Adams v. City of Greenville

1. Municipalities. Tax levy. Past years. Code 1898, $ 3020. Under code 1892, \ 3020, providing that municipal authorities shall levy taxes at the regular September meeting in each year, or, in ease of failure so to do, at any other regular meeting thereafter, the hoard of mayor and aldermen of a municipality have no power to levy taxes for a past fiscal year. 2. Same. Power. Construction. Municipal authority must be strictly construed, and unless a power he granted expressly or by necessary implication, it does noc exist. 3. State Kevenue Agent. Laws 1894, oh. 34. The state revenue ag-ent has no power, under Laws 1894, eh. 34, defining the powers and duties of that officer, to compel, by mandamus, the authorities of a municipality to act in any manner. (Justices Terral and Oalhoon.)

FROM tbe circuit court of Washington county. HoN. F. A. MONTGOMERY, Judge. Adams, state revenue agent, appellant, was tbe plaintiff, and the city of Greenville, tbe appellee, was defendant in tbe court below. From a judgment in favor of the defendant the plaintiff appealed to tbe supreme court. Tbe opinion states tbe facts. Tbe question which lies at tbe foundation of this case is, whether tbe board of mayor and aldermen can extend tbe levy for tbe years 1894 and 1895 over tbe banks and solvent credits which were located for the purposes of taxation within the city during those years, after the expiration of the current year itself. Our claim is that this authority is conferred by § 3020, annotated code, 1892. Counsel for the appellee contend that the statute means that such regular meeting thereafter held at which the levy may be made, must be during the current year. Such construction of the statute is not admissible, for the reason that it necessitates the introduction into the section of words which simply aré not there. The language of the statute is of the broadest and most comprehensive character. It reads, “At any other regular meeting thereafter.” The manadamus is not against the city. It is not a suit against the city, but is a suit against the board itself, in its organized capacity, to make it take such official action as the law itself imposes on it. The suit is not against the city, but is really in behalf of the city, and is simply an effort to make the city’s agents and servants discharge their official duty. The time for levying taxes has passed, and the charter of' said city does not authorize a levy of taxes for past years.. Appellant’-s contention is that under §§ 3019 and 3020 of the code of 1892, appellee has the power now to levy taxes for past years upon property that has escaped such taxes. Appellee is governed by a special charter, • and not by the provisions of the code on municipalities. But even if governed by the code provisions, the sections of the code cited do not authorize the levy of back taxes. These sections refer to the action of the municipal authorities with reference to annual taxes, and their action, in levying taxes, is confined to the particular year for which the taxes are to be levied, and, after any year has expired, they cannot, under these sections, levy the taxes for past years. Chapter 34 of Laws of 1894, enumerating the powers of the state revenue agent, does not authorize him to maintain this suit. By that law he can maintain suits against subordinate officers of the state, counties, levee boards or municipalities, and may sue in all cases “where the state or any county, municipality or levee board has the right of action, or may sue.”