of recital.” In a later case it was further said: “The indictment must be free from all ambiguity, and leave no doubt in the minds of the accused and the court of the exact offense intended to be charged, not only that the former may know what he is called upon to meet, but that upon a plea of former acquittal or conviction the record may show with accuracy the exact offense to-which-the plea relates.” Evans v. United States, 153 U. S. 584, 587 , 38 L. ed. 830, 831, 14 Sup. Ct. Rep. 934.

Having stated the general rules governing the sufficiency of indictments of this character, we pass to the consideration of the points of objection urged by the appellants on their demurrers,, dealing first with those that apply to both indictments alike.

1. The first and most important of these relates to the paragraph of the introductory averments which sets out the official-duties of the defendants, respectively, as Assistant Attorney General and Assistant Attorney. In the language of appellant’s brief, “the king-pin of this structure is the pleader’s conception of the duty cast upon” these defendants, respectively.

The duties of the Assistant Attorney General for the Post-office Department are not prescribed by the statute creating the-office (§ 390, Rev. Stat.) but arise under the authority of the head of the Department to make regulations for the conduct of officers and clerks. In the regulations published in 1893, the-Assistant Attorney General is charged with the duty of giving opinions to the Postmaster General upon questions of law arising-in the service, “with the hearing and preparation of cases relating to lotteries and the misuse of the mails in the furtherance of schemes to defraud the public,” etc.

Having recited the aforesaid regulations the indictment further charges that it was the duty of the said Tyner, if upon investigation of a scheme or plan of business referred to him for investigation it should appear to him that the same was obnoxious to the law, “to report his conclusion and opinion in the .premises to the said Postmaster General, with a statement of *355 the facts upon which such conclusion and opinion were based, together with a recommendation that such fraud order should be issued,” etc. And it is the failure to perform this particular part of his duty which constitutes the gravamen of the charge. The contention of the appellants is that this duty to report with, a statement of facts and recommendations, not having been prescribed by the regulations, is nothing but a conclusion of the-pleader drawn therefrom, a mere assumption without foundation, in any averment of the indictment.

We do not understand the indictment to charge this duty as arising by implication from the terms of the regulation, but as one additional thereto. The regulation as published charges the officer “with such other like duties as may, from time to time, be required by the Postmaster General.” It was not necessary that there should be an express provision of the law or the regulation promulgated by the department creating such additional duty. United States v. Macdaniel, 7 Pet. 1, 14 , 8 L. ed. 587, 592. As was said in that case: “A practical knowledge of the action of any one of the great departments of the government must convince every person that the head of a department in the distribution of its duties and responsibilities is often compelled to exercise his discretion. He is limited in the exercise of his powers by the law, but it does not follow that he must show a statutory provision for everything he does. No government could be administered upon such principles. To attempt to regulate by law the minute movements of every part of the complicated machinery of government would evince a most unpardonable ignorance on the subject. Whilst the great outlines of its movements may be marked out and limitations imposed on the exercise of its powers, there are numberless things which must be done that can neither be anticipated nor defined and which are essential to the proper action of the government Hence of necessity usages have been established in every department of the government which have become a kind of common law and regulate the rights and duties of those who act within their respective limits.”

This additional duty is not inconsistent with any provision of *356 the law, or the regulations made in accordance therewith, bnt is n reasonable and natural extension of that prescribed in the latter. If, then, such additional duty was imposed in connection with the special reference of the schemes set out in the indictment or by the established usage and practice following such orders made in cases prior thereto, the defendant was under obligation to respect and to obey it with fidelity. Being “required of him,” as was said in the case last cited, “by the head of the department, and being a subordinate, he had no discretion to decline the labor and responsibility thus imposed.”

Duties imposed by law or regulation promulgated thereunder, and not inconsistent therewith, require no proof. Additional duties that may have been imposed from time to time, by order or direction in the ordinary course of administration of the business of the department, must be proved like other facts. But the direct allegation of the fact in the indictment is all that is required; it is not necessary to set forth the evidence or to negative any theory of the defense. Stokes v. United States, 157 U. S. 187, 191 , 39 L. ed. 667, 668, 15 Sup. Ct. Rep. 617; Evans v. United States, 153 U. S. 584, 594 , 38 L. ed. 830, 834, 14 Sup. Ct Rep. 934.

What has been said is sufficient also to dispose of the contention on behalf of the defendant, Barrett, the Assistant Attorney, whose duty, as alleged, was to assist his codefendant and superior officer in the premises.

