Hamilton v. Carroll

Constitutional Law — Title of Statute — Special Law — Delegation of Legislative Power — Contested Election — Jurisdiction of Equity— Removal of County Seat. The Act of 1894, c. 546, was entitled ‘‘ An Act to provide for the removal of the county seat of Charles County from Port Tobacco to La Plata or Chapel Point, if the legal and qualified voters of said county shall so determine, and to provide for the erection of a courthouse andjail at such place as shall be so determined on, ’ ’ etc. By the Act itself the question submitted to the voters was whether the county seat should be located at La Plata or Chapel Point, and did not in terms submit the direct question whether the county seat should be removed from Port Tobacco, its then location. Held, that the Act provided for the removal and that the subject was sufficiently described in the title, as required by Art. 3, sec. 29 of the Constitution. Held, also, that the above mentioned Act was not within the prohibition of Constitution, Art. 3, sec. 33, providing that no special law shall be passed in a case for which provision is made by general law, since there is no general law concerning the location of county seats. Held, also, that said Act is not invalid as being a delegation of legislative power to the people, since the location of a county seat is a matter of merely local concern which the Legislature has a right to submit to the determination of the people directly interested. A Court of Equity has no jurisdiction to determine an election contest of any kind. The bill in this case alleging irregularities in the conduct of the election provided for by the above-mentioned Act, and asking that the same be declared null and void, was dismissed.

Appeal from a decree of the Circuit Court for Charles County (Briscoe, C. J., Brooke and Crane, JJ.), sustaining a demurrer to the bill of complaint in this case and dismissing the same. The prayer of the bill was that the “ County Commissioners of Charles County, their agents and servants, may, by writ of injunction issued out of this Court, be restained and enjoined from issuing any of the bonds described in section 6 of chapter 546 of the Acts of 1894, to any person or persons, corporation or corporations, committee or committees whatsoever, or from acting under or in any manner carrying out the said Act of 1894, chapter 546. And the said Act of 1894, chapter 546, may be declared unconstitutional, null and void. And that the said pretended election may be declared null and void.” It appears from the averments of the bill that these complainants, as taxpayers of the county, and others similarly situated, in whose behalf, as well as their own, the bill is filed, constitute a class specially damaged by the alleged unlawful act of the corporation in the alleged increase of the burden of taxation upon their property, situated within the county. The complainants have, therefore, a special interest in the subject-matter of the suit, distirict from that of the general public. The Mayor and City Council of Baltimore v. Gill, 31 Md. 393; Commissioners of Clay County v. Markle, 46 Ind. 104; Rice v. Smith, 9 Iowa, 570; Rickey v. Williams, 8 Wash. 479; Sweatt v. Faville, 23 Iowa, 328; Solomon v. Fleming, 34 Neb. 40; Hamilton v. Tucker, 38 W. Va. 71; Colton v. Hanchette, 13 Ill. 615; Merrill v. Plainfield, 45 N. H. 126; Beach on Injunctions, vol. 2, § 1386 and note 1. The jurisdiction of a Court of Equity to take cognizance of the constitutional questions presented, and to inquire by this proceeding whether any valid law has been passed, under which the county seat is about to be removed, results from the fundamental principles of equity jurisdiction and can hardly be questioned. Todd v. Rustad, 43 Minna. 500; Solomon v. Fleming, 34 Nebraska, 40; Thomas v. Commissioners, 5 Inda. 4. The equitable jurisdiction to investigate frauds and irregularities in an election for the removal of a county seat, where no statutory contest has been given, is also well established by authorities. Mc-Crary on Elections, § 458; Bowen v. Smith et al., 47 Ill., 486; People, ex rel. v. Wiant, 48 Ills. 268; Cokers' Clay Co. v. Markle, 46 Ind., 104; Rice v. Smith, 9 Iowa, 570; Sweatt v. Faville, 23 Ibid, 328; 6 Am. & Eng. Encyc. of Law, 392. As to the questions of laches, we contend that if the bill is filed within the period of statutory limitation, it is sufficient. Sweatt v. Faville, 23 Iowa, 326. The Constitutional Questions. — Section 5 of the bill raises the question of the misleading title of the Act of 1894, chapter 546, as invalidating the Act. The question of the removal of the county seat of Charles County had been twice before submitted to the voters of Charles County, first, by the Act of 1882, chapter 494; and, second, by the Act of 1892, chapter 260. In both of these Acts it was left to the vote of the people to determine whether their county seat should be removed from Port Tobacco, and in both cases they determined by decisive majorities that it should not. The Act of 1894, chapter 546, however, made an essential departure from the previous Acts, in that it absolutely removed the county seat from Port Tobacco and left to the people to determine only the question whether it