Newell v. Crider

1. Practice — Chancery—Bill to set aside a Conveyance. — Crider conveyed to Norton a tract of laud for $400, on credit. While so indebted, Norton purchased a tract of land from Newell, on credit also, and conveyed a portion of it to Crider, in payment of the $400. Newell enforced the vendor’s lien against all the land sold to Norton, had it sold and became the purchaser, then filed a bill against Crider to set aside the deed from Norton to Crider. There was nothing to show to Crider, or give notice that the purchase money to Newell was unpaid, the deed was in the ordinary form, acknowledging the receipt of the purchase money. Held, that Crider was a bona fide purchaser.

Appeal from the Chancery Court of Lincoln County.' Hon. E. Gr. Peyton, Chancellor. The facts in this case will be found sufficiently stated in the opinion of the court. “Taking property in payment of a pre-existing debt does not make the buyer a purchaser for valuable consideration, in the eye of the law, as against one holding a prior equity.” S. & M. Miss. Oh. Rep., p. 45. “ A purchaser who takes a conveyance in payment of a preexisting debt from the grantee is not entitled to protection against the prior creditors of the grantor, for there the conveyance places him in no worse situation than he was before, and the creditors would have the stronger equity. The purchaser must have advanced a new consideration upon the faith of the estate conveyed, or have relinquished some security for a debt previously due him.” Agr. Bk. v. Dorsey, Freeman Ch.,338; Dickerson v. Tilling-hast, 4 Paige, Ch., 215; Grovernier v. Fritz, 4 Paige Ch., 847; Coddington v. Bay, 20 John., 637; Upshaw v. Hargrove, 6 S. & M., 286 ; Boon v. Barnes, 23 Miss., 136. If a party take specific property in satisfaction and discharge of a pre-existing debt, which is thereby extinguished, he is a bona fide purchaser. Love v. Taylor, 26 Miss., 567; 16 Peters, 1, 16. The conveyance of the lands to the Criders by Norton, under the circumstances o£ this case was a fraud on them, and no payment. Their debt is stdl good. Hoopes & Bogart, v. Newman, 2 S. & M., 71; Swartwout v. Payne, 19 Johnson, 294; Maride v. Hatfield, 2 Johnson’s, 455 ; Blake & Willis v. Morrison, 33 Miss., 123 ; Perkins v. Swank, 43 Miss., 349. Wilful ignorance is not to be distinguished in its equitable consequences from actual knowledge. Kerr on Law of Frauds and Mistakes, 237; Jones v. Smith, 1 Ha., 55 ; 1 Ohio, 244; Owen v. Homan, 4 H, L., 997, 1035; Pringle v. Phillips, 5 Sandf., 157. It will be perceived that there is a total failure of the proof adduced by the appellants to establish the fact that Mrs. Crider or her husband, the appellees, had any notice whatever, either actual or constructive at or before her purchase or the payment of the money, of any equitable lien or claim, or pretense of such lien or claim held by the appellant, Mrs. Newell, as vendor. On the contrary, the appellees have conclusively established the negative of the proposition, viz., that she had no such notice nor any possible information which should have put her upon inquiry at to the existence of any such claim or lien. The case falls within none of the rules laid down by this court in reference to the notice which will bring subsequent purchasers — such as that a vendee is bound to take notice of all incumbrances which are recited in the title deeds of his vendor, and under which he derives title, and he cannot insist on want of notice of such recitals, by denying that he read them, as in Wailes v. Cooper, 2 Cush., 208; Gordon v. Sizer, 10 Geo., 805. And so when a purchaser cannot make out his title but by a deed which leads to another fact, he is chargeable with notice of the fact as in 2 Geo. 824. There were no recitals in deeds, no proceedings of court of record, no admissions or declarations of any party which affect Mrs. Crider with such notice. Tour Honor may apply to this case the rules laid down in Parker v. Eoy, 43 Miss., 260, a case going to the fullest extent the doctrine was ever carried in England or the United States, and in which the law was thus declared: “ Whatever is sufficient to excite attention, or put a party on inquiry, is notice of everything to which such attention or inquiry might naturally lead.” There is not a scintilla of evidence adduced by the appellants to support the allegation of the bill, that Mrs. Crider had any notice of nonpayment of the purchase money by her vendor, Norton, to his vendor, Mrs. Newell, whilst it is emphatically denied iu the answer and the depositions of Norton and the •appellees. Norton states distinctly, that it was quite impossible that she should have had any such notice; that the day after he bought from Mrs. Newell he sold and conveyed to Mrs. Crider, and there is nothing in the deed from Mrs. Newell to Norton which could have excited inquiry with IMrs. Crider if she had seen it, because on its face it avers payment of the purchase money. Again, the fact that Mrs. Crider paid the full market value of the land, paid it bona fide, rebuts any suspicion of notice of •existence of the money lien. It is equally rebutted by the fact, that Miller, brother of Mrs. Crider, let his half of the land, held with Mrs. Crider, go in the same way to Norton, so that every fact and circumstance conclusively establishing the ignorance of Mrs. Crider of any lien of Mrs. Newell, and there is a total absence of anything held in Parker v. Eoy to be sufficient to put upon inquiry. Every requirement of that case is fully met in this. Remarking upon purchaser having notice before execution of deed or payment of purchase money, the court say: “ In order to his protection the purchase must be complete before notice of the prior equity. To make it complete, there must be, on the one side an execution of the conveyance, and on the other, a. payment of the whole of the purchase money, and the protection will be denied if the notice be given before the transaction is complete in either particular.” The testimony of Norton states most positively that, not only was the trade with Mrs. Crider made and consummated, but the money paid and deed made to her the next day after his purchase from Mrs. Newell. Mrs. Crider, in her deposition, swears that she had not a suspicion when she bought, paid the money and took a deed from Norton, that the latter had not fully paid Mrs, Newell his purchase money. We have never known a bill brought to enforce a money lien against a sub-vendor, on the ground that he had notice his vendor had not paid his purchase money, which was so wholly unsupported by law or evidence. We ask that the decree be affirmed and the bill dismissed.