2. To constitute a breach of duty on the part of the defendants in failing to report a conclusion arrived at by them upon the consideration of any scheme referred for investigation and report it is not necessary to allege and prove that the said scheme was within the prohibition of the law. The defendant 'Tyner was not charged with the issue of the “fraud order;” that was the duty of the Postmaster General, although it is alleged that it was his general practice to issue the same in accordance with the recommendation made in the report, and it is alleged as one of the acts done in furtherance of the conspiracy (lbat. formal approval of the special report actually made of the *357 investigation of the eighty companies was in that way actually had and obtained.

Whenever the matter of the right of the promotor of any scheme to the use of the mails was specially referred to the Assistant Attorney General, or came into his hands through any official channel, it became his duty to investigate it and report his conclusion thereon, with his opinion and the evidence on which it was based, to the head of the department. If his conclusion was that the scheme was unlawful, within the provisions of the postal law, it was his duty to make the report as aforesaid and recommend that a “fraud order” he issued.

The duty was to report the conclusion, with the evidence on which it was founded, for the consideration of the Postmaster General and final action by him. • That duty existed without regard to the fact whether the scheme reported on was in fact lawful or unlawful. In either case the duty existed and its faithful performance was required. The discretion reposed in him in respect of the conclusion that he might reach upon an examination ended when that conclusion, whether a sound or unsound one, had been attained. Having in the exercise of his discretion attained a conclusion, the simple, imperative duty arose of reporting it to the Postmaster General in obedience to his orders or to the settled practice of the office.

3. The next contention is that the averments which contain the charge of the conspiracy are so vague and indefinite as to violate the rule in respect of certainty heretofore stated.

Having affirmed the sufficiency of the averments of the official duty imposed upon the defendant Tyner, we discover no lack of certainty in respect of time, place, and circumstance in the charge of the corrupt conspiracy to prevent the performance of that duty. Having, as averred, reached a conclusion in each of the cases under investigation which rendered that duty imperative, the charge is that the defendants conspired not to discharge the same, hut, instead, to substitute a general opinion artfully planned to secure each of the said companies in the unobstructed use of the mails, until, at least, the expiration of defendant Barrett’s official connection with the department, and to secure for *358 him thereafter employment by the interested parties, and the collection of large sums of money as fees.

4. The next question for consideration is whether the indictment in one of the cases (No. 1397) is fatally defective in that the purpose of the conspiracy as averred was to cause the defendant Tyner to commit the offense of misconduct in office.

The failure of the defendant to perform his official duty under the circumstances and for the reasons charged is sufficient to support an indictment for official misconduct as an offense by the common law. Whether an indictment for the common-law offense should charge that the misconduct was wilful, malicious, or corrupt, we need not stop to inquire, for the indictment is not for that offense but for conspiracy under the statute.

There is, however, no statute of the United States creating the offense of official misconduct, wherefore it is contended that the indictment is fatally defective because there are no common-law offenses against the United States. United States v. Eaton, 144 U. S. 677 , 36 L. ed. 591, 12 Sup. Ct. Rep. 764, and cases cited. Undoubtedly this is the general rule, but it does not apply in the District of Columbia. De Forest v. United States, 11 App. D. C. 458, 465.

In that case the appellant was charged with keeping a bawdy house in the District of Columbia, and his conviction was affirmed, although there was no statute creating such an offense. The reasons for the conclusion that the conditions existing in the District raised an exception to the general rule were stated as follows by Mr. Justice Morris, who delivered the opinion of the court: “As against the United States regarded as coextensive with the Federal Union of States and operating within the territorial limits of the States, it is undoubtedly true that there are no common-law offenses, for the jurisdiction there given to the United States by the Federal Constitution is distinctly and expressly restricted to the powers enumerated in the Constitution. But the statement was not intended to have application to the District of Columbia. ... At the time of the cession of the territory of Columbia by the State of Maryland to the Federal Union its law, as well as that of the rest of the States, *359 was the common law of England, both civil and criminal, so far as that common law’ w'as suited to our condition and was unaffected by statute. And with the common law the State of Maryland had adopted a considerable part of the statute law of England. When by the act of February 27, 1801 (2 Stat. at L. 103, chap. 115), the Congress of the United States finally accepted the cession and assumed jurisdiction over the ceded district, it was specifically provided That the laws of the State of Maryland, as they now (then) exist, shall be and continue in force in that part of the said district which was ceded by that State to the United States and by them accepted.’ This express enactment, if any such enactment was needed at all, was amply sufficient to continue in force and to perpetuate to the present day in the District of Columbia the common law of England as it existed in Maryland at that time, with all the existing statute legislation of the State and all the statute legislation of England that had been adopted by Maryland. And upon that theory of the law we have been conducting our affairs for nearly a hundred years. It is very true that much of the criminal branch of our common law has either become obsolete or has been obliterated by statutory enactment upon the same subject. Nevertheless, it is true that where it has not been repealed by express statutory provisions, or modified by inconsistent legislation, or where it has not become obsolete or unsuited to our Republican form of government, the common law of England in all its branches, both civil and criminal, remains to-day the law of the District of Columbia, and it has been repeatedly so held. See United States v. Watkins, 3 Cranch C. C. 441, Fed. Cas. No. 16, 649; United States v. Marshall, 6 Mackey, 34 ; United States v. Hale, 4 Cranch C. C. 83, Fed. Cas. No. 15, 279. The case of United States v. Eaton , therefore, is not applicable to the District of Columbia, and was not intended to be applicable to it. And we are of opinion that it was not within the purview of that case to hold that there can be no common-law offenses against the United States in the District of Columbia.”