should be located at La Plata, which had been twice before rejected, or one other place named in the bill and selected by its authors. Yet this last named Act gave no intimation at all in its title of this essential departure, but, on the other hand, by preserving the identical language of the titles of the previous Acts, necessarily induced members of the Legislature, and all others concerned, to believe that the retention of their county seat at Port Tobacco was still left to the choice of the people. The title was, therefore, essentially misleading and vitiated the Act. The title of this Act of 1894, ch. 546, describes the subject to be “to provide for the removal of the county seat of Charles County from Port Tobacco to La Plata, or Chapel Point, if the legal and qualified voters shall so determine,” which said title would lead the legislators and the taxpayers and voters to suppose that the question to be submitted to popular vote, was “should the county seat be removed from Port Tobacco, and if so, to which place named in the title ; but in section 2 of the enactment, the question of ‘removal’ from Port Tobacco is absolutely ignored, and the only question submitted is ‘whether or not the county seat shall be ‘located’ at La Plata or Chapel Point.’ ” If this is not “discordant matter introduced into the body of the statute,” at war with its title, what could be ? The question suggested in the title is, “removal from Port Tobacco to one or other place,” but the enacting clause is as to “location” at La Plata or Chapel Point. This provision becomes important in view of the fact that, while the constitution requires that every bill shall be read three several times ; by the rules of the General Assembly made in pursuance of another section of the Constitution, some of these required readings are by title only. It becomes more important in its application to local bills, because, by the rules also of the General Assembly local bills are never printed; and, in point of fact, as is well known to all who have served in the Legislature, few local bills, unless they be very short, ever have any full reading at all. In New York, this constitutional limitation is confined to local bills, and the Courts of that State are very rigorous in its enforcement. The Courts have shown some liberality in construing these provisions, in aid of legislation, as they relate to multifariousness and inaptness in the description of a single subject-matter; but whenever they have been brought to the consideration of a misleading title they have been inexorably strict in the enforcement of the constitutional limitation. Sutherland on Statutory Construction, sec. 90; People v. Commissioners of Highways, 53 Barb. 70; People v. Allen, 42 New York, 404; Contieri v. New Brunswick, 44 N. J. L., 58; Moses v. Mayor, &c., 52 Ala. 198; Anderson v. Hill, 54 Mich. 477. It is submitted that if the misleading title to the Act of 1894, ch. 546, be sustained, there will henceforth be little, if anything, of this constitutional limitation left in Maryland. Section 5 of the bill of complaint also raises the constitutional question of the delegation back to the people of legislative powers. This is a constitutional limitation on legislative power generally recognized throughout the American States. Cooley Const. Lim,,p. 137; Sutherland on State Cons., sec. 67, and numerous cases cited. In the earlier cases the submission of an Act of the Legislature to popular ratification was held void, as in conflict with this constitutional principle, but the submission of local and even general laws to popular ratification are now generally held valid. But there is one clear principle to which by the uniform force of the authorities all such submitted laws must conform. The Act submitted to popular ratification must be a perfected law; it must be “ as an emanation of the legislative will — perfect in all its parts.” The only question submitted to the people must be the mere ratification of the legislative will as thus perfected, the popular vote being the mere contingency upon which the perfected law shall take effect. Blanding v. Burr, 13 Cal. 357. Cincinnati R. R. Co. v. Commissioners, 1 Ohio St. 77; Sutherland Stat. Cons., sec. 68. This principle has been clearly recognized in Maryland. Fell v. State, 42 Md. 71. It must be a fair submission, broad enough to ascertain the actual popular will of all citizens interested in the matter. Bradshaw v. Lankford, 73 Md. 428. The Act of 1894, ch. 546, conflicts with both of the principles last above enumerated: 1. By the terms of the submission it'is not a perfected law, but confers on the people a discretion as to what the law shall be. 2. By limiting the popular choice to La Plata, the place the people had twice rejected, and one other place selected by the admittedly biased framers of the bill, the question submitted was not broad enough to ascertain the actual popular will of the people interested. If such a submission of the question be sanctioned, it will henceforth be in the power of a biased local delegation to actually remove the county seat and submit to the choice of the people one favored place in competition with one other impossible location. The only fair way to submit