Sovereign Camp v. Cole

1. Insurance. By-laws liberally construed as to beneficiaries só as to give effect to mutual benefit certificate. In determining who is entitled to benefits in mutual benefit societies, the members of which contribute money which provides the funds from which benefits are paid,. the courts will adopt a liberal construction of the by-laws of such society, so that effect may be given a certificate issued by such society to its members. 2. Insurance. “Parent" ivithin mutual benefit certificate held to include stepmother. Where a certificate of a benefit society provided that the beneficiary or beneficiaries shall be a wife, children, adopted children, parents, brothers, and sisters, or other blood relations, or persons dependent upon the member, and a pre-existing statute limited beneficiaries to “wife, husband, relative by blood to the fourth degree, father-in-law, mother-in-law, son-in-law, daughter-in-law, stepfather, stepmother, stepchildren, children by legal adoption, or to a person or persons dependent upon the member,” with a proviso that any society may by its laws limit the scope of beneficiaries within the above classes, the court will not put a narrow and restrictive meaning on the words used to designate beneficiaries, in the absence of a clear expression indicating a purpose to restrict, and in this case the word “parent” will be construed to include a stepmother, it being shown that the assured lived in the home and called the stepmother “mother,” and that he had been reared by the stepmother, and that their relations had always been the same as mother and son.

Appeal from circuit court of Warren county. ITon. E. L. B'jrien, Judge. Action by Mrs. Alice Cole against the Sovereign Camp of the statute by the legislature in any manner affects and defendant appeals. Appellee on page 5 of its brief states that in the acts of the legislature of 1916, chapter 206, section 6, the legislature very materially broadened and extended the laws of beneficiary that might be designated in policies of the kind sned on, We are unable to see how the broadening of the statute by the legislature in any manner affects the construction of the by-laws of the appellant order in the case at bar, for the reason that, while the beneficiary named in a policy or certificate of insurance in the fraternal class must come within either the class of beneficiaries designated by statute or the class of beneficiaries authorized by the charter, constitution and by-laws of the order, and in the case before the court, by the express and explicit terms of the by-laws of the order, the beneficiary is confined to “wife, adopted children, children,'parents, brother, sister, or other blood relations,, or to persons dependent upon the member.” This quotation is taken from section 3 of the constitution and by-laws of the appellant order, lines 17-20, page 4, a certified copy of which bylaws is attached in the back of the record. It is therefore clearly seen that under this provision no stepmother is eligible as a beneficiary. The facts that the statute may be broader than the by-laws is immaterial, and we refer the court’s attention to the many cases quoted from and cited in our original brief herein filed, where all the authorities hold that while the list of eligible beneficiaries as authorized by the by-laws of the order cannot be broader than the list of eligible beneficiaries allowed by statute; that on the other hand it is equally true that the order has a perfect right to restrict the list of eligible beneficiaries to a smaller and narroAver class than that prescribed by statute, and further, that the order has no greater authority than its constitution and by-laws authorize and that the list of eligible beneficiaries as laid down by this constitution and by-laws controls absolutely. The rule is clearly stated in 29 Cyc. page 108, quoted on page 2 of our original brief, and is cited abundantly in the cases following the above quotation. The only remaining question in respect to this phase of the argument is this. Is the word “stepmother” included in the constitution and by-laws of the appellant order which authorizes and restricts a beneficiary to that of “wife,” adopted children, children, parents, brother, sister, or other blood relations, or to persons dependent upon the member. ..Let us take up each class of eligible beneficiaries as laid down by these by-laws and endeavor to ascertain if the appellee, the stepmother of the insured in the case at bar, comes Avithin the list of eligible beneficiaries. (1) The appellee is not the Avife of the insured; (2) The appellee is not an adopted child of the insured; (3) The appellee is not a child of the insured; (4) The appellee is not the brother of the insured; (5) The appellee is not the sister of the insured; (6) The appellee is certainly no blood relation of the insured; (7) The appellee Avas not dependent upon the insured.; (8) Is the appellee included in the term parents? We submit that clearly none of the terms are applicable to this appellee in any sensé of the word, and the only one that is claimed by appellee to be applicable to this appellee is the term parents. In other words, the question now to be decided is, does the word “parents” include a stepmother? We are unable to find any authority anywhere holding that it does. On the other hand, we find the rule clearly established that the word “.parents” does not include a stepparent. In the case of Charles Marshall v. Macon Sash-door etc. Co. decided by the Georgia supreme court, 103 Ga. 725, 30 S. E. 571, 41 L. 11. A. 211, 68 Am. State, Rep. 140, this identical question arose. The construction of the identical word “parent” was decided by this court in this case not to include a stepparent. Again we find this identical word “parent” construed in the case of Einemier v. Arlitt, 29 Tex. Civ. App. 140, 67 S. W. 1038, where the court held that the term “parent” does not include a stepfather or stepmother,. Bouvier’s Law Dictionary in defining the word “parents” says: “Parent — -The lawful father or the mother of a person. This word is distinguished from ancestors in including only the immediate progenitors of the person, while the latter embraces his more remote relatives in the ascending line.” Counsel for appellee says that the courts give the broadest and. most comprehensive meaning to terms of the charters and laws of these orders in respect to the designation of beneficiaries, and refers the court to 29 Cye., 108, and the note and authorities there cited. We beg to differ with counsel on this point, and while it is a general rule that all contracts of insurance are construed most liberally in favor of the insured, yet this rule is not at all applicable when the question of the eligibility of a beneficiary arises, and in the citation referred to, Cyc. says: “Ordinarily the society has power to prescribe what classes of persons shall be eligible as beneficiaries, and in case it exercises .that power, .the designation of a person not belonging to one of those classes is ordinarily ineffectual.” And Bacon in his work on'Benefits, Societies and Life Insurance, at section 245 states the rule as follows: “If by statute or charter the beneficiaries of members are confined to certain classes, the designation of any one not of such class is void.” 