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State ex rel. Collins v. Watts

State ex rel. Collins, Attorney General v. Watts, County Superintendent

State ex rel. Collins v. Watts, 78 So. 515 (Miss. 1918)
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Court
Mississippi Supreme Court · State Highest Courts
Decided
March 15, 1918
Judges
Smith
Citations
78 So. 515117 Miss. 524
Syllabus
1. Schools and School Districts. Session 0† 'board. Time. There is nothing in the phraseology of section- 4512, Code 1906 (Hemingway’s Code, section 7332), indicating that the provision thereof, that county superintendents shall convene the school board prior to the first day of August, is intended as a limitation upon their authority to convene it thereafter; but the date to which the board should he convened was fixed as a matter, not of substance, but merely of convenience in order that the boun-claries of the school district might he defined at a time early enough to permit the teaching of the schools at the next ensuing terms thereof, so that the provision must he held to he merely directory and not mandatory. 2. Same. The employment of a teacher hy the trustees of a district which had been abolished at a meeting held by the public school hoard of the county on August 7th, did not give such teacher a cause of action to compel the county hoard to contract with him, on the ground that such hoard, should have met prior to August 1st, instead of August 7th, to abolish such district.
Summary
Appeal from the circuit court of Marion county. HoN. A. E. Weatheksby, Judge. Mandamus by the state, on relation of' Boss A. Collins, Attorney General, against E. I. Watts, Superintendent of Education of Márion County. From a judgment denying relief, the relator appeals.. The facts are fully stated in the opinion of the. court. This is a case brought by mandamus to compel the appellee, County Superintendent of Education of Marion County, to contract with one Jackson, a public school teacher, to teach one of the public schools of the county. The record in the ease, which is very brief, shows that the trustees of the public school in question, elected Jackson to teach and certified his election to the appellee as the law requires and that Jackson held a first grade teacher’s license, good and valid in any county of the state. The appellee defended on the ground that the county school board of the county had abolished the school and had consolidated this school with several other schools, and had thereby established a consolidated school district. Our contention is that the public school was never-lawfully abolished and that the act of the school board in attempting to abolish is was void. The school U'&»rá®ióíi MáMSíx» «bM#f 'MthfflqfteíS18 t# á'bólisfi-' tMs ,ümKi 9i‘ Weaai» :Hféia“g» oA«e sa, Wvtftm. M.aí b\9á 9(1 isa at aoKrsznn - j1blgflig’^gg,).,sgction 4512, Code 1906, the school" board was without legal ip ms ait m>di>n waufl oal x l± e A0O£ .(.«fiction jígg2Síí}Hfes3;mgway«si dSodk^o-iwe M it to l?eadr dS!,f'OÍlotV'S4''íí/ i&iw MuqjIs -ínaotf íí»£j,u bauom The county fe'h^SMtShcfdxit^-'sh’all^e^^y^iahxiif^f the school board and shall convene, it annually, prior to .the first «{P,V5»'ffi «P«Aie school districts of ..thl'^iihty of ‘The distr&í^if níi^'S.Mad^’fdfca’te.d? itfSt we find rfmmmarfAw^Wi m ‘MEM Wí 13» feWfiay ww4#* locationL of the sehoolhonse tor the consolidated school wMs tefáníle^igr^tóbfr&yexjyí ©^EWdw^oCQiQ^e^flrto a ccopMhe a rsay :S as fM ivhex-e (the; fexochnsaiidated, ngfihfeolí» isj,giothihg i98S$¿4tiaj|i a, ypaWfo wíaa hc^MMfid .Wdioi® del $W3Í- ;QrdgjjS íjcp^li'^tii®^tfee schooteiqrpclpjiiinf nthPnxhfibghl, jb^iJíoho fe a dr&oih@:)ikt)dn-X')of August ixfieabh 5te&r $0T tk&'pniE^ehoiMd^ide^agi^ matter iixfflaediioThis vworhí iM .