Wilson v. State

1. Criminal Law. Indictment Affidavit. Misdemeanor. Technical terms. It is only necessary that misdemeanors be substantially charged, and in charging them the use of technical terms are not essential to a description of the offense. 2. Samr. Obstructing justice. Intimidating witness. Code 1892, g 1222. An offense, under code 1892, 1222, making it a misdemeanor to attempt by threats or force to intimidate a witness in the discharge of his duty, is sufficiently charged by an affidavit that the defendants “did willfully and feloniously, there and then, without shadow of law or authority, place affiant under arrest and forced him to-go with them, and at the points of their guns attempted to obstruct a due process of law by threatening his life if he gave testimony against them on a certain charge against them in which he had been summoned as a witness for the state.” 3. Same. It is unnecessary in an affidavit charging an attempt to intimidate a witness in the discharge of his duty (under code 1892, § 1222), to aver in what case he was a witness.

From tbe circuit court of Madison county. Non. Robert Powell, Judge. Wilson and others, appellants, were defendants in the court below; they were charged with an offense, as shown by the affidavit given in the opinion of the court, were convicted and sentenced under code 1892, § 1222, and appealed to the supreme court. The code section is as follows : “1222 (2916). Obstructing justice; intimidating judge, juror, witness, etc. — If any person, by threats or force, attempt to intimidate or impede a judge, justice of the peace, juror, witness, or any officer in the discharge of his duty, or to obstruct or impede the administration of justice in any court, he shall, upon conviction, be punished by imprisonment in the county jail not less than one month nor more than sis months, and by fine not exceeding three hundred dollars.” The original affidavit was complete nonsense, and the amended affidavit is little or no better. It is elementary that all pleadings, civil and criminal, must make sense. To charge that defendants “did attempt to obstruct a due process of law” is to leave them in doubt as to which section of the code they are charged with violating. Indeed it is so obscure and meaningless that it does not charge any crime known to the law. The language is wholly insufficient to bring the offense within either §§ 1221 or 1222, code of 1892. But if it be conceded that the effort is here made to charge an offense under § 1222, code 1892, the affidavit is not only insufficient because instead of charging an “attempt to obstruct the administration of justice” as the statute provides, it charges that defendants “did attempt to obstruct a due process of law,” but also because it fails to show in what court the cause was pending in which the witness had been summoned to appear. Indeed the affidavit fails to show that the charge was pending in any court of any sort, anywhere. Manifestly, such pleading would be too obscure and indefinite in a civil proceeding, far less in a criminal one. Prosecutors ought at least to be required to couch their affidavits in sensible English that means something. The charge here in its essence is meaningless jargon, and we submit that this cause ought to be reversed for the reason that the affidavit fails to charge any offense, of any sort, under the law, since the language used to set out the gist of the action is sheer nonsense. It is not disputed that the defendants are guilty of the crime of attempting to obstruct the due course of public justice, and to prevent the attendance of the witness in a criminal case tried at Brandon, Bankin county, Mississippi, against John Ash and Joe Holden, by intimidating and threatening the said witness with death or great bodily harm. The record is clear on this, but it is contended by counsel for appellant that the judgment of the circuit court ought to be reversed, notwithstanding the correctness of the verdict because the affidavit on which the defendants were tried “does not charge any offense under the law, since the -language used to set out the gist of the action is sheer nonsense.” The gist of this offense is the attempt by force and threats to interefere with, or obstruct, in any manner the due process of a court, endeavoring to prevent the attendance of a witness in a case to be tried before that court. It is not a fatal defect that the affidavit fails to state in what court affiant was summoned as a witness; since all that would be mere matter of inducement, and not an essentially descriptive element of the offense. He would have been guilty of the same offense if he attempted to prevent the attendance of the witness in any court. The vital point essential to make out the offense is in attempting to obstruct the course of public justice. This court has held in the case of Berrow v. Skate, 67 Miss., 365, that the averment in the indictment that the “’witness had been subpoenaed, was mere matter of inducement, and a variance between the averment and the proof was immaterial. And the court there very properly says, “that if appellant does any act to prevent the attendance of the witness, he was guilty of obstructing the course of public justice, and punishable therefor.” Bishop Criminal Law, sec. 468. The words “attempt to obstruct a due process of law by threatening,” etc., as used in the affidavit, are practically synonymous with those of the statute, which is all that is necessary; and especially so, when followed by way of explanation, as in the case at bar, by the statement “that affiant had been summoned as a witness to testify.” The information is sufficiently explicit to appraise the defendant of the nature and cause of the acquisition against' him, required by the constitution. Roberts v. State, 55 Miss., 421.