Armistead v. Chatters

1. Laborer Under Contract. „ Employment. Damages. Laws 3 890, p. 69. In an action under act 1890, p. 69 (§ 1068, Code 1892), which, besides imposing a fine, makes liable to double damages one who knowingly employs a laborer under contract with another “before the expiration of Ms contract,” without the employer’s consent, the fact that the laborer had abandoned the contract before being employed, does not relieve the defendant from liability. 2. Same. Measure of damages. Original contract; breach of. Under such statute, the damages are not apportioned. The measure is double the damages sustained by the employer because of the breach of the contract by the laborer in abandoning the employment. The recovery is not restricted to the damages growing out of the employment of the laborer by defendant.

From tlie circuit court of the first district of Coahoma county. Hon. R. W. Williamson, Judge. The record in this case shows that the laborers or croppers, who had previously contracted with appellee for the year, were employed by the appellant about the fifth day of April, 1892. At that time the act of 1890 was in force. Laws, p. 69. This statute was substantially the same as § 1068, code 1892, which is quoted in the opinion, but which did not go into effect until November 1, 1892. Among others, the following instructions were given for the plaintiff: “ 1. The court instructs the jury that, if they believe from the evidence that the defendant, Armistead, had notice of any fact or circumstance sufficient to put an ordinarily prudent man upon inquiry, and that the prosecution of such inquiry would have developed the fact that Thompson, Gibbs and Cummings had made a contract to work on plaintiff’s land for the year 1892, which contract was in full force and effect, then the jury must return a verdict in favor of the plaintiff for double the amount of any damages which the proof satisfies them he has sustained; provided they further believe from the evidence that said Annistead knowingly employed, interfered with or induced said Thompson, Cummings or Gibbs to leave the land they had contracted to work, after such fact or circumstance came to the notice of said Armistead. “ 2. If the jury believe from the evidence that the defendant wilfully interfered with, enticed away or knowingly employed or induced Thompson, Cummings or Gibbs, or all of said parties, to leave the land they had previously contracted to work for the plaintiff, before the expiration of said contract, and without the consent of said plaintiff, Geo. Chatters, then the jury must return a verdict in favor of the plaintiff for double the amount of any damages which the proof satisfies them the said plaintiff has sustained.” Instructions announcing contrary principles, asked by the defendant, were refused. Plaintiff recovered judgment in the sum of $89.59. Motion for new trial overruled. Defendant appeals. The opinion contains a further statement of the case. The court erred in giving plaintiff’s instructions. The defendant did not entice away the laborers or induce them to leave the employment of plaintiff. While it may be true that he could be held criminally liable for employing laborers or tenants knowing they were under contract, unless the act of employing them resulted in actual damage to the original employer, he cannot be held liable in damages. The laborers had left the employment, and did not intend to return. The act of defendant in employing them did not damage plaintiff at all. His damage resulted solely from the acts of the employes in abandoning their contract. No one has a cause of action against another for the latter’s wrongful act, unless he is injured by it. 1 Sutherland on Dam., p. 3. We concede that the laborers left the employment without any valid excuse, and that plaintiff was damaged thereby,, but defendant did not induce them to leave, and therefore the damage did not result from any act of his. Where the-employe has quit and determined not to return, the law does-not impose the damage sustained by his breach of contract on a person who subsequently employs him, and who had nothing to do with the breach. While it is bad for an employe to abandon his contract, it would be worse to make it criminal for any one afterwards to give him employment. The instructions given for plaintiff announce the law correctly, and defendant’s instructions were properly refused.. Before the term of employment had expired or the contract had been nullified, defendant had no right to employ the laborers. Their abandonment did not nullify the contract. Benj. on Priv. Con., p. 133; Law Rep., 7 Exc., 112; 108 111.,. 181; 98 Pa., 545 ; 61 N. Y., 375. Recovery in a case like this is founded upon the legal right derived from the contract of employment and its breach. Lumly v. Gue, El. & B., 216; Law Rep., 6 C. P. D., 333; 107 Mass., 567. The act of defendant in employing the laborers was illegal if he knew, or had cause to know, that they were in plaintiff’s employment, or, in the language of the statute, if' he employed them “before the expiration of the contract.” On this point, see Fawcet v. Beavers, 2 Lev., 63; 6 Cush., 249. The language of the statute itself is conclusive of defendant’s liability. See Bowen v. Hall, Law Rep., 6 C. P. D., 333. Having in view the practice of laborers abandoning their employers without cause, the greatest evil which our state, as an agricultural state, had to contend with, the legislature gave criminal force to the common law civil liability of persons enticing away or employing laborers. The liability attaches if the time of the employment had not expired, although the laborer or tenant has abandoned his contract.