The common law being in force in the District of Columbia when Rev. Stat. § 5440 (U. S. Comp. Stat 1901, p. 3676), was *360 enacted, any common-law offense not repealed, superseded, or plainly inconsistent with existing legislation or necessarily obsolete must be held to be an offense against the United States within the meaning of that section. Congress must be presumed to have known then that official misconduct was punishable in this District as an offense against the United States, and yet it evinced no intention to exclude it from the operation of the conspiracy statute, nor is such intention to be found in any subsequent legislation. It is not to be inferred from the fact, upon which the appellants rely, that it is not an offense against the United States'when committed by a Federal officer in any of the States of the Union, and possibly not also when committed in any territory, or in any other ceded district under the exclusive jurisdiction of the United States. Criminal laws enforceable in the various courts established by the authority of the United States are not required to be uniform throughout the territories and districts under their control, whether within or without the restrictions of the Constitution.

Good reasons might be given why an act unpunishable in one territory or district should be made criminal in another, or if criminal in all, should be made punishable in a different way in each.

As a matter of fact, we know that it has not been the policy of the United States to subject their different territories and districts to one uniform system, civil or criminal. At one time before the act of retrocession to Virginia the common law and statutes of that State prevailed in one part of this District, whilst those of Maryland governed in the other. The District now has its criminal code supplementing the common law and the general legislation of Congress applicable therein. Alaska has its separate criminal code; the Indian Territory, Oklahoma, and, perhaps, others, have systems of their own.

If it be true that misconduct in Federal office is nowhere a crime, save when committed in the District of Columbia., the condition is rather to be attributed to oversight on the part of the Congress than accepted as evidence of its intention that it shall no longer be held criminal therein.

*361 It may be added that this view is not affected by the fact that misconduct in office is but a misdemeanor at common law, whilst the conspiracy to commit it, by reason of the character of the penalty prescribed, becomes an infamous offense. Clune v. United States, 159 U. S. 590, 595 , 40 L. ed. 269, 211, 16 Sup. St. Rep. 125. *

5. The indictment in the next case (No. 1396) is specially objected to on the ground that it does not show a conspiracy to defraud the United States. The contention is that to defraud the United States means to deprive them of something of value to do them a pecuniary injury. We have heretofore denied this restricted meaning to those words. Palmer v. Colladay, 18 App. 1 ). C. 426, 433. That was an appeal in a habeas corpus proceeding to obtain release from custody had by tbe order of a commissioner holding the petitioner to hail on a charge of forgery under Rev. Stat. § 5418 (U. S. Comp. Stat. 1901, p. 3666). The affidavit before tbe commissioner charged the petitioner with forgery in an attempt to defraud the United States through a false paper writing presented to the Civil Service Commission. After discussing the forgery sections briefly it was said tbat the acts of the parties would probably amount to a conspiracy to defraud the United States. The opinion of the court was delivered by Mr. Justice Barnard, of tbe supreme court of tbe District, who took the place of the absent Chief Justice. On this point lie said: “It is claimed by appellee tbat to defraud the United States must mean to deprive it of money wrongfully, or of something of money value; and that a falsehood or trick by which its officers are deceived in the matter of selecting those who are to perform work for it, could not be a fraud against the United *362 States. We do not agree to this proposition. . . If falsehoods are imposed upon the persons charged with the duty of ascertaining these qualifications, and made to take the place of facts, then the United States is defrauded, is deprived by deceit of the knowledge justly due to its officers in the proper discharge of its business, and it is thereby liable to obtain a less efficient employee.” See also United States v. Bunting, 82 Fed. 883 ; United States v. Curley, 122 Fed. 738 .

