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Reddall v. Bryan

Wm. C. Reddall v. Wm. H. Bryan and Others

Reddall v. Bryan, 14 Md. 444 (1859)
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Court
Court of Appeals of Maryland · State Highest Courts
Decided
July 29, 1859
Judges
Bartol
Citations
14 Md. 444
Headnotes
Digging deep holes and planting therein large stone pillars or abutments,, digging and carrying away large banks of valuable clay, and constructing an aqueduct by ditches and embankments through, and thus permanently dividing the complainant’s land, are acts which, if done without authority of law, would present a case of irreparable damage, authorizing the interference of a court of equity by injunction. The right to an injunction is not ex debito jusliticD, but the application is addressed to the sound conscience of the chancellor acting upon all the circumstances belonging to each particular case. Tho chancellor has the right to require a .“nil and candid disclosure of all the facts, and if there appears in the proceedings sufficient to show that this lias not been made, he may properly refuse to grant au injunction. The Constitution of this Stale declares that, “The Legislature shall enact no law authorizing private property to be taken for public use without just compensation, as agreed upon between the parlies, or a weeded by a jury, being first paid or tendered to the party entitled to such compensation.” llni.r: 1st. "’lidÍ these words are, mandatory, both as to the use for which private properly may he taken and the previous payment or tender of compensation therefor: it can be taken oul» for public use. 2nd. Hut the woids, “public use,” do not mean merely a use of the government or State of Maryland, and its inhabitants as such, but embrace within their scope a use of the Government of the United States. 3rd. The expropriation of land in Maryland for the purpose of supplying the city of Washington with water, is, in every sense, a taking of it for public use, and, therefore, the Act of 2d53, ah. 179, authorizing such expropriation, is not uuconstitu ional. 4th. The Government of the United States has power, under tho last, two clauses of the Constitution of the United States, to construct an aqueduct, drawing its supply of water for tho city of Washington, from within the limits of 'Maryland, and using and occupying land for that purpose in Maryland, by permission and consent of the State.
Summary
Appeal from the equity side of the Circuit Court for Montgomery county. This appeal is from an order refusing an injunction, upon a bill filed by the appellant against the appellees in April 1858. The bill alleges that the complainant is and has been for a long time, and was, long before the commission of the trespasses hereinafter described, seized and possessed of a valuable tract of land called “The llesurvey of Magruder’s and Bell’s Honesty,” situated in Montgomery county, containing one hundred and thirty acres, more or less; that certain individuals, (the defendants,) contriving and confederating together, on the 1st of April 1857, and on divers days and times between that day and the day of the filing of this bill, with force and arms, broke and entered complainant’s said close or tract of land, tore down his fences, cut down and destroyed bis crops, dug up and subverted his soil, and other great, and irreparable .damage to him then and there did, to his great injury; that said defendants have resolved and declared to complainant, and openly to others, that it is their fixed determination to continue said trespasses, and to do in and upon said land, and to complainant, like and further and greater irreparable damage; having dug deep holes in the earth and soil of the complainant, they are steadily and recklessly proceeding to plant and build thereon a large and heavy stone pillar or abutment, of about forty feet at the base, to be planted above one hundred feet beneath the soil, the said pillar being, as they allege, intended for the support of a bridge or aqueduct across a stream of water called “The Cabin John Branch,” adjacent to complainant’s said land, and they aver and declare that it is their fixed resolution and determination to continue the erection of said stone pillar or abutment until it shall be finished, or until the said bridge or aqueduct shall be completed and permanently established, which will be doing irreparable damage to complainant, inasmuch as it will be impossible for him except at incalculable and ruinous expense, to remove, fill up and restore the same, and that said bridge and pillar will be wholly useless to him, and if it were not, it is the fixed and avowed determination of the defendants so to construct, said bridge or aqueduct, that it shall never be used by him or the public at large. The bill further charges that the defendants have, in addition to their other trespasses, driven down into complainant’s land two lines of stakes, beginning at I he proposed termination of said bridge on his land and extending entirely across or through a part of his land, and have marked out a space between said lines of two hundred feet in width through the whole of said extent, for the purpose, as they allege, of digging up, carrying away and converting to their own use, the inexhaustible banks of clay there to be found/ which clay is of a character peculiarly valuable to complainant, being of that sort known as aluminous clay, and worth to him a large sum of money, all which they declare they mean to use in the construction of said aqueduct, or for purposes connected therewith, both on and off his land-. In procuring said clay and in con. structing said aqueduct, they aver their intention of digging up complainant’s soil to a great depth, and, for the purpose of forming an aqueduct through his land, will necessarily be compelled to go to the depth of twelve or fifteen feet in many places, and in others, where the land is lower, will be compelled to raise great banks upon his land, and also to erect brick walls through the same, and to cause a large and perpetual stream of water to flow through it for the sole use and benefit of said aqueduct, and to his entire exclusion, all which they declare it is their intention to do. This the Complainant alleges will be doing irreparable damage to him, by permanently dividing his land, not only to depriving him of said valuable clay, and of the use of the land over and through which the said deep holes shall be dug, and the said ditches shall be cut, and the said aqueduct shall be built, but totally and forever obstructing him in his necessary use of his land for tillage, and his passage and progress for farming and other purposes, from one part to (he other of that portion of his land so intended to be divided, dug up, built upon and obstructed. The bill further states that, complaiuant has instituted his action of trespass quare clausum fregit in the Circuit Court of Montgomery county, for the purpose of recovering damages against the defendants for the said trespasses, in the trial of which cause his rights will be adjudged by said court, and justice done him, so far as relates to said past trespasses, but not to any trespass which may be subsequently committed, or the exercise of any preventive justice by which they may be restrained from doing irreparable damage to him. It further states that said defendants pretend that in all trespasses which, as above charged, they have committed, and for all they threaten and meditate doing, as now set forth, they are authorized and protected by the authority of the Executive of the United States, such action of the Executive not being sanctioned by any Act of Congress, as complainant avers, under which any taking of private property for actual or pretended public use could be justified, but the only purpose of such aclion being the supply of water to the city of Washington, or the cities of Washington and Georgetown, beyond the territory of the State of Maryland, for which supply Congress has made merely, from time to lime, appropriations, without any legislative enactment prescribing the taking of property, or any other proceedings or means for effecting such supply. The complainant further stales that said persons so transgressing, claim colour of authority for that action of the Executive of thé United Slates, under the Act of the Legislature of Maryland of 1853, ch. 179, which purports (invalidly and ineffectually, as complainant insists) to give authority to the United States to purchase land for so supplying water through construction of dams/reservoirs, buildings and other works, and over such land to exercise necessary jurisdiction concurrently with the State of Maryland, and authorizing, in case of owners of lands and materials not agreeing with the United States for a sale, adverse appropriation of such lands and of requisite materials from lands in Maryland, by condemnation, and in valuation in manner as prescribed in the case of the Chesapeake and Ohio Canal Company’s occasions for land and materials for that compares works, and he avers that no Act of Congress allowing any purchase by or for the United States, was éver passed, nor was any attempt by or for the United States ever made towards an agreement with him for a purchase of his land with reference to said works, and he insists and charges that all pretended authorization and sanction aforesaid, under said action of the Executivemf the United States, and under such Act of the Legislature of Maryland, is repugnant to the Constitution of the United States and the Constitution of Maryland, and apart from any constitutional interest, and without regard to any organic law or principle of written law, is invalid, and cannot operate or deprive him of his properly to transfer it to a municipal corporation or corporations beyond the limits of a State within whose jurisdiction and protection it lies, and for no public purpose of the State of Maryland, nor for a purpose connected with (he United States, as such, and of a federal and general character, nor even so declared to be in said Act of Assembly, or in any action of Congress. The bill then prays for an injunction restraining the defendants from cutting down any further timber on said land of the complainant, or further proceeding in the planting or erecting any stone pillar or abutment thereon or therein, or any further digging in or through the same, or building brick or stone work thereon or therethrough, or the introduction of water through the same, or any further trespass thereon. On this bill the court (Brewer, J.) passed an order refusing the injunction, from which the complainant appealed.

