Evans v. Tatem

A person taking1 out letters of1 administration in Pennsylvania, may be sued in Tennessee for a debt due by the intestate. An action at law is maintainable in Pennsylvania, on a decree of á Court of Equity in Tennessee for'the payment of money. In such action the pleas of nil debet, and nul tiel record, are both bad on general demurrer. If the defendant mean to deny the existence of such decree, he may frame a plea to meet the averment of the decree in the declaration, and such plea must conclude to the country.

IN ERROR. Error to the District Court for the city.and county of Philadelphia. , — —1 Howell Tatem, the plaintiff below, brought this action of debt against Jinn Evans, administratrix of John B. Evans, deceased, to recover the sum of 6,239 dollars, and 10 cents, including the amount, with costs, decreed in favour of the plaintiff Tatem, against the defendant Ann Evans, as surviving administratrix of J. B. Evans, in the Court of Errors and Appeals, and Court of Equity, for the State' of Tennessee. The decree was made in that court in a proceeding by Tatem, by bill in equity, to which the defendant, Ann Evans, appeared and pleaded, and it was thereby ordered, adjudged, and decreed, that she the said Ann, administratrix of J. B. Evans, deceased, should pay to the said Tatem, the sum of 5,949 dollars 60 cents; out of the assets belonging to the estate of the said J. B. 'Evans, deceased, which had .come to her hands to be administered, and all the costs o'f the cause out of said assets in her hands to be administered, and if none, then out of her proper goods and chattels. The defendant pleaded nil debet, and nul tiel record: to both which pleas,, the plaintiff demurred, and the court below gave judgment for the plaintiff.- The. defendant also pleaded no assets,'jolene administravit', and payment with leave, &c.: to which the plaintiff replied, assets, not fully administered, and non solvit, and issues were joined thereon, and a verdict was given on each issue for the plaintiff.' On the trial of these issues in the court below, the defendant, under a previous notice of special matter, and notice to produce the copy of the order, judgment, and decree, upon which the suit was founded, offered to show by evidence, that neither she, nor the intestate, J. B. Evans-, were at any time indebted, or bound in law or equity, to pay to the plaintiff any sum or sums of money; and also, that the defendant, being administratrix under the law of Pennsylvania, and not under the laws of Tennessee, and the said order, judgment, and decree, being had or made upon matters alleged to have arisen and existed in the life time of the intestate, she was not, as such, amenable to the authority, or power of a court' in Tennessee; and that, therefore, the said order, judgment, and decree, were not had or made by any court having jurisdiction in the matter. And the defendant further offered to. show, that from the said decree itself, and the matters therein ■ stated j nothing was due in law or equity, or ought to be paid by the defendant to the plaintiff,, and that the same was unjust and unfounded. And also, that from the matters stated in the decree,, as inducing the same, it does not appear on the face of the proceeding and decree, that so much is due to the plaintiff, as by the same is-decreed. But the court below rejected the whole of the evidence so offered, and were of opinion, that the said order, judgment, and decree, were conclusive evidence of the debt in the plaintiff’s declaration claimed and could not be controverted, and so gave it in charge to the jury. To. which charge the defendant excepted. contended, that a decree of a Court of Chancery was- hot a record, nor conclusive of the rights of the parties, but mightbe inquired into in another suit, by evidence extrinsic, or by showing from matters intrinsic, that nothing was due in law or equity to the plaintiff, or that so much was not due as was decreed. ' Coke, in 3 Inst. 71, defines a record to be, regularly, a monument, or act judicial, before a judge or judges in a court of record,- entered in parchment in the right roll; and says, speaking of chancery, that as to the proceeding by-English bill, in a course of equity, it' is no court of record, for thereupon no writ of error lieth as in other cases. And again in page 123, the court of equity, in the proceeding in a course of equity, is no court of record, and, therefore, it cannot hold plea of any thing whereof judgment is given, which is a judicial matter of record.. And in 4 Inst. 89, this court of equity proceeding by English bill, is said to be no court of record, and therefore, it can bind but the person only, and neither the estate of the defendant’s lands, nor property of his goods or chattels. The same principios are laid down in 4 Vin. Jib. 382, k. In Doughty v. Fawn, Yelv. 226. Brownl. 117, it was held, that it was issuable and triable by jury, whether there was an ordér of chancery pleaded by the defendant, or not; for their orders there are only in paper, and are not of record, to be tried by the record, but only by jury. Gilbert in his Treatise on Evidence,- 48, says, the proceedings of the court of chancery on the JEnglish side, are not of record; and the reason is, they are not precedents of justice: for the proceedings in chancery are founded only on the circumstances of each private case, and they cannot be rules to any other; and the judgment there is secundum sequum et bo-num, and not secundum leges et consuetudines: and the "reason why any record is of validity and authority is, because it is declarative of the sense of the nation, and is a memorial of what is the law of the nation: now chancery proceedings are no memorials of the laws of England, because the Chancellor is not bound to proceed according to law. To the same effect are Bull. N. P. 235, and 1 Harr. Ch. 20.' Even the court of chancery itself, does not regard a prior decree as conclusive. Where a ..new original bill is necessary to carry a decree into execution, the court will'examine the grounds of the former decree, before they will make a new one: though in their examination," they will confine themselves to the proofs made in the' first decree. 