St. Mary's College v. Crowl

' Exemption fbom Taxation ; Educational Purposes. Property, in order to be exempt from taxation, because used for educational purposes, must be used directly, immediately and exclusively for such purposes.

Error from Pottawatomie District Court. Injunction, brought by St. Mary's College against the treasurer of Pottawatomie county to restrain the collection -of alleged illegal taxes. The petition alleges that plaintiff ■ is a corporation, “ organized for purposes wholly educational in their nature; that during the year 1870 said plaintiff was • engaged in the conduct and control of an educational institution” by the name of St. Mary’s College, “and the sole and only purpose and design of the plaintiff was the management of the said institution for the purposes of education, and none other,” etc.; that the plaintiff owned certain real and personal property, which it “ used exclusively for educational purposes,” and which was therefore exempt from taxation; that said property had been illegally assessed, etc. From the answer it appears that plaintiff owns 80 acres of land, inclosed by itself as college grounds, on which are erected the college buildings, and that said college grounds, and buildings thereon, being used for educational purposes, have not at any time been assessed or taxed; that the taxes complained of by plaintiff were assessed on an extensive tract of land adjoining said college grounds, of which 320 acres were inclosed and cultivated as a “farm,” 120 acres were used as a pasture, and the residue “is wild land, uninclosed, unoccupied, and unused for any purpose whatever by any person or corporation,” and upon a lot of horses, cattle, mules, asses, hogs, pleasure carriages, hay and grain, and farming implements kept and used on said farm. From the agreed statement of facts on which the case was tried, it appears — “ That from sometime previous to the time of the assessment and levy of the taxes complained of, the plaintiff, by contract with the government of the United States, had been educating about eighty Indians in agricultural pursuits, and in the rudiments of reading, writing, etc., and that the land and personal property were used by the plaintiff as follows: The inclosed part of the land was used as a farm on which vegetables, grain and stock are produced, and on which the Indians were trained and educated to agricultural pursuits, and the unimproved part of said land was used for grazing stock and cutting hay for the farm, and the wood-land for obtaining wood; and the products of the farm were mainly consumed on the farm, but a portion of the products of the farm was sold and the proceeds of the same were used in furnishing clothing and provisions for the Indians, the employees in their training, and the missionaries among them. The horses, mules, etc., wei'eused in working the farm, and the farming implements were used in the same way, and the live stock, consisting of cattle and hogs, was for use to furnish milk, butter and meat to the Indians and employees. The land used to obtain hay, pasture and wood, as above stated, was prairie and wood-land, unimproved, uncultivated, and was in part prairie and part wood land, and the balance inclosed and cultivated. The property, real and personal, on which the taxes were levied as alleged in the petition, was at the time of said levy and at all times herein stated, used for no other purpose by the plaintiff than as herein set forth.” The action was tried at the February Term 1872 of the district court. The temporary restraining order granted oft the filing of the petition was vacated, the injunction prayed for was denied, the petition dismissed, and judgment given in favor of the county treasurer for costs, and the plaintiff brings the case here on error. 1. The very name of the plaintiff indicates the purpose of its existence; and it is admitted that it is a corporation for educational purposes. We are aware that the current of the decisions is to the effect that the person claiming an exemption from the common burden imposed upon all property for the support of government, must bring himself clearly within the scope of the constitutional and statutory provisions granting the exemption. And we are further aware, to which reflection we desire to call the attention of the court, that the large majority of decisions on this question were rendered before the public mind had been so thoroughly awakened to the importance of fostering the interests of education; before the benefit to society, arising from educational institutions, had so fastened itself upon the public mind as to find expression in the exemptions from taxation, specified in the fundamental laws adopted of late years. And many of the decisions are based upon claims made by various religious denominations, on the plea of religious exemption, of which the state and the courts have been peculiarly jealous. In the matter of education of later years, the people, and the conventions which expressed their will, have become more liberal, as they have deemed that society can well afford, in view of the blessings of education, to forgive the pittance of taxation arising from institutions of learning and the property used therein. We claim that it is but just that the rigid, inexorable rule heretofore adhered to should, at least to some extent, bend to the liberality in these matters, which is the prevailing and intelligent sentiment of the times in which we live. In the case before us the property, real and personal, sought to be subjected to taxation, was used — the real estate “in training and educating Indians in agricultural pursuits;” the personal property used necessarily in the same training, and the products of the farm were consumed thereon, and in furnishing clothing and provisions for the Indians, employees, and for missionaries; “that the property, real and personal, mentioned in the petition, was used for no other purpose than as set forth;” that is, for no purpose of private or corporate gain, of individual emolument, but solely to the end of sub-serving the literary and agricultural education of the Indians • — a purpose sanctified by the legislation and paternal care of the federal government for many years past, a policy upon its part reflecting honor upon its foresight and humanity. It is too late now to question whether the science of agriculture is education, or forms any part of education. The constitution of our state (art. 6, sec. 2,) and statute of the state, as well as of the