®®|i;Q(i'$eaílíé •^®fers>ifcatrasted*'íitb'>i!lí; ríbtó?¡‘í& •jace^ard»rt 2]oa',.bíeMiiga.:#0'tíí'tlfig apips pfese tówát toé HeldobefofoAu^usNdsgtodlueadi ^amUlnaoi srjj . 'v Llü. bariiioifc > b é>‘ íbat c4btí>t)úíÓ!d^-'e»áQ /Teó:m& P'elled'-tova'dntraétí Vdtlf)41íetitéadlle»H;Mn od! >3iár>boíj id. mtEbe-. apjxfellant'S',r"olaÍ!m ath^aiteflbefoord4i»álfofv'lb.eí eoilnty 'sdbbblííbókMIbfoéducatia^irmideart date'}©#! Nte^’b.stííftb^ irrdio-8,-'*dli91'6i,‘’ (abdMshM^uitbgss wrar¿®nst!Í.tedlm’©lsí} araíd •eréatm'gístbe vÍDoib' eowolMatied nsdm©lpswaM)V;©id, [under •tháu'amébolijityíífofiTttieníeouaiNsiBh’gldin^ri ins [flier &asf>i of iBnávis W Bobi’ySsnnpéepditedoiadlM) 'Miss> tpage >■$.% ■ ípd -■w4ácb/decisáién(cpurpjórtedoíéea©UfetrgeMe!Q±iofiiyé51#-jófrtlié .-AimotátedríQodie -of IQOfomffiMsíised’iom >gi Ib©: Qodfe i&oín Hie following;:■■wordsVi biuod íoorb? títo too o/ii iido! lo ‘ tiUherGoaanty'snpesKiintepdent'isbatl íbeiip®e?iflñ®t^fjtíae ■sottool. board/, and s^alL dantendat-antouaillygi^ribr ítcoábe ■di’Stbidfeys'ofoAuíguffit] éé dbsfiae ■tbéí'.bou'MfetiésoaBfí'ábe sseboobídistficés' oi'/ither cfflMtjl/ífif&tsüdeddf Íltofo^epagíate •sdbobtodistrictsqof! tmrhakd aUtemtionsG-tbeKein^Kauldnfo déSignátecjifresaíocMixáía cffo tb'éTEánb0®lbQ-dse,\oiit9Ídacfe •diistiricifr,>Íif;1¿ot:i;alEead)yrdcíékfoir’bí£dfit8 JmÜ lo egairgusE aodEHeicdtetiiniitbistiesiser MiiPAlr^súy?, MUMwiS®wyr ;''eGnnttt’“i!áifg.)o;i!laisíE sedrononsaidteoí'EEííé •ifbo’aiBdo o# ■■edilcátroíil Hasotbs pcffreascfó meettoaá aiymtin^iftevtbe •paTlr «foils; presidemitp telo conduct Itoftgífeu^úessfissfed exercise the powers entrusted to it; but, in regard to the matters mentioned in section 4512, a meeting for this purpose must be beld before August 1st of each, year. If for no other reason, meetings for the establishing and altering of school districts and to designate the location of sehoolhouses therein, should be held before August 1st, because by section 4519 of the Code, the patrons of the schools of this character are required to elect trustees on the first Saturday of August in each year, and therefore, if schools of this class are to be consolidated, it • should be done before this time.” This appellee insists that the language used by the court in this opinion, was obiter dictum, and that it was not necessary for the court to have used this language in deciding the matter that it had before it for decision. We submit the further proposition that the court’s construction as placed upon section 4512 by the decision in the Purvis-Robinson case, is incorrect. The, section of the Code referred to merely provides that it shall be the duty of the county superintendent to call the county school board in -session at least once every year, prior to the first day of August, for the purpose of considering ' the matter of defining the boundaries of school districts and making alterations therein, but this section does not by express terms or by implication, inhibit the county • school board from considering the ' matter and passing orders respecting the boundaries of school districts after the first day of August. The purpose of this statute seems to be to insure that the county school board shall take up for consideration at least once a year prior to the first day of August the matter