such a question is to submit one place at a time, in competition with the old established county seat. Sections 15 and 16 of the bill of complaint raise the question that the Act of 1894, ch. 546, is in violation of section 33 of Article 3 of the Constitution, in that it is a special law; and the Legislature is required to provide by general law, and not special laws, in all cases where a general law can be made applicable. In the State of Indiana, with constitutional limitations in this respect identical with our own, the Supreme Court of that State held, as early as 1854, that a law providing for the removal of the county seat of Clay County was a special law, in conflict with this provision of their Constitution, although not specially enumerated therein as such, and that the removal of county seats, being manifestly a subject of a general nature for which provision could be made by general law, it was the duty of the Legislature to provide therefor by a general law. Thomas, &c., v. Coms. of Clay County, 5 Ind. 4. The one subject of the Act of 1894, as described in its title, is the fixing of the location of the county seat, and the body of the Act deals with this subject and no other. It deals with it by directing: ist. That a vote shall be had on the question whether the county seat shall be located at La Plata or at Chapel Point(section 2); 2d. By directing that if it appears by the proclamation of the Clerk of the Circuit Court, that a majority of the votes cast have been cast for locating the county seat at La Plata, then, thenceforth La Plata shall be the county seat; and if a majority were for Chapel Point, it shall be the county seat; and 3d. It makes provision for the building of the jail and court-house, at whichever place was thus selected as the county seat. Now, as there can be but one county seat, it follows that when the voters voted to locate it either at Chapel Point or La Plata, they necessarily voted that it should not be any longer located at Port Tobacco, and therefore voted on the subject of the Act described in the title, to-wit, the location of the county seat. This is all that need be said to show the Act is not in contravention of the said 29th section of Article 3 of the Constitution. But, in fact, there is no ground for the contention that the title of the Act indicated that the Act would present an opportunity to the people to vote on the question whether the county seat should remain at Port Tobacco. The whole title taken together shows that the intention of the Legislature was that either La Plata or Chapel Point should be the county seat, because a portion of the subject of the Act, as described in the title, was to procure sites for the new buildings, whereas, if it was not designed, at all events to remove the county seat from Port Tobacco, there was no necessity to provide sites for the buildings, as these were already provided ; and both a new court-house and a new jail were to be erected on these sites, whereas, there was already a jail in existence in Port Tobacco. The right to contest an election is not a common law right, but is entirely dependent upon statute. The Constitution, section 47, Article 3, provides that the “ Legislature shall make provisions for all cases of contested elections for any of the officers not herein provided for.” Either the Constitution or an Act of Assembly must provide specially for the contest or no contest is allowable. Now neither the Constitution nor any Act of Assembly makes any provision for the contesting of an election of the kind provided for by the Act of 1894, chapter 546, and that Act makes no provision for a contest of the election; therefore no such right exists. By the terms of the Act the summarization of the return judges and the proclamation of the clerk finally and conclusively determines the question of the locating the new county seat of Charles. Atty. Genl. v. Board Supervisors Lake County, 33 Michigan, 289. As this Court has more than once said, in the execution of all laws, trust must be reposed somewhere, and the Legislature reposed the trust of the due execution of this local law in the judges of election and the Clerk of the Circuit Court. If any authority is wanting for what seems to us so plain a proposition, it will be found in Gwinn v. Groome, 43d Md. In that case the Constitution did provide for a contest in the election for Attorney General, but the Legislature having neglected to provide the necessary machinery, this Court held that the returns by the judges of election was sufficient and the Governor must issue the commission. It must also be remembered that the contest was made in Gwinn v. Groome, upon the ground of fraud. See also Miles v. Bradford, 22 Md. 170. There seems to be injected in the minds of the appellants, that because they allege irregularities or fraud in the conduct of the election, &c., a Court of Equity has jurisdiction to inquire into and adjudicate their effect. This is not so. If a Court of Equity could be invoked every time there is an allegation of illegality in an election, there would be an enormous burden laid upon that Court. It has fieen tried before, but without success. Hardesty v. Taft, 23 Md. 530; McCrary on Elections, 3rd ed. 351.