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Opinion of the Court — Bartol

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Bartol, L,

delivered the opinion of this court.

In the opinion of a majority of this court, the nature of the acts complained of in this bill, and of the injury alleged, is such as to present a case of irreparable damage, which would entitle the complainant to the interposition of a court of equity by injunction, if it sufficiently appeared on the face of the bill' that the acts charged were done by the defendants without authority of law.

We think there is great force in the view taken by the Circuit court of the manner in which the case of the complainant is stated in the bill, and cannot avoid the conclusion, ‘‘that it is made out by the concealment of facts having a very important bearing upon it, and which would (if fully stated) act materially upon the conscience of the court.”

The right to an injunction is not ex debito justitice, but such application is addressed to the sound conscience of the chancellor, acting upon all the circumstances belonging to each particular case. He has the right (o require a full and candid disclosure of all the facts, and if there appears in the proceedings, sufficient to show that this has not been made, he may properly refuse to exercise the extraordinary power of the court, through the instrumentality of a writ of injunction.

There is sufficient, however, on the face of the bill to show that the defendants are acting under the authority of the government of the United States, in the construction of an aque *477 duct for supplying the city of Washington with water, and that the authority of the general government to occupy and use the lands of the complainant for that purpose, is based upon the Act of Assembly of 1853, ch. 179.

That Act authorizes the expropriation of lands within the State of Maryland, for the purpose of constructing such aqueduct. It is not alleged in the bill that the defendants have not in all things complied with the provisions of that Act, or that condemnation has not been made, as therein provided, and the damages awarded tendered to the complainant. But the ground is taken in the bill, and it has been insisted on in the argument, that the Act of 1853 is unconstitutional and void, because the use for which the property is authorized to be taken, is not “a public use,” within the meaning of the 46th section of the Srd Article of the Constitution.