of the boundaries of school districts, but the language of that statute is without any limitation upon the power of the-school board to convene at other times to consider this matter, nor does any good reason exist why they might not nor does the general legislative scheme in regard to schools, suggest a reason why such, a matter should not he considered and passed up op subsequent to the first day of August. It is suggested by the court as a reason why the matter of definitely ■establishing school districts should be passed upon prior to August first, is because the patrons of schools are required to elect trustees on the first Saturday of August in each year. We think that this cannot be held as a reason, for the reason that the legislature in the year 1914, as appears from page 257 of the Laws of 1914, changed the time for the election of trustees from the first Saturday of August to the first Saturday of May. We submit as a further proposition, that while the language used in this section is apparently in the imperative, yet that a fair construction of the section is to make this duty of the county superintendent directory and not mandatory and that a failure to observe this provision would not void an order of a county school board passed after the first day of August and providing for the defining of boundaries of school districts of the county. On page 1158 of 36 Cyc., some subsidiary rules are stated for the determination of the legislative intent in regard to statutes. It is declared that: “A provision of course is mandatory, which is declared by the statute itself to he so. When a particular provision of a statute relates to some immaterial matter as to which compliance with the statute is a matter of convenience rather than substance, or • where the directions of a statute are given merely with a view to the proper, orderly and prompt conduct of business, the provision may generally be regarded as directory. It may well be observed here that this statute does not declare that the same is to be construed' as mandatory, and it appears that the legislative- intent was merely to provide for the proper, orderly and prompt conduct of the business of defining school districts. Without a doubt, some advantage in having school lap-Tj^rb.Q'FiutínílpiL^i'ffSÍ'l'Ql; ‘fes ij¡tó> al(|Y&3é^6>fl YiseAié)S[(boiíttieí>fe0M9&rfes /p£.;t]i4 j:aBai?édp ©r abolished, siiTlfeeíjift^t vtehifce^shblavy oí>jAb^sfen>OIlte tQodgnjHjaiie^fagi^lg^yOiYl&^a- ffpt¡ eMi^BgiKflwúftg.jMb&rté c#§lhic ^Sfíedo^yt«^»g« meMftghoif>;tfce * i^bsalifó a^impM^W^Kiffieaping, ,Xut.-.tl^úlanguagá!ot-).ífee atefefert§nsn!?bit]Sia¿-4t-?Qugb;trfe i^e-igivpñí-a.» digpctegy XRbaifew-w aidi on^ado lolfyífe (?kir £tei us^tfeath#:^ fffiietfs fef><ftfee ~-0hml rboapdir&afebljshpgnfefe üftb 'PdnsfiMat©<b¡s<fhp.'Ol tpa^shd on August 7th, and 8,/3^^).pag]át^pt¡'#);,thffihíeld.(-t@ 'be <yoidv/ 'íf thp;jiípuiítríSh,oiHild a.clb'®^\íto'}.fthr$ofeiigpage!fú^ed .ip itbe r3PaPMisnB@feipaj(?ji 9?Ks^oib6nt.^ -tlj-infethab thehyérN-Plftatotbai] Aypuld^Síli^Jdcipfaftgaffd # .ftes^-i oi&deir&oQf ftth|e0fg6hotqlr-bfi&H.<lnPÍíMfpáop ppupiy, •pa5iñaÍ?OP*¡4ag5a§t;7ífe7apd4^'wpii|ldobea.i;hMtpfte^rívrP.Ra ippperatiyq fof; -the JyéarhbSMí b»h)«diátbMe;to,e- oper#ííf-ÍY;p ¿Sijfoífev^?feo^s%i5W8ff'9 rib rfiiw o'utnríqmoa ¡s 5» pppfi‘te§blP wtt ipaiatv/tha;t tteuiághferqguit i^Jbía pasenwagiíreaqhpd^-ppíi í#£at ^ogfeft^v^bMfe ipteaeist ¿páaw^í tfee sigtjaMiíg ipí jthfeíísahqqlíxdigtrl^ asióte case should b,exal3bpílb/l-??iíí JóoSyrn'iO'f urí vfíaTOfí ~ víhit

