Bacot v. State

1. Cbiminal Law asstd Peocedube. Murder. Insanity. Nonexpert witness'. Opinion. Evidence. Remoteness. In a murder trial, the question of defendant’s sanity being in issue, the opinion of a nonexpert witness touching defendant’s mental condition, given in connection with the facts upon which it is based, is not objectionable because of remoteness, where the witness had known the accused for fifty years, had gone to school with .him when they were boys, and had been intimately associated with him. 2. Same. Same. Instructions. Where insanity is pleaded as a defense in a murder case, and non-expert witnesses have testified to their opinions touching defendant’s mental condition in connection with the facts upon which they are based, an instruction is fatally erroneous which directs the jury, in weighing the testimony of such witnesses, to disregard their opinions and consider- alone the facts upon which they were based.

Ekom the circuit court of Pike county. IioN. Moyse H. WileiNSON, Judge. Bacot, appellant, was indicted and tried for the murder of one Thomas Brown, was convicted of manslaughter, sentenced to the-penitentiary for a term of ten years and appealed to the supreme court. The opinion of the court states the facts upon which the case was decided. This fourth instruction is indisputably wrong and reversibly ■erroneous. Several witnesses, laymen, testified for the defendant, that the defendant .was insane or was not able to distinguish right from wrong when he killed Brown. The state then put on the stand Dr. Beacham, a country physician, in rebuttal, and some laymen. Beacham was a young practicing physician without experience in mental diseases. The court instructed the jury that in passing upon the evidence given by a nonexpert, as to his opinion of the sanity or insanity of a person, it must be governed by the facts and circumstances as related by the non-expert witness, upon which he based his opinion, and judge whether or not.the party charged with crime had mind enough to Icnow right from wrong at the time he committed the crime. This was to single out Beacham, and say to an unlearned jury that he was an expert, and to set him up against the other witnesses as one to be relied ux^on from the standxooint of his opinion ■only. This was to tell the jury that the laymen, with abundant knowledge of the defendant, all his life, and opportunity to know, could have no opinion that could go to the jury, but that the jury should substitute their opinion for such laymen’s opinions, and in so doing they could not go beyond the facts and circumstances , detailed by the witness. In the first place Beacham was not an expert. Russell v. State, 53 Miss. 367; Wood v. State, 58 Miss. 741. In Reid v. State, 62 Miss. 405, this court said: “It is competent for a nonexpert witness * * * who has had opportunity to observe the conversation, conduct or manner of the ■defendant, to- state his opinion or belief of the sanity or insanity of the accused, in connection with the facts upon which it is based. Such a witness may give his opinion or belief from facts stated and known by him.” If the fourth instruction .be correct, why should the law allow a nonexpert to give his opinion or belief at all; why not say, that all nonexperts may state the facts and circumstances known to- them, but no opinion or belief based upon such facts. Many of the witnesses testified from acts and conduct and observation of the defendant from long association, close personal observation, running back to childhood, for many years, and perhaps could- only give a portion of the facts and circumstances upon which our opinion was based. Many of the facts, acts and circumstances going to make up the basis of such a belief or opinion, may have been lost to memory, and oftentimes are, yet the opinion formed from the various things done in life is not lost; yet the court charged the jury that in passing upon the opinion of such witness they must be governed by and confined to the facts and circumstances as related by the witness, upon which he based his opinion, and that the jury must judge whether the defendant had mind enough to know right from wrong. This was in effect to- state to the jury that no such witness could have an opinion which the •jury should consider, and that though the facts and circumstances may have been sufficient, when taken in connection with the knowledge and opportunity to observe the defendant and intelligence of the witness, for the witness to have an opinion, yet the jury should not regard such witness as having an opinion or belief on the subject. In Wood v. State, 58 Miss. 741, the court said: “How much weight is to be given to the opinion of a witness on the question of insanity depends, like the weight to be given to all other •ojfinions, upon the intelligence of the witness and his opportunities of observation; and while the testimony of a profess sional man, '.with equal opportunities, would ordinarily be more reliable than that of a nonprofessional, the testimony of an intelligent friend who had known the subject of the inquiry for years, might be more weighty than that of the most experienced expert who had seen him only since the condition of his intellect had become a matter of investigation. Craft and deceit might mislead the one into an error which the lifetime acquaintance and observation of the other would readily detect.” The instruction is on the weight of the evidence and is wrong, and so narrows the defendant’s defense that it cannot stand the test of the judicial mind. This instruction totally ignores and takes by exclusion'from the jury a consideration of the intelligence of the witnesses; his opportunity to know, and confines the jury only to the facts and circumstances that the witness is able or is called upon to relate for the basis of his relief, and ignores everything an intelligent witness might store away in his mind, the facts and circumstances of which were lost to memory. It is the opinion of the witness from knowledge, intelligence and opportunity to know, that governs; and not what a jury may think a witness should have believed from a state of facts partially related. One witness with life-long opportunities to know, and with intelligence and close observation, but who can remember but few circumstances on the spur of the moment, is to be measured and have less weight than other witnesses with fewer opportunities to know, observe, and intelligence, yet with more facts and circumstances retained in his memory. It is the'opinion that is of value. The court erred manifestly in sustaining the state’s objection to the witness, Williams, being permitted to'express an opinion touching defendant’s sanity or insanity. This witness’ opportunity for knowledge was even greater than that of others who were permitted to give their opinions. Emery v. Hoyt, 46 Ill. 258. Tbe witness "Williams bad not been associated with tbe accused for eighteen years, and besides be did not state tbe facts upon wbicb bis opinion, if be bad one, was based. Reid v. State, 62 Miss. 406. Tbe fourth instruction for tbe state is unreasonably distorted and is misconstrued by appellant’s counsel; when properly con-trued and read in connection with tbe other instructions it is not. erroneous, certainly it does not contain reversible error.