City of Corinth v. Robertson ex rel. Alcorn County Chickasaw School Fund

1. Public lands. State held to have acquired school sections only upon survey and extinguishment of Indian rights, The state of Mississippi acquired the right to the sections No. 16 granted to it for the use of schools by the Act of Congress of March 3, 1803, when, but not until, the right of occupancy of the Indian tribes was extinguished and the sections had been surveyed as provided by law. 2. Public lands. Federal act held controlling as to terms of trust of school lands in Chickasaw Cession. The terms of the trust upon which the land was granted to the state .by the federal government for the use of schools in the Chickasaw Cession must be gathered from the Act of Congress of July 4, 1836, by which the grant was made. 3. Public lands. Act granting land to state for schools in Chiclcasaw Cession held not to require use for schools in particular township. , • The Act of Congress of July 4, 1836, by which land was granted to the state for the use of schools in the Chickasaw Cession, does not require any part of the land, its proceeds, or the interest theron, to be' used for schools in any particular township. 4. Public lands. Congressional act authorizing state to sell land reserved for schools does not affect trust under which state holds lands in Chiclcasaw Cession. The Act of Congress of May 19, 1852, authorizing the state to sell the land reserved for the use of schools, has no effect upon the terms of the trust under which the state held the lands granted to it for the use of schools in the Chickasaw Cession. 5. Public lands. Upon vesting of title to school lands in Chiclcasaw Cession, state has full power of disposal. After the title of the state to the land granted to it by the Act of Congress of July 4, 1836, for the.use of schools in the Chickasaw Cession had vested, the state had full power to dispose of the land without the consent of Congress, and it was also beyond the power of Congress to change the terms of the grant. 6. Schools and school distkicts. State agent administering trust fund for educational purpose under state law not personally liable to cestui que trust for diversion resulting from compliance with law. When the agent or officer of a state charged by its laws with the duty of administering a fund held in trust by the state for educational purposes, administers it in accordance with the laws passed by the Legislature of the state for that purpose, he is not personally liable to the cestui que trust for any diversion of the trust fund which may result because of his having disposed of it as he was directed by law so to do. 7. Schools and school distbicts. Neither muncipal treasurer nor district liable for diversion of interest on Chiclcasaw school fund where administered according to law. The treasurer of a municipality constituting a separate school district in receiving and disbursing the interest on the Chickasaw school fund apportioned to the separate school district under the laws of the state for the maintenance of its public schools acts as the state’s agent, and if he complies with the law in making the disbursement, neither he nor the municipality-can be held liable for any diversion of such interest from the use for which the fund is held by the state, which may thereby result from the method adopted by ‘the state for administering the trust.

Appeal from chancery court of Alcorn county.- Hon. A. J. McIntyre, Chancellor. Suit by Stokes V. Robertson, State Revenue Agent, to the use of Alcorn County Chickasaw School Fund, against the city of Corinth and another. A demurrer to the bill was overruled, and defendants appeal. Complainant makes exhibit to his bill chapter 335 of the Act of Congress of 1836, approved July 4, 1836. The second section of that act is the only part of said act that bears upon the controversy in this case. Inasmuch as all of the land in the territory ceded by the Chickasaws had been sold, this Act of Congress of 1836, provided in.the second section thereof that there should be reserved from sale in the state of Mississippi a quantity of land equal to one thirty-sixth part of the lands ceded by the said Chickasaws aforesaid out of any public lands remaining unsold contiguous to the said lands within said state so ceded by the Chickasaws: “Which lands when so selected as aforesaid, the same shall vest in the state of Mississippi for the use of said territory in said state so ceded as aforesaid by the Chickasaws; and said lands, thus selected, shall be holden by the same tenure and upon the same terms and conditions, in all respects, as the said state now holds the lands heretofore reserved for the use of school in said state.” Complainant’s contention is that the same construction ought to be put upon this act as is expressly provided in the Acts of Congress relative to the 16th sections. We contend that this is an impossibility. The law with reference to the sixteenth section provides that the funds arising from the said sixteenth section shall be used within the township in which said sixteenth section is situated. But, it is impossible for this rule to apply with reference to the Chickasaw territory, as the land provided for in said Act of Congress above did not lie in any township or in any county in the Chickasaw territory and therefore the law with reference to the sixteenth section fund could not be applied. Appellee, in the court below, as we understood him, bases his whole contention upon the last