Syllabus and headnotes are prepared by the reporter or publisher, not the court, and are not part of the opinion.

Opinion of the Court — Smith

Text extracted by OCR from a scanned original; check the original for exact wording.

Smith, C. J.,

delivered the opinion of the court.

ap vThigi^nán-já.pb^al^ftiíonadd jhd§taiemtíd:enyi:iig the: pray eb ip#ía>'petítfen t&to&'rwr.it'rofí'iitapSarntís ftfeihOMp@l¿ appellee .tP^dPhthac't'f’W&lñi ©wstgif* jMcaOñ/ítdrcfthél'itekhiiígtpf)^ Spüblic §dh'ó"#ífdfi ttea^BSífefif of«fM7rlf&7oh r> jirmíílW

*531 1 o . NEMábiÓñ íbfilá%->hél& í>fe®e ^fPffiíá $thblMyá>4f i; ’■’í&ÍEf sfíveí&l -is^lídd'ld daátribf^^kc’Mdííígíf^ljé lt#®%tiÁ'as-AhedBiiíé B;rfrr‘>dis'tí5j6^!%éíf@‘I'ééB%!SÍMáíteá5,:ML ;to ohAdMííet1- aAd á.'é'SígnM'fe'd fál¡ tkíé’í!EMb,<cc9ís.Md'£t%á .^cto'ol’?distr-xci,St]i%y'SblioM ofi^híéh. éónS'oííSatfedídistíÚGt was maintained duringAhd-Mtire ■sesgÍM':ní,vÍ-9Í6-Í7sa'Tíd -ig< c&tffis ití sTgip éEM-fiNií * ?á®d!cdiíl^r‘f-SfiÜMSs? f dHlhe dieefefBy'd^ teaSbhefi,8vPák •elecléd?b^íi3íe íttd!s%^s oBttíelBiííb’^BííiSridiBMétiítb Té'áíh ítlib ■ tSbhubHefi' tkSf’SSisittífet^íoí^tób 2sgg®cMM05p39l7-^-; Íte,a#;a'|?p@l!e^-f^3íe %btiht;f> sn^bfciktdMMtíb^ffedk'éáÉ.®®, íd&-ífelMed h$ fteeñtE'áctííW'ítñ- * MSíf“iflá4r éf oE-^íi rff?ké‘| é^tíd^teat 't-líé¡f#tMiBfir:Pbad?-b'idn'3tSbB3ish.'feá^<^Blíiéx^S2i íl ■«íl 'io ^aitaom adl ‘io't íioac-n a

íbSbfbhtitoiínlt fÜ&t ■Bine-Buff d s&hdbl ‘ffia^^eátirt^ftie^S fcdibol'ik vdid^fé^ke'ykaSdií'í ing held after the 1st dá^9df^áS3g'tfet^M ¥ .sectidh 14512, Code of 1906 (section 7332, Hemingway’s Code), which provides that: ’4fe%áb M’ad^^át^naSé^-'

‘ ‘ The county superintendent shall, be president of the school board, and shall. convene-it annually, prior to the ■first day of Angnst, to- define the boundaries of the school districts of the county outside of the separate •school districts, or gtjq.^akp .^altjeRations therein, and to designate the location of the school house in each district, if not already- located::’!a-<í/o3 zrj

There is nothing in the phraseology of this statute, !ilor-’'-ah^''bthei,i,be'ariiSg>Hhdtbdfi'>whieh.''Thabt'%gglf!Mll,dd to our attention, indicating .thaT^fiS^pró^lfoíi ,tfi&fré’ó$ that '% 9.PWWel?iit TOlcaMgñfé^^JgM/^oard pri.or.jjtoidheyfefciidayj df? Asgastrfjsjinteided as aaolimita-'iiPnivupcmsahi'S cauth'Orityi toramavsneiHt' thereafter; but Oh#1 ddb&: prió'FId l^hfehvthd“b0bMa sbóhld'íTb^hbliVened was evidently fixed as a matter, not of substance, but *532 merely of convenience in order that the boundaries of the school districts might he defined at a time early enought to permit the teaching of the schools at the next ensuing terms thereof, so that the provision must he held to be merely directory and not mandatory. 36 Cyc. 115; Koch v. Bridges, 45 Miss. 247 ; Keeton v. Board of Supervisors, 77 So. 906 .

The question here under consideration was not presented to the court in Purvis v. Robinson, 110 Miss. 64 , 69 So. 673 , relied on by appellant, so that what was there said is not controlling here. Section 4519, Code of 1906 (Hemingway’s Code, section 7339), which requires the patrons of,a public school to elect trustees thereof on the first Saturday of August in each year, and which was referred to by the court in that case as furnishing a reason for the meeting of the school boards to define the districts before the first day of August, was amended by chapter' 187, Laws of 1914, so as to provide that the trustees of a school shall be elected on the first Saturday of May in each year.

Affirmed„

How later courts describe this case

No later court has written an explanatory parenthetical about this case yet.

1931: 119312026peak 1931 · 1

Relies on it most ⓘ

  1. Columbus & G. Ry. Co. v. Miller134 So. 847 (Miss. 1931)

Most recent

  1. Columbus & G. Ry. Co. v. Miller134 So. 847 (Miss. 1931)

Citing references are not a citator: they show that a later opinion cites this case, not whether it followed, distinguished, or overruled it. Check negative history before relying on this case.

Authorities cited 3

DepthCaseCited by
Purvis v. Robinson, 69 So. 673 (Miss. 1915) 7
Koch & Dryfus v. Bridges, 45 Miss. 247 (1871) 32
Keeton v. Bd. of Supervisors, 77 So. 906 (Miss. 1918) 2

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