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Davidson v. Myers

Samuel A. Davidson v. Charles H. Myers and Alexius J. Myers

Davidson v. Myers, 24 Md. 538 (1866)
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Court
Court of Appeals of Maryland · State Highest Courts
Decided
May 2, 1866
Judges
Cochran
Citations
24 Md. 5381866 Md. LEXIS 34
Headnotes
Lien of Judgment : Interlocutory and Final Judgment. — A judgment by default was entered on the 15tb of January, 1862, and final judgment for the amount of the claim with interest was entered up on the 30th of October, 1862, Held: 1st. That this judgment could not in the nature of things relate back and take effect as of the date of the judgment by default; nor could the judgment by default, in establishing the jurisdiction of the Court and the simple fact of the plaintiffs right to recover, be said or understood to constitute a recovery. 2nd. That treating the judgment by default as interlocutory merely, it could not operate as a lien on the real or leasehold property of the defendant. The Act of 1861, Oh. Í0, declares that judgments shall be liens for their amount and from their date, Held : That by this provision final judgments alone were contemplated.
Summary
Appeal from the Superior Court of Baltimore City. On the 14th of December, 1863, the appellant filed his bill of complaint in the Superior Court of Baltimore City, stating as follows : “That at January Term, 1882, of the Court of Common Pleas for Baltimore City, your orator obtained a judgment by default against a certain William Rogers, which was afterwards extended by the agreement of the parties on the 30th day of October, 1862, for the sum of $277.50 cts., with interest from the 24th day of October, 1862, and costs, that on the 18th day of August, 1863, your orator caused a writ of fieri facias to be issued on said judgment, which was duly executed by levying the same on certain leasehold estate belonging to said Rogers, lying on Hoffman street, in the City of Baltimore, and by a sale thereof, at public sale to your orator, all of which will more fully appear by a short copy of the docket entries in said Court of Common Pleas, herewith filed, marked A, and by a copy of the Sheriff’s deed herewith filed, marked B, and prayed to be taken as part hereof. “ That all said proceedings were regular and bona fide on the part of your orator, and as he charges, vested a perfect leg'al title in him, and he especially avers that the judgment as finally extended as aforesaid, was for the real debt due by said Rogers to your orator, and for which he held the note of said Rogers. Your orator further showeth, that on the 9th day of September, 1862, a certain Charles H. Myers and Alexius J. Myers, who are prayed to be made defendants hereto, obtained a judgment against said Rogers in your honorable Court by confession, as appears by the short copy thereof herewith filed, marked C, and prayed to be taken as part of this bill of complaint ; that the said plaintiffs last named since the execution of the Sheriff’s deed to your orator, to wit: on the 29th day of October, 1853, caused a writ of fi. fa. to issue on said last judgment, and placed it in the Sheriff’s hands for the avowed purpose of levying the same on and selling the identical property described in said Sheriff’s deed, under the pretence that said judgment so obtained in your honorable Court, is prior in legal effect to the aforesaid judgment of your orator ; whereas your orator charges that the same is subsequent, and that the only effect of such levy and sale will be to harrass and injure your orator, by casting clouds of doubts upon the title thus legally acquired by him, and by causing him to institute proceedings against the purchaser, whoever he may be, under the said fi.fa. now in said Sheriff’s hands as aforesaid, with a view to the cancelation of his said pirrchase, and the removal of' the cloud about to be cast over the title of your orator by the illegal acts and continuances of said Charles H. Myers and Alexius S. Myers in the premises, all of which proceedings your orator charges are oppressive and contrary to good conscience, wherefore inasmuch as your orator is remediless, at and by the strict rules of the common law, and to the end that the said Charles H. and Alexius J. Myers, and the Sheriff of Baltimore City, may be enjoined from proceeding further in the execution of said writ of fieri facias so issued from your honorable Court, and that your orator may be decreed to have a perfect and valid title to said property as against the pretended lien of the judgment so obtained by said Charles H. and Alexius J. Myers, and such other and further relief as to your honor may seem right and proper ; may it please your honor to grant the State’s writ of injunction, restricting and enjoining the said Charles H. and Alexius J. Myers, their aiders and abettors, and John J. Dannecker, the Sheriff of Baltimore city, from proceeding further in the execution of said writ of fieri facias issued at the suit of said O. IP. & A. J. Myers, by levying the same on the property described in the deed of said Edward E. Sparks, Sheriff, as aforesaid to your orator, a copy of which is herewith filed, marked B ; and in case your honor should hold that the said defendants are entitled to priority by reason of their said execution and judgment, then your orator herewith tenders himself ready to pay into Court, and he does hereby tender himself ready under the order of your honor to pay to said defendants the full amount due to them. The defendants answered, admitting the material facts stated in the bill, and the cause being heard on the bill and answer, the Court, Martin, J., on the 13th of January, 1864, delivered the following opinion : In this case the application for an injunction is refused, and the bill dismissed, as the judgment obtained by the complainant by default, in the Court of Common Pleas, on the 15th of January, 1862, is to be treated as a mere interlocutory judgment, on the case of Kiersiead vs. Rogers & Garland, 6 H. & J., 282, and supported by approved writers on the practice of the Courts, {Evans’ Practice, 335. Bingham on Judgments, 3,) and as such created no lien on the leasehold estate of the debtor, until it became a final judgment, by being extended by the Court on the 30th of October, 1862. United States vs. Morrison, 4 Pet., 136. Eschbach vs. Pitts, 6 Md. Rep., 11. Glements & Barry, 11 Hoto., 398. The judgment therefore obtained by the complainant in the Court of Common Pleas on the 15th of January, 1862, and not extended until the 30th of October, 1862, must be considered as subordinate to the judgment regularly and fairly obtained by the defendants in the Superior Court, on the 9th of September, 1862, and I will sign a decree refusing the prayer for an injunction as asked for by the complainant, and dismissing the bill, with costs. This appeal is taken from the order passed in conformity with the foregoing opinion.

