Hartfield v. Pennsylvania Co.

Where a testator purchased a tract of land, and later an adjoining tract, after which he erected a house on the first tract and fenced in both tracts for a lawn, his devise of it as “my house” included both tracts.

On final hearing on bill to quiet title. Complainant has filed a bill to quiet title to certain real estate in the city of Beverly. Defendants have answered admitting complainant’s peaceable possession and asserting an adverse title. No demand for an issue at law having been made, final hearing has been had on the issue of title raised by the pleadings. No dispute exists touching the facts. The isstíe of title is wholly dependent upon the construction of a clause in the last will and testament of Charles English, deceased. . That clause is as follows: “Third: I order and direct that my wife be suffered and permitted to occupy and have the use of my house in Beverly and its contents for and during the full term of her natural life, and from and after her decease, I give, devise and bequeath the same unto my daughter, Alice E. Brown, absolutely, if she be then living' or should she predecease my said wife, then I give, devise and bequeath the same unto my said wife, absolutely if she be living at my decease.” It is to be herein determined what land'passed by the above-quoted devise of “my house in Beverly.” Whatever land passed by that devise is now owned in fee by complainant by virtue of a deed of conveyance from Alice E. Brown, who survived testator’s widow. The material facts touching the issue stated are as follows: March 13th, 1885, one Diehl conveyed to testator a tract or lot of land in Beverly fronting eighty feet on the east line of Jennings street and extending easterly in depth one hundred and twenty feet, more or less. October 7th, 1886, testator purchased from Diehl an adjacent tract of land at the north and also in the rear of the land first purchased, the tract so purchased being in the shape of the letter “L” and embracing the land lying between the lot first purchased and Church street and land in the rear of the tract first purchased. This tract had a frontage on Jennings street of forty feet and extended along Church street one hundred and sixty feet and- embraced forty feet in the rear of the tract first purchased. By these two purchases testator became the owner of a rectangular tract one hundred and twenty feet in frontage on Jennings street and one hundred and sixty feet on Church street. Thereafter testator erected a dwelling-house on the land so owned by him. The dwelling-house was located on the land described in the first conveyance above referred to and a lawn was made by testator embracing the remaining portion of his land, and tlie whole was then surrounded and enclosed by a fence and no visible or distinguishable trace was left of the lines which originally divided the two tracts of land. The dwelling-house was then occupied by testator as his home during the remainder of his lifetime, and the surrounding land above referred to as a lawn was so used and enjoyed by him. Testator's will was executed while he was so enjoying his home. Testator owned no other house or home in Beverly. Defendants claim that the land secondly purchased by testator does not pass by the above-quoted devise of “my house in Beverly.”