The statute, it will be remembered, denounces a conspiracy to defraud the United States in any manner or for any purpose, thereby expressly indicating an intention to give the word its broadest and most comprehensive signification. “Although a penal statute is to be construed strictly, the courts are not to disregard the plain intent of the legislature. Among other things it is well settled that a statute which is made for the good of the public, ought, although it be penal, to receive an equitable construction.” People v. Bartow, 6 Cow. 290 . See also Northern Securities Co. v. United States, 193 U. S. 197 , 48 L. ed. 679, 24 Sup. Ct. Rep. 119, and cases there cited.

To defraud means, not only to deprive or to withhold from one that which justly belongs to or is due him, but also to deprive him of any right by artifice or wrong practised upon him.

In its equitable sense, fraud, says Mr. Justice Story, “properly includes all acts, omissions, and concealments which involve a breach of. legal or equitable duty, trust, or confidence justly reposed, and are injurious to another, or by which an undue and unconscientious advantage is taken of another.” 1 Story, Eq. Jur. § 187.

The Postoffiee Department is charged with the performance of a great public service in which the people of every State, territory, and district are vitally interested.

The complete enjoyment of the benefits and advantages of this public service, as well as the prevention of evils that utilize the mails for their dissemination, depends upon the integrity and efficiency of the administration of the affairs of the Postoffice Department, particularly at its head in the city of Washington.

Any wilful or corrupt misconduct on the part of an official of *363 the department that operates to impair this administration works a wrong to the United States and does them some substantial injury. The injury may be pecuniary, that is to say, one whereby public money or property may have been taken, destroyed, or expended, but it may also be one the general damage resulting from which may be most serious and far reaching, and yet not of a specific character susceptible of certain ascertainment nnd pecuniary compensation.

Of this latter kind is the injury embraced in the charges of this indictment, and we are of the opinion that it is within the comprehension of the statute which makes punishable a conspiracy, not only to defraud the United States but to defraud them in any manner or for any purpose.

For the reasons given the order in each case must be affirmed. And it is so ordered. Affirmed.

[The appellants were subsequently tried in the lower court upon the indictments here sustained, and were acquitted by the verdict of the jury. — Reporter.]

Note by tlie Court, filed April 20, 1904:

We failed to observe before this opinion was filed that Congress liad specially recognized the continued existence of common-law offenses in the District of Columbia, by providing a uniform punishment therefor in § 910 of the new Code, which reads as follows:

“See. 910. Punishment for offenses not covered by provisions of Code.— Whoever shall be convicted of any criminal offense not covered by the provisions of any section ©f this Code, or of any general law of the United States not locally inapplicable in the District of Columbia, shall be punished by a fine not exceeding one thousand dollars or by imprisonment for not more than five years or both.”

How later courts describe this case

No later court has written an explanatory parenthetical about this case yet.

1938: 11940: 11941: 11947: 11955: 119382026peak 1938 · 1

Relies on it most ⓘ

  1. Story v. Rives97 F.2d 182 (D.C. Cir. 1938)
  2. Gertman v. Burdick123 F.2d 924 (D.C. Cir. 1941)
  3. United States v. Davis71 F. Supp. 749 (D.D.C. 1947)
  4. United States v. Manuel126 F. Supp. 618 (D.D.C. 1955)
  5. Burdick v. Burdick33 F. Supp. 921 (D.D.C. 1940)

Most recent

  1. United States v. Manuel126 F. Supp. 618 (D.D.C. 1955)
  2. United States v. Davis71 F. Supp. 749 (D.D.C. 1947)
  3. Gertman v. Burdick123 F.2d 924 (D.C. Cir. 1941)
  4. Burdick v. Burdick33 F. Supp. 921 (D.D.C. 1940)
  5. Story v. Rives97 F.2d 182 (D.C. Cir. 1938)

Citing references are not a citator: they show that a later opinion cites this case, not whether it followed, distinguished, or overruled it. Check negative history before relying on this case.

Authorities cited 11

DepthCaseCited by
Evans v. United States, 153 U.S. 584 (1894) 277
United States v. Eaton, 144 U.S. 677 (1892) 184
Northern Sec. Co. v. United States, 193 U.S. 197 (1904) 532
Pettibone v. United States, 148 U.S. 197 (1893) 387
Clune v. United States, 159 U.S. 590 (1895) 184
United States v. MacDaniel, 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 1 (1833) 120
Stokes v. United States, 157 U.S. 187 (1895) 59
People v. Bartow, 6 Cow. 290 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1826) 12
United States v. Bunting, 82 F. 883 (E.D. Pa. 1897) 8
United States v. Curley, 122 F. 738 (1903) 7
City of Cincinnati v. Rossiter, 18 Ohio App. 1 (1923) 4

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