The language of that section is:

“The Legislature shall enact no law authorizing private property to be taken for public use, without just compensation as agreed upon between the parties, or awarded by a jury, being first paid or tendered to the party entitled to such compensation.”

We regard the words of this section as mandatory, both as to the use for which private property may be taken, and the previous payment or tender of compensation therefor. It can be taken only for public use. But we cannot adopt the narrow, and restricted construction of these words, contended for by the appellant’s counsel. They do not mean merely a use of the government of Maryland, or of the State of Maryland, and its inhabitants as such, but, in our opinion, they embrace within their scope, a use of the government of the United States.

The supplying of the capital of the United States with water, essential for the preservation of the public buildings and public records, and alike essential for the use of the officers of the government, who are compelled to reside there, permanently or temporarily, is surely a public use, within the meaning of our State Constitution.

Maryland, as one of the States of the Union, and, in some *478 sense, an integral part of the great public, interested in and constituting a part of the general government, has, by the provision of her Constitution, which we have cited, conferred upon the Legislature the power of passing the Act of 1853, and we should have no difficulty in pronouncing that Act valid and constitutional, even if there were no other or different relations subsisting between the State of Maryland and the seat of government of the United States, than those which belong to every other State. But, as justly remarked by the judge of the Circuit court, in his opinion in the case of United States vs. Anderson, “By the Act of 1791, in pursuance of the 8th sec. of the 1st Article of the Constitution of the United States, the State ceded jurisdiction over its portion of the ten miles square, for certain purposes. ® * ® * * The State never intended to abandon all interest in the District.”

The relation, therefore, between the District of Columbia, composed of territory ceded by Maryland for certain purposes only, and the State of whose soil it forms a part, is more intimate and close than that which it bears to any other State.

We conclude, therefore, that the expropriation of lands in Maryland, for the purpose of supplying the city of Washington with water, may be regarded, in every sense, as taking it for public use.

■ We are also of opinion that the government of the United States possesses the power, under the Constitution, to construct such aqueduct, drawing its supply of water, if necessary, from within the limits of Maryland, and using and occupying lands for that purpose in Maryland, by the permission and consent of the State. We have not failed to recognize the force of many of the views presented in the able arguments of the appellant’s counsel on this point; and we appreciate the delicacy and importance of questions, involving the exercise by the general government, of powers not expressly granted. We do not undervalue the doctrine which inculcates a jealous and watchful vigilance against any encroachment upon the rights of the States; but we know of nothing to prevent a State from entering into any contract which is not prohibited by the Constitution of the United States or its own fundamental law. *479 We regard the power of the Legislature to pass the Act of 1853, as clearly recognized by the 46th section of the 3rd Article of the State Constitution, and we think the power of Congress to accept the privileges granted under the Act of 1853, and to provide for the construction of the aqueduct, is conferred by the last two clauses of the eighth section of the first Article of the Constitution of the United States.

(Decided July 29th, 1859.)

The order of the Circuit court, from which this appeal was taken, will be affirmed, and the cause remanded.

Order affmned icith costs, and cause remanded.

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Cited by 24 cases

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1864–1865: 11866–1867: 11868–1869: 11872–1873: 21874–1875: 11884–1885: 11890–1891: 11896–1897: 11898–1899: 11902–1903: 11904–1905: 11912–1913: 11920–1921: 11926–1927: 11930–1931: 21932–1933: 11934–1935: 21936–1937: 11940–1941: 11942–1943: 11956–1957: 118642026peak 1872 · 2

Relies on it most ⓘ

  1. Peoples Gas Light & Coke Co. v. Cook Lumber Terminal Co.256 Ill. App. 357 (1930) · Dissent
  2. Lowe v. Lowe133 A. 729 (Md. 1926) · Concurrence
  3. In re Will of Fox52 N.Y. 530 (1873)
  4. City of Logansport v. Uhl99 Ind. 531 (1885)
  5. Grover Irrigation & Land Co. v. Lovella Ditch, Reservoir & Irrigation Co.131 P. 43 (Wyo. 1913)
  6. Baltimore & Ohio Rail Road v. Worthington21 Md. 275 (1864)

Most recent

  1. United States v. Dreos156 F. Supp. 200 (D. Maryland 1957)
  2. Delfeld v. City of Tulsa1942 OK 402, 131 P.2d 754
  3. Fishel v. City & County of Denver108 P.2d 236 (Colo. 1940)
  4. Opinion of the Justices to the Senate297 Mass. 567 (1937)
  5. Tarver v. Silver178 S.E. 377 (Ga. 1935)
  6. Via v. State Commission on Conservation & Development9 F. Supp. 556 (W.D. Va. 1935)

Citing references are not a citator: they show that a later opinion cites this case, not whether it followed, distinguished, or overruled it. Check negative history before relying on this case.

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