Fox v. Pearl River Lumber Co.

1. Taxation. Assessment. Growing trees. Beal estate. Sepa/rate interest. Code 1892, U 3753, 3759, 3774. While growing trees are real estate, yet they are subject to separate ownership; and where the soil belongs to one person, and the trees upon it to another, they may be separately assessed for taxation to their respective owners. 2. Same. Approval of assessment. Bes adjudicóla. Code 1892, \ 3787. Where the owner of trees, growing upon the land of another, returns them to the assessor for taxation, giving their value, the judgment of the board of supervisors approving the assessment, UDder code 1892, § 3787, defining the effect of such judgment, concludes the owner from disputing the validity of the assessment.

From tbe chancery court of Lawrence county. Hon. Henry 0. Conn, Chancellor. The Pearl River Lumber Company, appellee, was the complainant in the court below. Fox, Tax Collector, appellant, was defendant there. The facts are fully stated in the opinion of the court. Growing trees are subject to separate ownership from the soil on which they stand, and they are part and .parcel of the real estate. Harrell v. Miller, 35 Miss., 700; McKenzie v. Shows, 70 Miss., 388. The Pearl River Lumber Company is shown by the record to have been the owner of $25,000 worth of standing timber in Lawrence county upon land, the fee simple title of which is in other parties. We make two points as against the decree of the chancellor: First, The appellee returned its trees to the assessor for taxation, fixing the value thereof. This assessment was approved by the board of supervisors at the proper time, and in the proper manner, and thereby the assessment became res adjudícala, and forever excluded the taxpayer, the Pearl River Lumber Company, from disputing its validity. Code 1892, § 3787. Second, The assessment itself was correct and proper, and was properly entered on the land roll, since the trees standing and growing were real estate. Code 1892, § 3774. It will be observed that the owners of the soil gave in the same to the assessor at its value, less the value of the standing trees. It will be further perceived that the Pearl River Lumber Company gave the trees in to the assessor at their value, adding nothing thereto for the value of the soil. This is, therefore, not a case of double assessment, but is a correct and proper assessment of several and distinct interests in the real estate. Authorities are not wanting to show that the trees are the subject of a separate assessment, and our statutes, §§ 3758 and 3774, require in such case that if there be more than one claimant, all of them should be named in the assessment roll, and that each owner should give in his land — - that is, his interest in the land — at its intrinsic value. In New York it is held that distinct interest in the same parcel of land may be owned by several persons, and that where one person owns the soil, and another the buildings thereon, they should be separately assessed. People v. Brooklyn, 93 N. Y., 308. And in Pennsylvania it is held that where the surface of land belongs to one owner, and the minerals thereunder belong to another, the respective interests should be assessed for taxation to each owner according to his interest, and according to the respective value of each interest, and it is further said that the owner of one interest cannot be charged with the whole tax. Sanders v. Scranton, 105 Penn. St., 469. In Massachusetts we find that a right to maintain a dam upon the land of another is taxable, and that it is properly assessed as real estate to the owner of the right. Flax Pond Water Go. v. Lynn, 147 Mass., 31. Unless the decree in this cause be erroneous, one thing is certain, and that is, that $25,000 worth of propery will escape taxation, and this result should be avoided if possible. The trees are not exempt from taxation. Liability to taxation is the general rule, exemption the exception, and exemption is not to be presumed or implied. Frantz v. Dobson, 64 Miss., 631; Cooley on Taxation, 146-152; Railroad Go. v. Thomas, 65 Miss., 553; State v. Simmons, 70 Miss., 485; Constitution of 1890, Sec. 90 (h) ; lb., Sec. 112; Code 1892, § 3774. Land embraces not only the soil, but its natural products, growing upon and affixed to it. Such things are a part and parcel of the realty, and pass by a grant of the land. Ilarrell v. Miller, 35 Miss., 700; McKenzie v. Shows, 70 Miss., 388. It being an undisputed fact in this case that the land was assessed to' parties other than the Pearl River Lumber Company, and that these other parties had paid the taxes thereon, it follows as a matter of fact that taxes have been paid on the standing timber growing on the lands so paid upon. Even if the timber be taxable, it is apparent of record that the Pearl River Lumber Company is a joint stock corporation, and its property can only be taxed in pursuance of Code 1892, § 3758, which prescribes that “the president, or other officer of such a company, shall, on demand, or on or before the first day of June of every year, deliver to the assessor of the county in which the company or corporation is domiciled, or located, a written statement, under oath, of the capital stock paid in, and its market value, and to whom each share belongs.” State v. Simmons, 70 Miss., 485. Section 486 of the code of 1880, which is practically identical with § 3758 of the code of 1892, was construed, and it was held that “under our statutes a domestic corporation is taxed with the value of its capital stock, and individuals are not taxed on the shares of such stock held by them.” The trees could only have been assessed under the statutes to the Pearl Eiver Lumber Company at its domicile, which domicile is not in Lawrence county, but in Lincoln county. Furthermore, it is charged in the bill, and of course taken to be true on this hearing, that the complainant, the Pearl Eiver Lumber Company, was duly and legally assessed with all property which should have been assessed to it for the year 1900, and had paid all the taxes due thereon, and .also the privilege tax required by law for said year. This allegation is not denied by the answer. It necessarily follows that if the Pearl Eiver Lumber Company had paid all the taxes legally assessed to it for the year 1900, no valid sale of its property for taxes can be had. It is too plain for argument that the timber holdings of the lumber company add to the value of its capital stock, and must be considered in the valuation of the same; and as a matter of fact the valuation of the timber holdings of this company constitute a very large proportion of the value of its capital stock, and when the capital stock is assessed at its proper value in Lincoln county, as has been done, there is no room for re-assessing it in Lawrence county. If it be so reassessed, it will be double taxation, which is not permissible. The code of 1892, § 3772, provides that all lands shall be assessed according to its intrinsic value, and if the assessor of Lawrence county violated the law, and did not assess the land upon which the timber in controversy stood, at its just value, the Pearl Fiver Lumber Company is not in fault because thereof.