1 Harr. Ch. Pr. 148, cites Lawrence v. Birnie, 2 Ch. Hep. 128. In West v. Skip, 1 Vez. 145, though the general rule is stated to be, that on a bill to carry a former decree into execution, the court can only do that, and not vary; yet there are' several instances wherein the court has considered the directions, and whether there was any mistake; and it was done in that case.. To give this decree in a court of equity, therefore, the conclusive effect contended for, would be to give it a more binding efficacy than a court of chancery, in the same state, would allow it: They would examine into any mistake appearing on its proceedings: but the court below, in this casé, would not allow us to show error on the face of the proceedings. 2d. No action at law lies on a decree in chancery. That court proceeds on the special circumstances of each particular case, founded on-principles of equity,'which a court of law does not recognize, and it makes specific decrees, which it is out-of the power of a court of law to enforce. A court of equity only can enforce the decree o'f another court of equity, and apply the proper redress. It would be a great hardship if the party pould come into a court of law, and give the decree, by the ■ forms of proceeding there, a conclusive effect, when it would be liable to be opened by a bill of review, in the same court where it was given. For in the same court the decree is never concluded: it is always in fieri, and has no likeness to a judgment at law. Any error in figures may be even corrected by an order: and a bill of review lies on new matter. Cowp. Eq. 88, 91. The plaintiff here was not without a remedy, for he ought to have filed his bill on the equity side of the Circuit Court of the UnitedjStates. In the case of Post v. Neafie, 3 Caines, 22, it is true, it was decided in New-YorJe, that debt lies on the decree of a court of chancery in another state, for the payment of money only by the defendant, without any acts to de done by the plaintiff; but it was against the opinion of Kent,.J., and. by a law of New-Jersey, a decree in chancery has the force and effect of a judgment at law: so that it is no authority in case of a decree of an ordinary character. It is stated, however, in page 37, that Chase, J. had decided in the Circuit Court of Connecticut, that an action at law would not lie on a decree in chancery. 3d. Nil debet, or mil tiel record, were correct pleas in this action, if it be sustainable. The aid of the jury might be necessary to examine facts, and correct errors. If there were no such.decree, how was the party in any other way to put that in issue? The plea of no such decree is unprecedented. Nul tiel record, was the proper plea for that purpose: and should conclude to the country. If there were such decree, then the party ought to be allowed to plead nil debet, by which he would entitle himself to all the rights he would possess in a proceeding in a court of equity in Tennessee. It is the usual and proper plea to debt on a foreign judgment, and under -it want of jurisdiction might be shown. It does not contravene the constitution of the United States, but admits whatever may be given in evidence in accordance with the constitution. It is 'a further objection to this action, that it is upon a proceeding in Tennessee, against a person who administered in Pennsylvania. It is different from the case of an administrator plaintiff. In Pennsylvania, by act,of assembly,’ one who administers in another state may bring suit here; but it does not follow that he may be sued. In the case of the Selectmen of Boston V. Ward Nicholas Boylston, 2 Mass. Pep. 384, an administrator with the will annexed of one domiciled in England, and dying there, .came into Massachusetts, and took administration there cum testamento an-nexo: he was held not .liable to account .there for effects received by him in England. This case is recognized in 5 Mass. Rep. 77, and it is held, that an administrator who has not administered in Massachusetts is not liable to be sued there, so as to render the real estate liable. ' One who has obtained administration in another state cannot prosecute or defend an áction in Massachusetts. Goodwin y. Jones, 3 Mass. Rep. 514. It is objected, that the defendant pleaded in Tennessee: but there is nothing in that: consent cannot give jurisdiction. The assets 'were all collected in Pennsylvania, and held in trust for others. The defendant never was in Tennessee. If one administers in another state, and changes his domicil, and comes here, he may be sued here. Bryan v. M‘Gee cited Whart. Big. 277. The decree is for payment out of the assetsj which must be understood of assets in Tennessee. 