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Power v. Common Council of Village of Litchfield

POWER v. COMMON COUNCIL OF THE VILLAGE OF LITCHFIELD

Power v. Common Council of Vill. of Litchfield, 104 N.W. 664 (Mich. 1905)
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Court
Michigan Supreme Court · State Highest Courts
Decided
September 20, 1905
Docket
No. Calendar No. 21,142
Judges
Blair, Grant, Hooker, Montgomery, Ostrander
Citations
104 N.W. 664141 Mich. 3501905 Mich. LEXIS 791
Disposition
Reversed.
Headnotes
1. Intoxicating Liquors — Dealers’ Bonds — Sureties—Number. Section 5886, 2 Comp. Laws, does not authorize a municipality to require more than two sufficient sureties on a liquor dealer’s bond, but confers the privilege on the principal of presenting a bond with two or more sureties, and the authority of the municipality is limited to a determination of the sufficiency of bonds tendered in compliance with the law. 2. Same — Mandamus—Answer—Exercise of Judgment. On mandamus to compel the common council of a village to approve a liquor dealer’s bond with two sureties, its answer that it had adopted a resolution requiring four sureties, because of its belief that four sureties would operate as a restraint in conducting the business, sufficiently showed that the council had not attempted to determine, as expressly required by section 5386, 2 Comp. Laws, the sufficiency of the bond. 8. Mandamus —Liquor Dealer’s Bond — Compelling Aooept- ' anoe. On certiorari to review the refusal of a mandamus to compel the common council of a village to accept a liquor dealer’s bond with two sureties, a finding by the court below that the council acted in good faith in determining that the bond did not comply with a resolution of the council requiring four sureties is immaterial.
Summary
Certiorari to Hillsdale; Chester, J. Mandamus by John J. Power to compel the common council of the village of Litchfield to accept a liquor bond. There was an order denying the writ, and relator brings certiorari.

Syllabus and headnotes are prepared by the reporter or publisher, not the court, and are not part of the opinion.

Opinion of the Court — Ostrander

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Ostrander, J.

Relator, desiring to operate a bar or saloon in connection with his hotel, presented a bond to the common council of the village, in proper form, with two sureties. The bond was rejected. Thereupon he applied to the circuit court for the county of Hillsdale for the writ of mandamus to compel the acceptance of the bond. The court denied the writ, and his action is brought here by writ of certiorari for review.

By unanimous vote, the common council of the village had required saloon bonds to be in the sum of $6,000, with four sureties. The answer of the common council avers its good faith in the premises, and that,—

“The purpose of requiring four sureties was that the best possible results might be realized in said village in connection with the operation of a proposed saloon; that it was conceived by said common council that four responsible citizens of said village as sureties on said liquor bond would operate as a wholesome salutary restraint against "the well-known vicious tendencies of such places.”

The only question presented is whether the common council had authority to require more than two sureties upon the bond.

The statute (2 Comp. Laws, § 5386) requires as a condition precedent to the right to carry on the retail liquor business the execution and delivery to the county treasurer of a bond—

“The sufficiency of which shall be determined by the township board of the township, or the board of trustees, the council or common council of the village or city in which such business is proposed to be carried on, to the people of the State of Michigan, in the sum of not less than three thousand nor more than six thousand dollars, with two or more sufficient sureties, who shall be male residents and freeholders of the township, village or city in which such business is proposed to be carried on,” etc.

And sets out the form of the bond.

It is contended that, because the statute calls for two or more bondsmen, it is within the power of the common council to require more than two. We disagree with this *352 contention. If the council has the power to require four sureties, it may require eight or ten, or more. The statute is in form a general law, and should not receive a construction which will make its operation variable. There must be at least two sureties, and we think that no more than two who are able to answer the statute conditions can be required. It is well known, however, that sureties upon official and other bonds sometimes prescribe as a condition for becoming sureties that either certain particular persons or a certain number of persons join in assuming the responsibility and liability imposed by the bond. It is the privilege of the principal in the bond required by this statute to present a bond having more than two sureties, so long as each of them is able to answer the statute requirements.. What is left to the municipal authority is the sufficiency of the bond tendered in compliance with the general law.

The opinion of the common council that the larger the number of bondsmen who are responsible the less likely would violations of the law occur is undoubtedly a sound one, which experience would approve. But there is involved in it more than the duty of determining the statute sufficiency of the particular bond. The declared purpose of the common council for requiring four sureties affirmatively establishes the fact that it has not attempted to determine, as the law requires it to do, the sufficiency of the bond tendered.

The finding that the council acted in good faith in determining whether relator had complied with the standard used is immaterial. If the bond is found to be otherwise sufficient, it should be approved.

The order is reversed.

Grant, Blair, Montgomery, and Hooker, JJ., concurred.

How later courts describe this case

No later court has written an explanatory parenthetical about this case yet.

1914: 119142026peak 1914 · 1

Relies on it most ⓘ

  1. Price v. Township Board148 N.W. 438 (Mich. 1914)

Most recent

  1. Price v. Township Board148 N.W. 438 (Mich. 1914)

Citing references are not a citator: they show that a later opinion cites this case, not whether it followed, distinguished, or overruled it. Check negative history before relying on this case.

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