clause in said section 2 of the Act of Congress of 1836; which is in this language: “The said lands thus selected shall be holden by the same tenure and upon the same terms and conditions, in all respects, as the said state now holds the lands heretofore reserved for the use of schools in said state.” It will be observed that the above clause has nothing whatever to do with the distribution of the money arising from the sale of said lands. It simply has reference to the land itself; that the land shall be held by the same tenure, terms and conditions, but not that the distribution of the fund's arising from said lands should be distributed otherwise than for the use of the schools within the territory. As to how it should be distributed among the different schools in said territory is left entirely with the legislature of the state of Mississippi. The only thing the schools of the Chickasaw territory was interested in, was that they should receive one thirty-sixth part of the money arising from said lands selected in lieu of the sixteenth sections in the Chickasaw territory. It is true the land must be held just like all other land ceded to the state for school purposes should be held, same tenure, same conditions, same terms; that is to say by the same title and for the same use and purposes, no more no less. The state of Mississippi assumed this trust of handling this Chickasaw fund arising from the lands selected and has from the beginning shown that this fund was not understood to be distributed as a township fund as a unit rather than the county as a unit. Chapter 3, Acts of 1848, of the legislature of Mississippi, made provision for the disposal of the lands ceded by the Act of Congress for the use of schools in the Chickasaw cession, in lieu of the sixteenth sections of said cession, and in the fifth section of said act it is provided that the auditor of public accounts should open an account between the state of Mississippi and the fund realized from the lease of lands in a book to be kept for that purpose, in which he should charge the state with the amount received on account of said lands, and the whole amount of said money, after deducting expenses, to be. held in trust by said state for the use of schools in the Chickasaw cession and to be applied for that purpose as hereafter to be provided by law. Chapter 27 of the act approved March 12, 1856, Acts of 1856-57-61, page 81, provides in the first section thereof that the pro rata share of the net proceeds of the Chickasaw school lands to which the counties therein named, including Tishomingo county, which at that time covered the territory which is now called Alcorn county, together with all monies arising from other sources, such as filies, forfeitures, etc., and all other school funds belonging to said counties or which may hereafter be created for them by any law, should constitute the school fund for the same, and section 8 of said act provided: “That nothing herein contained shall be so construed as to prevent said commissioners, after providing for all proper beneficiaries, from expending the whole of the remaining current interest from time to time as equally as may be between all the schools applying for aid.” This demonstrates that the funds arising from the Chickasaw'- lands W'ere appropriated to counties, as counties, independent of the question of township. ■ ■ It will be observed from the quotation of the Act of 1848, above, that it was provided that the funds arising from this land should be applied as hereafter to be provided by law; and now, to put at rest bow it should be applied as above provided, we find in chapter 56 of the Acts of 1856-61, pages 141-142, and in the third section of said act, the following: “That the secretary of state is hereby required to make out and furnish to the auditor of public accounts a calculation, based on the area of territory in the Chickasaw purchase, of the proportionate amount of interest due to each of said counties; and it is hereby made the duty of said auditor to issue his warrant on the state treasury for said proportionate amount, upon application by him to said county treasurer.” It is perfectly clear from this act that the county was selected as a unit of distribution and not a township. Each county was to receive the same proportion of the inoney that the area of said county bore to the area of territory in the Chickasaw purchase. That is the way this fund has ever since been handled. Complainant attaches the Laws of 1858, approved December 2, 1858, page 121, as an exhibit to his bill. By reference to said act it will be observed that the township feature is recognized, but that act, by section 5 thereof, applies only to Ittawamba county and can have no possible bearing upon any other county in Chickasaw territory. Chapter 11, Laws of 1873, page 17, expressly declares said Chickasaw school fund should be expended annually in the maintenance of the public school system in the several counties entitled to the same. In chapter 9, Acts of 1878, section 1, provides: “that hereafter the interest arising from the Ckickásaw school fund shall be paid by the treasurers of the several counties entitled thereto upon the school warrants issued for the services rendered during the year, that said interest is distributed to the several counties, and shall be paid out in the same manner as now provided by law for expending the common school fund.” All these foregoing acts clearly and unmistakably deal with the county as a