American Laundry Machine Co. v. Citizens Nat. Life Ins.

Fixtures Machinery. Rights of mortgagees. Where the machinery of a laundry attached by screws, rods, and bolts to the floor or ceiling of a building, or to concrete or brick foundation, in order to support and steady it, and which was placed in the building solely for use in connection with the laundry business, none of such machinery being necessary for the use of the building, as each and all of it can be removed without injury to the building, such machinery was personal property, and not fixtures in the sense that they became a part of the building in which they were placed and in such case a mortgagee of the house and lot in which the machinery was placed had no claim on such machinery as against a subsequent mortgage of the same.

Appeal from tlie chancery court of Alcorn county. Hon. I. Q. Robins, Chancellor. Suit by American Laundry Machine Company, against the Citizens National Life Insurance Company and others. From a decree for insufficient relief, plaintiff appeals. The facts are fully stated in the opinion of the court. The appellant relies upon the principals of law as established in the following cases, to wit: Weathersby v. Sleeper, 42 Miss. 732; John Vam, Range Co. v. Allen, 7 So. Rep. 499; Boone v. Mendenhall Lbr. Co., 97 Miss. 554, which cases, so far as we can find, are not in conflict with any other decisions of our court. In the .case of Allen v. Jolvn Van Range Co., supra, in 7th Southern Reporter, the stove in the controversy was fastened to the floor, evidently for the -purpose of holding it steady, just as the machinery above mentioned was fastened to the floor or ceiling to hold it steady and keep it from turning over, and Judge Wood in the Allen case says that in the absence of any agreement, the court was unable to see any plausibility in the contention that the property was a fixture, that it would be time enough to revise the former rulings on this subject when an attorney of that court could be found to assert that a cooking stove partakes of the nature of real estate, even though it is fastened to the floor. Now, this kitchen stove was fastened to the floor of the hotel for the purpose of being used in connection with the running of the hotel, and was an essential piece of machinery to be used in operating a hotel — indeed, the hotel would not have been run without the stove — and while it may be conceded that this machinery involved in this litigation was necessary in the operation of the laundry, it was no more a part of the realty than the stove was a part of the hotel building, even conceding that the laundry could not have been operated without such machinery. There is nothing in the placing of this machinery for use in the operation of the laundry that indicated that it should be considered a permanent attachment to the realty in order to increase the value of the realty, only so long as the laundry would be operated in the building.. The building could be used for merchandise, 'or any other kind of manufacturing plant, or trade or business as well as for a laundry business. The Weathersby case, supra, states that the intention of the parties in making the attachment can be looked to in arriving at whether or not it was intended to be permanent attachment, converting the chattel into a fixture. Let us look at the dealings between these parties with this property, in order to ascertain, if possible, the intention of Mr. Collier in making the attachment, and the understanding of the Life Insurance Company in taking the trust deed. (1) At the time this trust deed was taken by the Life Insurance Company, there was then a trust deed on a part of this machinery of record in the office of the chancery of Alcorn county, Mississippi; (2) The appraisers in appraising the property for the loan from the Life Insurance Company did not list this machinery nor appraise the same. (3) The trust deed from Collier and wife to the Citizens Life Insurance Company did not describe this machinery; (4) The trustee’s deed from Key, trustee, to the Life Insurance Company, the defendant, did not describe this machinery; (5) Mr. Collier attempted to increase his loan with the defendant Life Insurance Company with this machinery as security, which the said defendant declined, because the defendant did not loan money with machinery as security, therefor this last point is clearly established by Mr. Collier in his testimony in this case, and it is admitted by. Mr. L. W. Key, the agent of the defendant Life Insurance Company who negotiated this loan for the Life Insurance Company — the only difference being about the time the application was made, Collier thinking that it was immediately upon closing the loan on the real 'estate, and Mr. Key contending that it was several weeks thereafter by correspondence. The above clearly shows that Collier dealt with this machinery as separate and apart from the realty, and that Mr. Key, the agent and trustee for the defendant Life Insurance Company, did not understand that he had a trust deed on the machinery, as he distinctly says that he would not loan money upon machinery as security. We, therefore, respectfully contend that the decree of the chancellor should be reversed and the appellant’s lien on the property hereinabove described declared to be good as against the conveyances of the realty, and that said property did not pass to the purchaser of the realty. The sole question in this case is, whether or not certain articles of machinery were fixtures. The chancellor held them to be fixtures and that the Citizens National Life Insurance Company were entitled to them because they were fixtures, and decreed them to be the property of the insurance company. The rule of law adopted by this court is that if there is any testimony to support the findings of the chancellor, his findings will be sustained by this court. The findings of the chancellor on this point were predicated on the testimony of Mr. Collier, the vendor, in this case and one of the parties to this suit. Another rule of law adopted by this court is, that, in passing on the question, whether certain articles become ■fixtures or not, the presumption is against the vendor and in favor of the vendee. Taking the, testimony of Collier and applying the principal of law governing in this case, it is easily seen that the findings of the chancellor are correct.