'Thus clearly the designation of this appellee as beneficiary was without authority and beyond the power of this appellant order and not authorized by its charter, constitution and by-laws and is therefore, we submit, absolutely void. In the case of Jones v. Fire Relief Association, which is a Wisconsin case cited by appellee on page 7 of his brief, the construction turned upon the question as to whether or not the beneficiary was a member of the insured’s family. As is plainly seen in the opinion of the court wherein it said in closing: “Manifestly upon the established facts, plaintiff, stepmother of deceased, Richard J. Burke, was a member of his family.” It appears that this case goes a little further than most of the cases, and does to some extent, uphold the contention of the appellee, and Ave respectfully submit to the court that it is not in accord with the general rule and' the better line of authorities, but on the other hand represents an exception to the rule. This court in the case of Gar son et al. v. Vicksburg Bank, 37 So. 559, which case is quoted from at length in our original brief, said: “The constitution and by-laws of the insurer, The Knights of Pythias, named those that Avere eligible as beneficiaries' and-under such constitution and by-laAvs the said Vicksburg Bank Avas not eligible as beneficiary.” In the IoAva case cited by appellee on page 9 of its brief Smooke v. Grand Lodge, 15 L. R. A. 114, the facts are entirely different from the case at bar, as in that case the word AA’hich ay as construed AYas not “parent” but on the other hand the broad and comprehensive term “relative.” Not, if it please the court, blood relative. And Ave are unable to agree with counsel for appellee that because the term stepfather is included under the term relatives, that, therefore the term stepmother ayüI be included under the term parent. “Parent” is specific and restrictive in its meaning, whereas “relatives” includes a broad field. We again refer the count to the only Mississippi case dealing Avith.the case of Garson et al. v. Vicksburg Bank, supra, where this court expressed its policy to adhere to the established rule of confining the list of eligible bene: fi claries to that set up in the by-laAvs of the order. We again respectfully call the attention of the court to the question of the decedent having Avarranted that the appellee Avas his mother, Avliich warranty Avas untrue, and therefore a recovery could not be had, as discussed in point 2 of our original brief, Aidierein is cited the case of Citizens Life Insurance Go. V. Swords, 109 Miss. 635, wherein this court unequivocaly stated that: “A warranty must be literally true, and its materiality'cannot be subject to inquiry.” We therefore respectfully submit that: (1) The appellee is not eligible as a beneficiary and the attempt to name her as such was void, and that under no circumstances can she be heard to claim proceeds of this certificate of insurance. (2) The insured warranted that the appellee was his mother, Avliich Avarranty, Avas untrue, and that therefore no recovery can be had; and therefore the peremptory instruction granted by the learned trial court against this appellant and in favor of said appellee Avas error, and that the judgment thereupon rendered should, by this court, be reversed and judgment entered here in favor of this appellant. As announced at the beginning of this brief, the court will observe that the sole and only question involved is Avhether or not this stepmother, who is the appellee here, has the right of recovery on this policy aaTlícIi designated her as mother AAdien assured named his beneficiary. Under the Acts of 1916, supra, section 6 which Avas pleaded in our replication, the legislature very materially broadened and extended the laws of beneficiaries that might be designated in policies of the kind sued on. It seems from Mr. Yates’ deposition that under the authority of this act his order met in Atlanta, Georgia, and in July, 1917, adopted and promulgated the constitution and by-laAVs filed herein leaving the beneficiaries that might be designated the same as they Avere before the passage of said act. This list of beneficiaries is found in these reAdsed laAvs in section 3, page 4' thereof, and it is to that provision that we will address ourselves principally in discussing the question involved. Our contention is, and this is Avhat the loAler court decided, that the term “parent” allowed' by section 3 of the constitution and by-laws of this order for designation as beneficiary is not confined to a parent by consanguinity, but may embrace a parent by affinity. It is a well-recognized rule and seems to be universal that tbe. courts will give as broad and comprehensive a meaning as possible to the terms of the charter of laws of these orders which are provided for the designation of beneficiaries. 29 Cyc. 108, Note 16 and authorities cited. It is also held Avithout any material contradiction so far as we have been able to find, that a stepmother will take as beneficiary under the authorized term “mother,” or as in the present case “parent.” 19 E. C. L., page 1285, section 82; Jones v. Fire Relief Ass’n of the City of Mihmuhee (Wis.), 138 N. W. 618; Am. Ann. Cases 1911B, page 59, 151 Wis.. 215. In the case of Fawon ¡v. Grand Lodge Brotherhood of Locomotive Fireman, 87 111. App. 262, in a case analogous to the Jones case it is held that a stepmother was included as a member of the family. See, also,.Anderson v. Royal League, 130 Minn. 416, L. E. A. 1916B, and note page 905 et seq. This is one of the latest cases we can find , bearing-on this question. We respectfully submit, therefore, that the lower court committed no error in any of its rulings, and that the case should be promptly affirmed and this order be required to pay this claim,, principal and interest, and all costs incurred.