unit and not with the townships therein. I find no act subsequent to 1878 dealing with the Chickasaw school fund, save only that each legislature appropriates the interest due on the Chickasaw school funds out of the state treasury, and this appropriation each year has been sent to the counties as provided in the acts hereinabove referred to; to be used as a common school fund in the county as a unit and not the township; that is, divided between the several separate school districts according to the number of educable children in said districts and territories. This has been the custom continuously, at least as far back as 1880. This handling of this fund, as set forth in the above acts, has been uniform, public and notorious, known by Congress, and no complaint has ever been made by Congress as to the handling of this fund by using the county as a unit instead of the township; and we think the language of this court in the case of Connell, et al. v. Woodard et al., 5 Howard, 672, is appropriate. Appellee’s contention rests altogether upon implication. They base the claim upon the facts that inasmuch as the sixteenth section was one-thirty-sixth of a township, that by implication the same rule should apply to the Chickasaw fund, inasmuch as it was provided that one-thirty-sixth of the money arising from sale of lands in lieu of the sixteenth section should be devoted to school purposes in the Chickasaw territory. The rule of distribution of the sixteenth section to each township was not a rule of necessity, but purely an arbitrary rule. Now, to give the Chickasaw fund this interpretation by implication, there must be a necessity therefor in order to carry out the real purpose of the act. Only those things are implied in the construction of an act as are necessary to carry out the full purpose of the act. The county could be adopted as a unit in either case as well as a township. The object of the grant could be accomplished just as well by one unit as by the other, and the adoption therefore of one method in one act does not involve or control in the other act. The real object and purpose of this reservation of land was for the education of the youth of the land and could be equitably subserved under the one system as well as under the other. It is therefore unnecessary to imply anything in the act with reference to the Chickasaw fund, and if this court should put that construction upon the laws with reference to the Chickasaw territory fund by implication, it would be legislating something into the statute rather than construing the statute. Appellee attaches to his original bill chapter Acts of Congress of 1852, United States Statute at Large, Yol. 10, page 6. This act of the Congress ratified and.approved the sales of land made by the state of Mississippi prior thereto. The first section thereof provides for the sale or lease of all or any part of the lands reserved and appro-' priated by Congress for the use of schools within the state of Mississippi, and to invest the money arising from the sale as the said legislature may elect, for the use and support of the schools within the several townships and districts of the county for which they are originally reserved and set apart, and for no other use or purpose whatsoever; provided said lands or any part thereof shall in no case be sold or leased without the consent of the inhabitants of said township or district, to be obtained in such manner as the legislature of said state may by law direct; and provided further, that in all cases the money arising from the sales of land within a particular township and district shall be appropriated for the use of schools within the township and district. If this act of Congress has any bearing whatever upon the issue involved in this case, then it appears clearly that the Congress had in mind the situation as it existed at that time in Mississippi, namely, that all that territory in Mississippi ceded to the state by the Chickasaw Indians had been sold and there could not be a reservation of the sixteenth section in said territory or “district of county” and that, therefore the Congress provided that the money should be for use in the several townships and “districts of county” for which they are originally reserved. We think that “district of county” in said act referred to the district of county ceded by the Chickasaw Indians, and the only provision in the act was the money should be used for the schools in that district independent of the question of townships, as the township feature was an impossibility in the Chickasaw territory. There was-evidently something in the mind of the Congress as to the situation in Mississippi other than a township ; and we know of no situation to cause the Congress to use the word district in conjunction with township except this Chickasaw territory situation. It is clear that in so far as the “district of county” is concerned, the Congress did not attempt to prescribe the method of distribution of the fund in said “district of county.” . The sole object and purpose of the reservation of land for school purposes was to educate the children of the state, the education of one child was just as important and as much desired as the education of any other child, and if a system is adopted by which each child has the same benefits conferred upon it as every other child, then the real purpose of the statutes, both state and congressional, is accomplished. The paramount consideration in the distribution of school funds