Summary
From the circuit court of Lincoln county.
Hon. J. B. Chrisman, Judge.
Action begun in a justice court by appellee against the Norwood & Butterfield Co., a corporation, and C. S. Butter-field for $200, balance claimed to be due plaintiff on a contract for a reward. Plaintiff recovered judgment for the amount claimed against both defendants, and they appealed to the circuit court, where the suit was dismissed as to the defendant, C. S. Butterfield, and there was a trial on the plea of general denial by the other defendant.
The appellant is a corporation created under the laws of the state of Illinois, domiciled in Lincoln county, in this state, engaged in the manufacture and sale of lumber. By its charter, the only power expressly given the corporation is the “ manufacturing and dealing in lumber and other merchandise.” It owns a large lumber mill and a considerable tract of land, and employs a number of persons in the conduct of its business, among these one McNair, who hauled logs for the mill, and McNair had in his employ Bange Connelly and Moses Mimms and his wife, who lived in a house belonging to the company. The plaintiff’s testimony tended to show that certain lawless persons had been interfering with the defendant’s employes and business, and, on one occasion, in the night time, had set fire to and shot into the house occupied by Connelly, wounding the wife of Mimms; that, in order to protect the interests of the coi’poration, C. S. Butterfield, who was secretary and treasurer of the corporation, made a contract with the plaintiff, Andrews, by which the company promised to pay him the reward for detecting and bringing to punishment the guilty parties. As the only question passed upon in the opinion of the court on this branch of the case is as to the power of the defendant corporation to incur liability for a reward offered under such circumstances, it is not necessary to set out the testimony, which was conflicting, as to the terms of the alleged contract. For the plaintiff, the court instructed the jury that the corporation, through its agents, had the power to incur the liability.
The plaintiff testified as a witness in his own behalf, and the defendant introduced several witnesses to show that lie was unworthy of belief. One of these (Rayburn) testified that he lived in an adjoining county, and had known plaintiff from boyhood — about twenty-five or thirty years; that plaintiff lived in the same neighborhood with him up to within about two years before the trial, when he removed to Lincoln county. The witness- was asked by defendant’s counsel if he knew plaintiff’s general reputation for truth in the community in which he was raised, and in which he lived until his removal to Lincoln county. This was objected to, whereupon defendant’s counsel stated to the court that they expected to prove that the plaintiff, after removing from Pike county two years before, had lived in several places, and now resided in Lincoln county, where he had been only about six weeks. Thereupon the court asked the witness if he knew plaintiff’s reputation in Lincoln county, and he answered that he did not. The objection was sustained, and the witness was not permitted to testify as to the general reputation of plaintiff in Pike county, whereupon defendant excepted.
Defendant’s refused instruction, which the court holds should have been given, is as follows: “ The jury are the judges of the credibility of the witnesses, and they may, if the circumstances and the other evidence justify so doing in their minds, disregard the testimony of a witness altogether; and they may consider the interest of a witness in the result, and his character for truth and veracity, if shown by the evidence, either direct or circumstantial, in determining the weight, or the want of it, to be given the testimony of any witness.” On this instruction the court indorsed: “ Defused because distinctly aimed at the plaintiff.”
1. In showing the reputation of a witness for truth, the inquiry must be as to the general reputation where he is best known. 1 G-reenleaf on Ev., § 461. This is the common sense of the matter. It cannot be presumed that plaintiff was better known at the several points at which he had temporarily resided, and in Lincoln county, where he had lived only six weeks, than at the place where he had lived from boyhood, and from which he had removed only two years previously. If our position as to this is not correct, a witness who is a transient person could not be impeached.
2. The section of defendant’s charter conferring power, is, in its terms, exceedingly limited. Certainly, if the corporation could make the contract, all other corporations can do so, and if this be true, then there is an end to legislative intent in limiting the powers of corporations. That corporations are not empowered, to offer rewards generally seems too clear for disputation. While we find some authorities which hold that they have the implied power to do so for the apprehension or conviction of persons who have committed offenses against their property, yet the proof in this case is too. meager for the application of such a rule. It does not appear that Connelly or Mimms were employed about the business of the corporation, and the fact that the house might be considered as belonging to it, did not establish its ownership, and the interference with the business of the company was not shown to be the shooting and burning contracted about.
3. It would tax the ingenuity to point out an objection to defendant’s fifth instruction. How the court discovered that it was aimed ,at the plaintiff does not appear. But, if the assumption be indulged in that it was so aimed, that is not a vali d reason for denying the instruction. The court was evidently misled by the decisions of this court which rest on our statute enabling defendants to testify in criminal cases. Buckley v. State, 62 Miss., 705, and Woods v. State, 67 lb., 575. In the first of these, the instruction passed on was held to annul the statute, in effect, and the second case rests upon the first. The application in this case of such a rule would abolish, in all cases, instructions on the credibility of witnesses.
1. In 1 Q-reenleaf on Ev., § 461, cited by opposite counsel, it is said that the proper mode of examining into the general reputation, is to inquire of the witness whether he knows the general imputation of the person in question among his neighbors. The inquiry is as to the reputation among those who are his neighbors at the time of the inquiry, and not such as were his neighbors years before. Worcester defines “ neighbor ” to be one who lives near another. On this point, see Chess v. Chess, 21 Am. Dec., 350. It does not appear how far the witness lived from Lincoln county, and he did not know the general reputation of plaintiff in the community where he lived at the time of trial. But, if the court erred as to this, the defendant was not prejudiced, because other witnesses testified as to the facts sought to be shown by the witness Rayburn.
2. Plaintiff’s instructions correctly announce the law. The defendant had large milling interests, and had in its employment many persons. Bange Connelly and Moses Mimms were indirectly in its employ, and were living in a house owned by it. In order to protect its property and business, the corporation employed plaintiff as a detective, with a view to arresting and punishing the guilty parties. This it had ample authority to do. 21 Am. & Eng. Ene. L., 390, note; Railroad Co. v. Cheatham, 85 Ala., 292, s.c. 7 Am. St. R., 48.
3. I am not prepared to say that defendant’s fifth instruction should have been refused. If, however, its refusal.was improper, it was harmless, and is not reversible error. The instruction would have availed the plaintiff as much as the defendant. It is not clear that its refusal was error. It is manifest that it was aimed at the plaintiff', and this is not gainsaid by opposite counsel.
Syllabus and headnotes are prepared by the reporter or publisher, not the court, and are not part of the opinion.
