State ex rel. Isaac v. Jones

Constable’s Bond, Action on: Statute op Limitations: Act 1853, on. 132. Under the Act of 1853, ch. 132, providing that all actions on constable's bonds shall bo brought within five years from the date thereof, and no-t afterwards, — a party having a right of action at the time -the law went into operation must institute suit within the time prescribed by the Act, even although, as the law stood at the time the bond was executed, the right oí action would have continued for a longer period. Oonstitutioxai. LawI — And the Act of 1853, by so abridging the period within which such suits may be brought, does not so affect the right of action as to fall within the constitutional inhibition against laws impairing the obligation of contracts.

Akpeaíj from the Circuit Court for Prince George’s County. Action upon a constable’s bond, brought October 28th, 1859, by tlie appellant, against tbe appellees, as sureties upon said bond. Tlie defendant pleaded limitations, to which plea the plaintiff demurred. The Court below, (Crain, J.,) overruled the demurrer, and the judgment being for tbe defendant, the plaintiff appealed. The facts of this case are more fully stated in the opinion of this Court. The appellant will insist, that the judgment of the Court below was erroneous, and should be reversed. The Act of Assembly limiting the time within which suits should be brought on constable’s bonds, was passed in 1853, ch. 132, and by its terms did not go into operation until the 1st day of January 1854. Before the passage of that Act, twelve years from the date of the bond were allowed by law to bring suits, and this law imposed duties and responsibilities, and created rights which were impaired and abrogated by the Act of 1853, if retroactive. Courts are not inclined to give a statute a retroactive operation. Butler vs. Boar-man, 1 JET. & Moll., 371. Hagruder & Tuck, vs. Carroll & others, 4 Md. Hep., 335. Under the law as it existed prior to 1853, the plaintiff would have had twelve years within which ho might have brought his action. This was a valuable vested right, and even should it be-construed as forming no part of the contract, it was a responsibility assumed by the defendants, and entered into the inducement of the contract. By the Act of 1853, this valuable vested right, which, at the time this law was passed, had nearly eight years to run, was by this Act cut down in the time to less than one year. In the case of 'Baugher & others, vs. Nelson, 9 Gill, 299, this Court distinctly announce the doctrine, that a statute which by its.retrospective operation divests vested and valuable rights, is, in the absence of any express prohibition in the Constitution of the United States, or of this State, unauthorised and void, as arbitrary and violatory of the first rules of right and justice, and contrary to the fundamental principles of the social compact. It may however be insisted, that this law dees not defeat vested rights or abrogate contracts, but goes only to the remedy, leaving the obligation on the part of the defendants, the same as it was before the passage of the law. But of what avail is the right to demand the performance of a violated contract without the remedy to enforce the right ? For all practical purposes the rights under the bond are as effectually defeated as if the bond itself had been cancelled by the express words of the law. This Court has met this view of the case in the same decision, 9 Gill, where it is said that, “an Act which divests a right through the instrumentality of the remedy, and under pretence of regulating it, is as objectionable as if aimed at the right itself.” But it will also be insisted, that if this Act is to be construed as applicable to objections existing prior to itspassage, then it is a law impairing the obligation of contracts, and for this reason must be treated as an infraction of the Constitution of the United States, and void. On the part of the appellees it is presumed they will argue, that the provisions of the Act of 1853, impair no rights which entered into or formed part of the contract or obligation assumed by them, but was only intended to apply to the remedy. This application of this clause in the Constitution, has given rise to many most able discussions by the greatest legal intellects of the country, and may still be said to be unsettled as to the extent to which it may be applied. Story on Con., sec. 1385, &c. Story’s Oonf. of Laws, sec. 576, &c. Don vs. Lippman, 5 Clark & Finnelly, 15, 16. Sturges vs. Groioninshield, 4 Wheat., 200, 207. Mason vs. Hahle, 12 Wheal., 370, 380. Ogden vs. Sanders, Id., 262, dec. Hawkins vs. Barney, 5. Peters Sup. Ct. Bep., 457. 1 Kent’s Com., 419. Green vs. Biddle, 8 Wheat., 1, 17, 84. These cases, though all decided on cases not of limitations to the action, which went to defeat the remedy on pre-existing obligations, yet have very fully discussed the whole doctrine in relation to the effect of such laws on the remedy, distinguished from the contract itself. The better opinion to be derived from them all, as well as’ many other decisions entitled to equal consideration, now seems to be, that though there may be legitimate alterations of the remedy, if they do not seriously impair that remedy, yet that all effectual remedies protecting the rights and interests of the parties, existing when the contract was made or the obligation assumed, become essential ingredients in it, and are parcel of the creditor’s right, and ought not to be disturbed. All suspension by statute of remedies, or any part thereof, existing when the contract was made, is more or less impairing to its, obligation. 1 Kent’s Com., 419, noto a. 4 Kent’s Com., 434, note a. Green vs. Biddle, 8 Wheat., 1. Bronson vs. Kinzie, 1 How. IT. S. Bep., 311. McOracken vs. Hayward, 2 How. U. 8. Bep., 608, 612, 614. To deny hny remedy under a contract, or by burdening the remedy with new conditions and restrictions, to make it useless or hardly worth pursuing, is equally a violation of the Constitution. 1 Kent’s Com., 419. In the case of Sturges vs. Groioninshield, 4 Wheat Rep., 207, Chief Justice Marshall decides a proposition which covers this case exactly. In speaking of how far State Legislatures have the power to change the remedies furnished by tbe Courts, he expressly limits it to that class of cases whose obligations date subsequent to the passage of the law, but as to contracts already entered into, such enactments would impair the obligation of contracts and be void. His words are: “If in a State where six years may be pleaded in bar to an action of assumpsit, a law should pass declaring that contracts already in existence not barred by the statute, should be construed to be within it, there could be little doubt of its unconstitutionality.” It is therefore submitted, that the Act of 1853, eh. 132, as to all pre-existing contracts, is contrary to the Constitution of the United States, and that the plea of the defendants is no bar to this action, and that the judgment of the Court below will be reversed.