has always been to preserve equality and uniformity. While it may be that a separate school district that has an organization and a taxing power might be required to raise funds with which to meet a decree similar to the one sought in this suit, yet if a township or townships in a county has received more of this Chickasaw fund than it is entitled to under the rule contended for in the bill of complainant, we know of no remedy that could be resorted to to force such a township to refund the overplus received by it of this Chickasaw school fund. We would therefore have one portion of a county dealt with differently ¡from other portions of the county. We, therefore think that our demurrer, in which we contended that the county is a unit instead of a township, ought to be sustained. Our fourth ground of demurrer is that this suit ought to be brought by the state and not by the county, if anyone is entitled to bring the suit. The acts of Congress place these lands and the funds arising from the sale or lease thereof in the state of Mississippi to be by it held in trust. This proposition is so clear and has been so many times .so decided by this court that we only refer to the cases of Jones v. Madison County;, 72 Miss. 777, and Robertson v. Monroe County, 119 Miss. 520, in which cases it is held that the state is a trustee and as a trustee has control of this school fund derived from the Acts of Congress. Alcorn county certainly has no authority whatever given to the county to control this fund for the state. The Congress nor the legislature of Mississippi has never intrusted the county with any authority to control or direct distribution of this fund. The state has heretofore, through its legislature and departments, distributed this money among the counties as a unit and ignored the township feature contended for in the bill of complaint. If that was lawful, then it is the duty of the state to correct the ruling, and the power is lodged alone in the state and cannot be exercised by any other person or subdivision of the state. If we are mistaken in this view, then the state ought to be sued for the improper distribution of this fund, and not the city of Corinth or. the Corinth separate school district; the money is in the hands of the state. The state made the appropriation thereof and turned the same over to the separate school district of Mississippi. If this was an unlawful act, then the remedy ought to be against the party responsible therefor. The city received the money from its sovereign and certainly ought to be responsible to no one but its sovereign; so that either way you look at the matter, this suit is either brought by the wrong party or against the wrong party. One or the other propositions is true. The special demurrer in this case ought to have been sustained. The case of Town of Crenshaw v. Panola County, 76 So. 741, does not apply; this suit is brought in the name of revenue agent for the use of Alcorn county and the Chickasaw school fund. The Chickasaw school fund has no entity as to make it a party to a suit. That part of the bill therefore must be left out of consideratino. The • county of Alcorn is not shown to have any interest in the matter in controversy so as to make it the real beneficiary of the suit so as to defeat the plea of the statute of limitations. The fund sued for would go to the different townships which have not received their proper pro rata, if the suit is successful, and the real beneficiaries are those townships, and no constitutional or statutory enactment grants immunity against the statute of limitation to a township. The nominal plaintiff may be a party entitled to immunity from the statute of limitations, but the test is: Is the real beneficiary such a person? If not then the statute does apply. United States v. Beehe, 127 U. S. 338, 37 L. Ed. 121; Curtner v. United States, 149 U. S. 662, 37 L. Ed. 890. Becapitulation. First, when the meaning of a statute is doubtful, a practical construction put upon it, at the time of its passage, or soon afterwards, and universally acquiesced in for a long period of time, as shown by a general usage, will be entitled to great weight and will be accepted as the true construction, unless there are cogent reasons to the contrary. Black on Interpretation of Law, page 215. The “usage” which is entitled to be considered in the construction of a statute is such as is practical, general and public. It may be the usage of the courts; it may be the usage of the executive and administrative officers of the government in the discharge of their duties. Black on Interpretation of Laws, page 217. The above rule is universal; that the county has been adopted as the unit of distribution of the Chickasaw fund has been the uniform construction of the acts of the Congress, by our legislature and administrative officers, consistently and continuously from the creation of this fund until the present day and no complaint has ever been made by Congress; therefore has become the law on the subject. Second, the complainant has no right of action as shown by the bill under the law. Third, the special demurrer ought to be sustained. We submit that this case ought to be reversed and dismissed here. Appellant’s contention “that, in the distribution of this Chickasaw school fund,, the county as a whole should be taken as the unit for distribution according to the number of educable children therein, and not the different townships” is not tenable. The distribution of this fund is