1. The administrator here was liable in Tennessee. In Swear-ingen v.Pendleton, 4 Serg. & Rawle, 389, this point was decided, and the opinion of the court below confirmed, that an executor is liable in respect to all the assets which come to his hands, whether they arise in the county where the letters testamentary are granted, or elsewhere, in another state, or even in a foreign country, agreeably to Bowie’s case, 6 Co. 46, b., where one administered as executor in Ireland, and received assets there, ■ and then came to England: he was held liable: for if the executors have any goods of the testator’s in any part of the world, they shall be charged in respect to them. No distinction can be drawn between an executor ■ and an administrator in this respect. But it does not appear by the proceedings.in Tennessee, where the defendant administered. The bill and answer merely state, that administration had been granted to Jinn Evans, and Henry Hawkins, citizens of Pennsylvania; the plea put in by Jinn Evans states her to be surviving administrator of J. B. Evans, and does not mention where administration was granted. She appeared voluntarily to the plaintiff’s bill, and thereby admitted the jurisdiction, and she is now estopped to deny it. All the cases referred to on the opposite side occurred in Massachusetts, where there is an act of the legislature, regulating this matter, and under this act the cases- were determined. 2. The plea of nil debet to an action on the judgment or decree of the court of another state, is not. admissible.. This plea opens every thing, even the original cause of action; and would put the plaintiff upon proving that. Chitt. Plead. 476, 7. The constitution of the United States declares, that full • faith and credit shall be given in each state to the public acts, records, and judicial proceedings of every state: and congress may, by general laws, prescribe the manner in which such acts, records and proceedings shall be proved and the effect thereof,' Jlrt. 4. Sect. 1. Congress have accordingly, by the act of May 26th, 1790, Sect. 1. enacted, that they shall have such faith and credit given to them in every court within the United States, as they have by law or usage in the courts of the state from whence the said records are or shall be taken. They have thereby declared the effect of such proceedings: and the result is that the judgment of a state court shall have the same credit, validity, and effect in any state, which it had in the state where it was pronounced: and that whatever plea would be good in a suit thereon in such state and no other can be pleaded. Serg. Const. Law, 381, and cases cited. In Mills v. Duryee, 7 Cranch. 481, in a suit in the District of Columbia, upon a judgment in the Supreme Court of New YorJe, the pjea of nil debet was held bad on general demurrer. In Hampton v. M‘Connel, 4 Wheat. 234, in debt in the Circuit Court of South Carolina, on a judgment in the Supreme Court of New York, nil debet was held a bad plea. To the same purpose is the case of Armstrong V. Carson’s Executors, 2 Dali. 302. In Burden v. Fitch, 15 Johns. 144, and Andrews v. Montgomery, 19 Johns. 162, the Supreme Court of New York have held, that a judgment fairly and regularly obtained in another state is conclusive: though it is-void, if the court had no jurisdiction. And the same principle was adopted by the Supreme Court of Massachusetts, in Bissel v. Brigs, 9 Mass. Rep, ■ 462. The proceedings here were judicial proceedings within the meaning of the constitution and acts of congress, and therefore equally binding with a record. 3. The plea of nul tiel record was altogether improper. The proceedings of the court of equity in Tennessee are not called a record in the declaration, and the cases cited on the opposite side abundantly prove, that they were not of'the nature of a record. If the defendant meant to deny that there was any such decree, he certainly might plead that there was no such decree: or might plead a want of jurisdiction in the court. . 4. Does an action at law lie on a decree of a court of equity? The Court of Chancery in England is termed by Blackstone, one “of the King’s superior and original courts of justice.” 3 Bl. Com. 46. A decree in. Chancery may be proved by an exemplification under the seal of the court. .1 Phill. Ev. 295. Such decree is equal to a judgment at law, so far as concerns the personal estate of the party: and his goods maybe sequestered, although the party is in custody upon an attachment for a contempt. 2 Madd. Ch. 355, If the decree is prior to a judgment at law, it shall have preference in the administration of assets: and the original demand transit in remiudicatam.For. 218. Cas. temp. Talb 217,22-3. The same principle is decided in Thompsons. Brown, 4 Johns. Ch, Cas. 638. In Hopkins v. Lee, 6 Wheat. 109, a decree in chancery is said to be as conclusive between the parties as a judgment at law. The inquiry into the merits of an original decree, is but matter of practice: and in New York it can only be done by bill of review, Gel-ston v. Codwise, 1 Johns. Ch. 189. Bennet v. Winter, 2 Johns. Ch. 205. The cases cited to show that in England, on a bill filed to enforce a' decree, the court will inquire into the merits of the original decree, do not prove this to be the general rule; and if it were, it does not prove that the complainant may not have his election to proceed at law. or equity. By the law of Tennessee, the complainant may have an execution on a decree in equity, as on a judgment at common law. Such being the effect of a. decree, there- is no reason why an action at law should not be maintained on it, where it is. simply for the payment of1 money, which then becomes a debt, 3 Lev. 555. Equity js part of our law; and as we have no Court of Chancery, a party recovering a debt by such a decree in another state, would be remediless in the courts of Pennsylvania, if the courts of common law refuse to sustain an action. Such action is not without precedent. In 7 Went. Plead, there is the form of a declaration on a decree in chancery. And iti Post v. Neafie, 3 Caines, 22, the Supreme Court of New York, determined, that'an action at law was maintainable there on a decree in chancery in New Jersey.