Syllabus and headnotes are prepared by the reporter or publisher, not the court, and are not part of the opinion.

Opinion of the Court — Cochran

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Cochran, J.,

delivered the opinion of this Court.

The appellant rests his claim to relief on a judgment by default, obtained in January, 1862, and upon which, as appears from .the record, a final judgment by confession was entered in the month of October following. The Act of 1861, ch. 70, declares that judgments shall be liens, “for their amount and from their date,” on leasehold interests, in the same manner as upon real estate-; and the appellant’s proposition is, that the judgment by default, relied on here, operated as a lien on the leasehold property of the debtor from the time of its rendition.

The character of such a judgment is well defined in our practice. “Judgments by default, on demurrer, and non obstante veredicto, are interlocutory; and final judgment cannot be given until the damages to be recovered are assessed.” Bingham on Judgments, 3. Evans’ Prac., 335. Generally, a defendant on whose default a judgment by default is entered, confesses the cause of action, and the judgment so entered is conclusive in respect to the jurisdiction of the Court and the right of recovery ; but it goes no farther, for the amount remains to be ascertained, and the recovery thereof to be finally adjudged to the plaintiff. Kierstead vs. Rogers, 6 H. & J., 282 . Green vs. Hamilton, 16 Md. Rep., 317 . Heffner vs. Lynch, 21 Md. Rep.

The' mode of ascertaining the amount for which the final judgment can go, in all cases of interlocutory judgments whereby the right of the plaintiff is established, and the damages cannot be ascertained without the intervention of a jury, is prescribed in the Code, Art. 75, sec. 62. In this class of cases, the final judgment is entered upon the inquisition of the jury; but where the parties fix the amount by agreement, and in that manner waive the inquisition, *555 or the cause of action is such that the Court may ascertain the amount without an inquisition, then the final judgment may he entered.

The judgment in question here, was clearly interlocutory ; and the record of the case in which it was obtained shows that another and final judgment was entered on the 30th of October following. It was agreed by the parties on the 29th of October, that the judgment should be entered for $277,50, with interest from the 24th of October, 1862, and costs, and it was thereupon adjudged that the appellant should recover from the defendant the amount thus ascertained. This judgment could not, in the nature of things, relate hack and take effect as of the date of the judgment by default; nor could the judgment by default, in establishing the jurisdiction of the Court and the simple fact of the plaintiffs’ right to recover, be said or understood to constitute a recovery. Strictly speaking, there was no recovery until it was adjudged by the Court on the 30th of October; and the only privilege secured to the appellant by the judgment by default, was that of proceeding by inquisition or otherwise, to assess the damages and obtain a final judgment, without delay to the defendant.

Treating the judgment by default as interlocutory, merely, it could not operate as a lien on the real or leasehold property of the defendant. The reason why a judgment constitutes a lien on the property of the debtor, as stated in Combs vs. Jordan, 3 Bland, 284 , and in Eschbach vs. Pitts, 6 Md. Rep., 71 , is that it clothes the judgment creditor with the right to make his debt out of the land of the judgment debtor ; this right, on the one side, and consequent liability of the debtor’s property on the other, constituting the lien. And it surely cannot be maintained that a creditor is clothed with any such right by an interlocutory judgment, where the amount to be recovered remains to be ascertained, and the recovery of it *556 to be adjudged by the Court. The cases of Clements vs. Barry, 11 How., 398 . United States vs. Morrison, 4 Peters, 136 , and Eschbach vs. Pitts, are conclusive on this point. But further, the Act of 1861 declares in specific terms, that judgments shall be liens for their amount and from their date, and as we construe this provision, final judgments alone were contemplated. The decree of the Court below must be affirmed, with costs to the appellee.

(Decided May 2nd, 1866.)

Decree affirmed.

How later courts describe this case

No later court has written an explanatory parenthetical about this case yet.

Cited by 10 cases

View all citing references →
1870–1871: 11880–1881: 11894–1895: 11896–1897: 11904–1905: 11926–1927: 21972–1973: 11974–1975: 218702026peak 1926 · 2

Relies on it most ⓘ

  1. Union Trust Co. v. Biggs137 A. 509 (Md. 1927)
  2. Lee v. Keech133 A. 835 (Md. 1926)
  3. Maggin v. Stevens291 A.2d 440 (Md. 1972)
  4. J. C. Penney Co. v. Harker326 A.2d 228 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1974)
  5. Sharp v. Bates62 A. 747 (Md. 1905)
  6. Heyward v. Sanner37 A. 798 (Md. 1897)

Most recent

  1. Sullivan v. Miller337 A.2d 185 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1975)
  2. J. C. Penney Co. v. Harker326 A.2d 228 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1974)
  3. Maggin v. Stevens291 A.2d 440 (Md. 1972)
  4. Union Trust Co. v. Biggs137 A. 509 (Md. 1927)
  5. Lee v. Keech133 A. 835 (Md. 1926)
  6. Sharp v. Bates62 A. 747 (Md. 1905)

Citing references are not a citator: they show that a later opinion cites this case, not whether it followed, distinguished, or overruled it. Check negative history before relying on this case.

Authorities cited 5

DepthCaseCited by
Green v. Hamilton, 16 Md. 317 (1860) 37
United States v. Morrison, 29 U.S. (4 Pet.) 124 (1830) 33
Clements v. Berry, 52 U.S. (11 How.) 398 (1851) 17
Eschbach v. Pitts, 6 Md. 71 (1854) 17
Kiersted v. Rogers & Garland, 6 H. & J. 282 (1824) 6

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