Ellinger v. Crowl

In cases of fraud and mistake, courts of equity will reform instruments of writing so as to do justice, and make them conform to the intention of the parlies, but this can only be done on clear and satisfactory proof. Parol proof is inadmissible to vary the considerations stated in deeds, and thereby either to alter their character or to maintain them when impeached for fraud, by showing considerations differing from those mentioned in them. indebtedness at the time of executing a Voluntary conveyance, is prima facie evidence that the deed is fraudulent as to creditors, and the onus is thrown upon the grantee to prove, in order to repel the fraudulent intent, that the grantor, at the time, Was in prosperous circumstances, and possessed of ample means to pay all his debts. Where the proof shows a valuable as well as good consideration for thé deed, and that, at the time of its execution, the grantor had other property sufficient to pay all his indebtedness, as shown by the record in the case, such deed cannot be successfully assailed by creditors.

Cross-Appeals from the Circuit Court for Baltimore city. In these cases a bill was filed on the 18th of August 1857, by the appellants in the first case, as well for themselves as all' other creditors of Henry Crowl, against the appellees, to vacate1, as fraudulent as against creditors, a deed' dated the-1st of June 1857, from Henry Crowl’ to Agnes P. Crowl, his wife, and on the 26th of September 1857, a bill was filed by Agnes P. Crowl, by her next friend, Edward Murray, theappellee in the second case, against her husband’, Henry Crowl, and his creditors, the appellees in the second, and' the appellants in the first case, asking that said deed from her husband to her, might be reformed, so as to recite the true consideration upon which it was made, or a new deed decreed to be executed, reciting such true consideration. The allegations of these bills, and of the answers thereto, and the purport of the evidence in the cause, sufficiently appear from the arguments of counsel, the opinions of this court, and the following opinion of the court below, (Krebs, J.,) delivered upon passing the decrees appealed from: . “The bills filed in the above cases are cross-bills. In the one, Ellinger and the other complainants, alleging themselves to be creditors of Henry Crowl, file their bill to set aside, as voluntary and fraudulent against them, a deed executed by the said Henry Crowl, the husband of the said Agnes, to her, for the consideration of love and affection for her, and the better to provide for her support and maintenance. “In the other bill, Agnes P. Crowl alleges that the true consideration for the said deed was not natural love and affection, &c., as above stated, but that it was executed in consideration of marriage between her said husband and herself, and of the relinquishment of her right of dower in and to the real estate of the said Henry, and that there was a misrecital in the said deed of the true consideration thereof, and she prays that a new deed, conveying the property described in the said deed to her, and reciting the true consideration therefor, may be executed under a decree of this court. These two cases have been heard together, and if the complainant, Agnes P. Crowl, is entitled to the relief that she asks-, the complainants in the other case will necessarily be defeated, and their bill will be dismissed. A very large portion of the evidence produced by the complainant, Mrs. Crowl, has been offered for the purpose of proving that her husband, before her marriage with him, entered into a marriage contract with her, by which he agreed, in consideration of her marriage with him, to settle upon her a large and valuable part of his estate-. This evidence I deem altogether unimportant to the decision of the question presented in her bill, because it is not filed to compel the performance of that contract, by requiring him to settle that property upon her, but to establish her title to a different parcel of his estate, and because if such a marriage contract as is alleged was made, if Was, as the testimony shows, abandoned after her marriage, and destroyed, for the purpose of enabling her to set up her right of dower in his property. The true ground upon which her claim to relief is to be sustained, is, that she agreed to relinquish the potential right of dower that she claimed in the land conveyed by her husband to his sons, as mentioned in the proceedings, in consideration of the conveyance to her of the property described in the said deed by his said sons, to whom he had transferred it. I am of opinion that the evidence proves clearly that she was to receive the title to the property described in that deed, in consideration of her relinquishing all claim of dower in the property which had been so conveyed by her husband to his said sons. It is true that when she relinquished this right of dower, they conveyed the property to him; but inasmuch as the consideration for the conveyance moved from her in equity, the trust of the property would have resulted to her. The deed afterwards executed by him to her for love and affection, does certainly embarrass her title, and cast a shade upon it when disputed by creditors. But if the consideration that induced him to execute that deed to her was her relinquishment of her said right of dower, as above stated, and if, through his mistake or misrepresentation in regard to the amount of his debts, or his ability to pay them, made in his statement to the conveyancer, by whom the deed was drawn, he was induced to insert the consideration recited in the deed, instead of the true one, it certainly would not be consistent with equity that she should be deprived of the property. Israel Cook, one of the witnesses, proves that (his was the consideration for the conveyance to her. Mr. Crowl informed Mr. Thompson, the conveyancer, as he testifies, that Mrs, Crowl was justly entitled to dower in real estate that he had conveyed to his children, for which he had received no consideration, and that in consideration of his making this conveyance to her, she would relinquish her right of dower in that land. That, then, was the true consideration. And the reason why it was not inserted by Mr. Thompson in the deed, instead of love and affection, &c., is obvious, from his testimony. He suggested to Mr. Crowl an objection to the conveyance of the property to his wife in the form in which it was done, but that objection was removed by his positive statement that he had abundant means to pay his debts, &c. Now, if the conveyancer was misled by the mistake or misrepresentation of Mr. Crowl, for it was the one or the other, and by reason of being so misled, recited a consideration in the deed that endangers her title under it, it ought to be reformed so as to recite the true consideration, and thus make her title to the property conveyed by it perfect. The conveyancer was certainly misled, if there is any foundation for the proceedings instituted by the creditors of Mr. Crowl, in which they attack the deed, for the very reason that in it it recites the consideration that the conveyancer was induced to insert in consequence of Mr. Growl's statement to him. I will, therefore, pass decrees in the two cases in conformity with these views.” From these decrees appeals were taken by the creditors and Henry Crowl, the complainants in the one case, and the defendants in the other.