now made to the different counties strictly upon an acre, or acreage basis, and not upon the basis of the number of educable children in the county. By an act of the legislature of 1856 (chap. 56, page 142), the basis for the distribution of this fund was stipulated as the ratio of the area of the counties to the total area of the lands of the Chickasaw cession (Par.’3). This is the present method of the distribution of this fund, the figures showing the total number of acres in each county and the total number of acres in the cession being certified to the state auditor, by the state land commissioner in May, following each regular biennial session of the legislature which makes provision for the payment of the interest on this fund by appropriation. This method of distribution to the different counties is in accord with the terms and conditions of the trust by which the lands, originally reserved for school purposes by virtue of the Georgia compact, were held by the state; and in accord with the terms and conditions of the trust imposed by the United States when the Chickasaw school lands were granted to the state in lieu of the original six-teentb sections. A distribution to tbe counties, based upon the number of educable children in each county, would be unfair to the counties of larger area and smaller number of educable children, as there was originally reserved in each county for school purposes the sixteenth section of each township; then each county should be entitled to an interest in the land granted in lieu of the sixteenth sections in proportion that its area bore to the entire area of the Chickasaw cession. Then to distribute the interest arising from the fund created by the sale of this land to the different counties on the basis of the number of educable children would be manifestly unfair and contrary to the express terms and conditions of the trust. If this be true it is equally as true that it would be unfair to distribute this fund, which is distributed to the counties on an area basis to the different townships of the county upon the basis of the number of educable children in each township. In accord with the Georgia compact, by an act of Congress, approved March 3, 1803, section 12 of chapter 27 (U. S. Statutes at large, Yol. 2, page 234) the sixteenth section of every township in the then Mississippi territory was reserved for the support of schools within the same. Then in the outset, each township had reserved for it an equal amount of land to be used for the support of schools in the township; but by the treaty with the Chickasaw Indians before mentioned, the United States violated this compact, and the sixteenth sections were all sold. In order to carry into effect the existing compact, which had been by the state of Georgia for the state of Alabama and Mississippi, Congress passed the act, approved July 4, 1836, heretofore referred to, the state of Mississippi was granted an amount of land equal in area to one thirty-sixth part of the entire Chickasaw cession, in lieu of the sixteenth section sold, and it was provided therein, “and said lands, thus selected shall be holden by the same tenure, and upon the same terms and conditions, in every respect, as the state now holds lands heretofore reserved for the use of schools in said state.” The state revenue agent contends that this gave to each township in the Chickasaw cession an equal interest in the lands so reserved and set apart by said act; and that when said lands were sold by state and' congressional authority, each township was entitled to an equal interest in said fund and an equal share in the interest arising therefrom. Appellants contend that this is impossible. That the law with reference to the sixteenth section funds provides that the funds arising from the sale or lease of the sixteenth sections shall be used in the township where the sixteenth section is located. And that this is impossible in the Chickasaw cession, and this rule cannot apply because all the land was sold, and none of the land granted by the Act of 1836 is in any township or county in the Chickasaw cession. If this reasoning held good, many of the townships in the state lying outside the Chickasaw cession would be without the benefit of the township fund; for it frequently happened that the sixteenth section had already been taken up under Spanish and British land grants, before this reservation for school purposes was made by the Act of 1803. When this contingency arose, the township was granted a section in lieu of the sixteenth section, sometimes it was in the same township but frequently the lieu section was located in another township, or even in another county. In the Chickasaw cession this contingency arose, but arose as to all the sections numbered sixteen and to all the townships in the cession, and hence Congress by the Act of 1836 gives to these townships, thus deprived of their sixteenth sections, sections located elsewhere. No attempt was made under this act to select particular sections and award them to particular townships, but an amount of land equal to one thirty-sixth part of all the lands of the Chickasaw cession was to be selected from any unsold public lands in the state, and was to vest in the state of Mississippi in lieu of said sixteenth sections, and this land was to be held by the same tenure, and upon the same terms and conditions, in all respects, as the lands theretofore reserved for the use of schools. In other words, the government was simply