Clark v. Lopez

1. Deed. Execution obtained by fraud. Status quo. Where there is great weakness of mind in a grantor, arising from age, sickness or any other cause, though not amounting to absolute disqualification, and the consideration given is grossly inadequate, equity will, on proper and reasonable application by the injured party, or his heirs, vacate the deed, requiring complainant to restore the grantee to the status quo before its execution. 3. Appellate Peactice. Oral evidence not of record. When will not cause affirmance. If the supreme court disregards the deposition of a party because the witness’ mental incapacity is apparent therefrom, it will not withhold a reversal for error because the witness was also examined orally in the chancery court, and the testimony orally delivered is not of record, even if the object of the oral examination was to enable the court below, by observation, to determine the witnesses’ capacity.

From the chancery court of Harrison county. HoN. N. C. Hill, Chancellor. Mrs. Clark, the appellant, filed her bill in equity against Lopez, the appellee, to cancel a deed made by her to him, averring that the execution thereof was obtained for a grossly inadequate sum; that she was, at the time, weak in mind, in feeble health, easily imposed upon, poor, destitute, distressed, and greatly oppressed by her necessitous and helpless condition; that appellee, by continuous persuasion, gross fraud, circumvention and false representation as to her title and the value of the property, induced her, on the faith of such representations, to execute the deed to the property, which was actually worth four or five times as much as the appellee paid for it. The facts upon which were based the charges of fraud, imposition, circumvention, etc., were all set out in the bill. The money paid by Lopez for the property was tendered back to him with interest. The answer of appellee denied all the material aver-ments of the bill of complaint. Proofs were taken, among which was the deposition of Mrs. Clark, referred to in the response by the court to the suggestion of error. The decree of the court below was in favor of Lopez, and it recites the taking of the oral evidence mentioned by the court in its opinion denying the suggestion of error: Mrs. Clark appealed to the supreme court. Complainant was in very straitened circumstances, right upon the verge of being ejected from the house in which she lived, for the nonpayment of her rent. The proof is abundant that, while the appellant is not an idiot, she is of such weak mind and intellect that she is almost a complete imbecile. The land was worth five times what Lopez paid for it. Mr. Adams, in his estimable work on equity jurisprudence, sec. 183, says that a conveyance may be impeached for mere weakness of intellect, provided it be coupled with circumstances which go to show that the weakness has been taken advantage of by the other party. Mr. Story, in his Equity Jurisprudence, secs. 234-237, lays down the doctrine that where a person of weak mind, from whatever cause the weakness may arise, has assumed to contract, and the price paid is so small as to shock the conscience of an honest man, the case becomes closely allied to the contracts of idiots, persons non compos mentis and infants, and that equity will relieve against the fraud, and it is obvious that weakness of understanding must constitute a most material ingredient for determining whether the contract has been obtained by fraud, imposition or undue influence. Mr. Story further says (secs. 240-248) that there may be such an unconscionableness or inadequacy in a bargain as to demonstrate some gross imposition or undue influence, and where there are ingredients in the case of a suspicious character, gross inadequacy must necessarily furnish the most vehement presumption of fraud, and lays down the doctrine that where immovable property is sold for less than one-half its value, that there was some undue influence brought to bear on the party selling, and must necessarily furnish the most vehement presumption of fraud. In Bunch r. Shannon, 46 Miss., 525, and Simonton v. Bacon, 49 Miss., 582, our supreme court lays down the doctrine that, where one of feeble understanding enters into a contract with a person in whom he has confidence, so that he trusts to that person to do right towards him, if there is any unfairness in the transaction the inference is that it was obtained by fraud, circumvention or undue influence, and he is not bound by the contract. In Fitzgerald v. Heed, 9 Smed. & M., 94, our supreme court says that, when the fact of an incapacity to make a legal contract is established, the contract is avoided, and that is the legal consequence, dependent on no court or judge. Inadequacy of consideration, coupled with other circumstances, such as weakness of intellect or pecuniary distress, may, in many cases, be considered as amounting to fraud, and will justify the setting aside of the contract, and it would appear that any unfairness in a transaction obtained over one of feeble mind by a person in whom he trusted, will raise the presumption that the advantage was obtained by fraud, and if the inadequacy is so great as to shock one at the injustice of the transaction, the inadequacy itself will be sufficient to establish the fraudulent character of the transaction. Allove v. Jewell, 4 Otto, 506; Griffith y. Godey, 113 U. S., 95; Kemyoson v. Aslibee (Eng.), L. R., 10 Ch., 15; Fry v. Bane (Eng.), 40 Ch. D., 322; 10 Am. & Eng. Ene. L., 527; Snell’s Equity, 395; Story, sec. 239. An examination of the record discloses the fact that this suit was not instituted until eight months and eleven days after the sale to Lopez, and then at the instance of others. The parties who instigated the suit had possession and control of the property, and were renting it to a tenant. According to appellant’s own testimony, it was at their instance that she brought this suit. They employed an attorney for her, made her bond for cost and her appeal bond. They furnished her the money to tender to appellee, which was tendered without her even knowing where it came from. This is a case in which not one single charge in the bill is sustained by the evidence. The testimony of appellant herself does not support her bill. Complainant testified in open court, and the chancellor had ample opportunity to judge for himself of her intelligence, without resorting to the testimony of witnesses. On the question of inadequacy of price, there is a mass of testimony, some relevant and some irrelevant. The witnesses who fixed highest values were dealing with speculative figures —the assessments all favor appellee. We admit that if it had been shown that complainant was weak minded, and had her weakness been taken advantage of, and she had been defrauded, it would have been a case where equity would have intervened. But, in this case, it has not been shown that appellant was weak minded; it has not been shown that any advantage of any kind has been taken of her; it has not been shown that she did not receive a fair price for the property sold; -it has not been shown that defendant did anything except such acts as can correctly be termed fair and honest. There was no fiduciary relation, or even relation of friendship, shown to exist between the parties. It was a simple business transaction, in which no advantage was taken or attempted. We confidently assert that not a single allegation in the bill is supported by the proof, and that if we leave the case to be determined upon the testimony of the appellant alone, it is shown that there is absolutely no foundation for the allegation of fraud in the bill. That the bill was not filed in good faith is shown by the fact that more than eight months elapsed before its filing, during which time the property materially enhanced in value. This case is brought up on a part only of the testimony before the chancellor, the oral proof not being made a matter of record, and in such case the presumption is always in favor, of the correctness of the decree. Anderson v. Williams, 24 Miss., 684; Steadman v. Holman, 33 Miss., 550; Balfour v. Mitchell, 12 Smed. & M., 629; Townsend v. Bluett, 5 How. (Miss.), 503; Lee v. Bennett, 2 Ga., 119; Doe v. Barnard, 7 Smed. & M., 319; Smiths. Hurd, 8 Smed. & M., 682.