federal government, specifically mentions agriculture as a branch of education, and both governments, have within our own borders munificently endowed agricultural colleges; and when our organic law says that “ all property used exclusively for educational purposes shall be exempt from taxation,” it would be a contradiction of terms to say that property used exclusively in teaching, the science of agriculture should be taxed, The test which seemed to be applied by this court in the Washburn College case, (8 Kas., 344,) was, whether the property was used for educational purposes; and because the fact was apparent there that the property was not used at all, the court decided that the mere ownership by an educational institution did rfot bring the property within the provision of the constitutional exemption; but it seemed to be admitted in that case if the property had been occupied and used by the collegiate institution, and if it had therein its necessary scientific property used in colleges, that all such property would be exempt from taxation. This case is totally different from that, for here, all the property, real and personal, is admitted to be used for the purposes of education, and “for no other purpose;” so that the ruling in the Washburn College case can have, we apprehend, no bearing on the case at bar. The personal property on the farm — the live stock, plows, threshing machines, wagons, harrows, etc., it must be admitted, are as essential in the process of an agricultural education, as chemical, astronomical, or mathematical instruments are in obtaining or imparting a purely scientific education; and if one class of property would be exempt from taxation, we see no reason why the other would not. The quantity, value and usefulness must be left to the discretion of the persons in charge of the institution, and is not a question for the court. If the evidence in the case shows they are exclusively used in the process of education, the express terms of the constitution exempts them from taxation. Can it be argued that because the products of the farm are partially consumed in feeding the students, and their instructors, that therefore the property is not exclusively used for educational purposes? As well might it be said that a blackboard, a compass, a theodolite, a crucible, or other article used in colleges, is not exclusively used for educational purposes, because with their aid, in part, tuitions are earned which pay the expenses of a professor, and that, therefore, they are not exclusively used in the sense of the constitution; or that churches are not used exclusively for religious purposes, because the Sabbath collections are taken up to defray the.expenses of maintaining the church. Such constructions would surely do violence to the intention of the framers of our organic law. (Asylum v. Phoenix Ba/nk, 4 Conn., 172.) The institution that now claims the benefit of the constitutional exemption from taxation, was in fact, though, not in name, an educational institution long before the white man had crossed the Missouri, and its efforts and labors in- the education and civilization of the original owners of our soil have been gratefully appreciated by the general government, which provided by treaty stipulation that it should retain the lands on which it had educated the red men for a quarter of a century before the fundamental law of Kansas was framed. Under that law it has become a body corporate for educational purposes only. Its property, in every fair sense of the term, is exclusively used for educational purposes, and though it refers with pride to its history and its antiquity, it asks only that this court shall hold it to be what it ever has been, and shall extend to it the benefits of a constitutional provision framed to foster, protect and cherish it and kindred institutions. The plaintiff claims exemption from taxation for its property on the alleged ground of its use for educational purposes. The exemption from taxation is of property used exclusively for educational purposes, and not partly for educational and partly for other purposes. (Const., art. 11, § 1.) If used for other purposes, it was liable to taxation, although the proceeds were in future to be applied for the promotion of education. Cincinnati College v. State, 19 Ohio, 110. All laws exempting any of the property in the state from taxation, being in derogation of equal rights, should be construed strictly: 19 Ohio, 110; 1 Metcalf, 538; 2 Cushing, 611. “ Exemptions, as they are contrary to common right, are not to be favored by the courts. They should be confined to the specified objects, and to such as by reasonable intendment the legislature must have had in contemplation. In short, the statute which exempts persons or property from taxation is to be construed strictly.” Orr v. Baker, 4 .Ind., 86. See also 8 Ind., 328. The property of the plaintiff which was taxed was not used exclusively for educational purposes, but was used for other purposes; and very little, if any of it, was actually used for educational purposes at all, in the sense intended by the constitution. It was not such property, either in ,its kind or use, as was intended to be exempted from taxation by the constitution. To entitle it to exemption, its use for educational purposes must have been immediate, as well as exclusive, and not remote — the property must have been such as the college buildings, the furniture and apparatus used in the schoolrooms, the ground whereon the buildings are situated, the yards, college grounds proper, in actual and immediate use in carrying on the usual and necessary business of an educational institution; and - not such property, put to such uses, as the plaintiff's, described in the agreed statement of facts. Were it otherwise, it would be difficult to tell where the exemption would stop. Indeed, it is difficult to see how a large portion of the property claimed to be exempt from taxation in this ease' — -for instance, the meadow and pasture lands, the wild, unoccupied, unimproved prairie and wood- - lands, threshing machine, horses, mules, cattle, swine, and a pleasure carriage — could very well be used exclusively for educational purposes. The fact that the plaintiff was, under contract with the United States, educating a certain number of Indians to agricultural pursuits, on the farming lands, can make no difference.. Any farmer might have a similar contract, and use his farm for a like purpose; but that would not give his farm immunity from taxation.