carrying out the existing compact with the state of Mississippi, and that compact reserved the sixteenth section of each township in the state for the support of the schools within the same. Under the original compact, and the Act of Congress of 1903, each township in the Chickasaw cession had been guaranteed an equal amount of land for school purposes within the township, then each township should have an equal interest in the lands selected under the Act of 1836, and necessarily an equal interest in funds for which said lands were sold. Again appellants contend on page 3 of their brief that the last clause of section 2 of the Act of Congress of 1836, which is in this language, to-wit: “the lands thus selected shall be holden by the same tenure and upon the same terms and conditions in every respect, as the state now holds the lands heretofore reserved for the use of schools in said state,” only has reference to the land itself, that as long as the land was held by the state., the conditions of the trust must be complied with, but if the lands were sold, there was absolutely nothing binding upon the state of Mississippi as to how the fund should be distributed. All that was required was that the funds be used for school purposes within the territory, that the distribution of this fund is left entirely to the legislature of the state. If this be true with reference to the Chickasaw cession lands, it would apply with equal force to the reserved sixteenth sections in the other parts of the . state. But the courts have long since decided that these township funds, arising from the sale or lease of the sixteenth section, or section set apart in lieu thereof, which were reserved for the use of schools within the township, cannot be diverted from the township, or used for anything else than schools within the particular township. Morton v. Grenada Academy, 8 S. & M. 786; Bishop v. McDonald, 27 Miss. 371; Jefferson Davis County v. James-Sumrall Limber Co., 94 Miss. 530, 49 So. 611; Davis v. Indiana, 94 U. S. 794; Moss Point Lbr. Co. v. Harrison Co., 89 Miss. 571-2. It is tbe contention of tbe state revenue agent that regardless of wbat acts tbe legislature of tbe state of Mississippi may pass declaring bow sucb funds shall be distributed, sucb acts have no binding force or effect whatever unless they are in accord with the terms of the trust created. Appellants seem to be of tbe opinion, from tbe number of acts of tbe state legislature which they have cited, that tbe legislature has selected tbe county as tbe unit for tbe distribution of this fund. This is not tbe case, for in that event each county would receive tbe same amount. Tbe fund is now distributed to tbe counties on an area basis, as we have attempted to show heretofore, and no two counties receive- tbe same amount. We contend that such distribution is in accord with tbe terms of tbe trust as far as tbe counties are concerned, and we have no quarrel with this method of distribution as far as it goes; but to completely perform tbe terms and conditions of tbe trust, the distribution of this fund should be carried a step further, and each township, or fractional part of a township in tbe county should receive its proportionate part of tbe fund in the ratio of its area. Again appellants on page 7 of their brief contend that tbe real object and purpose of this reservation of land was for tbe education of tbe youth of the land and could be equitably subserved under one system as well as the other; and, on page 8, the education of one child was just as important and as much to be desired as tbe education of any other child, then if a system is adopted in which each child has the same benefits conferred upon it as every other child, then the real purpose of the statutes, both state and congressional, is accomplished. Unfortunately, appellant’s ideal method of distribution has not been adopted in this state, for the children of some of the Chickasaw counties received a great deal more from the interest from this fund than the children of other counties, but under the terms of the trust, this is unavoidable. While the primary, object of the reservation of this land for school purposes, as appellants suggest, is for the education of the youths of the land, this was not the only object Congress had in view when it reserved the sixteenth section of every township for the use of schools within the same. There must have been some other purpose Congress had in view, other than the education of the youth of the land, or else each state would have been granted a body of land for the use of the schools of the state, and in this event, each child would have been entitled to exactly the same amount and would have been given the same opportunity as every other child. Appellants contend, that because of the fact that the terms of the trust have been so long violated, that this abuse should not be corrected at this late date, and that the language of the court in the case of Connell, et al. v. Woodward, et al-, 5 Howard, 672, is appropriate in this case. In that case it was contended on the one hand that the Act of 1803, which reserved from sale the sixteenth section in every township in the state to be used for the support of the schools within the same, was a grant to the state of this land for the purposes therein named, and the state Would hold the legal title as trustee; while on the other hand it was contended that the legal title to the land never vested in the state but remained in the United States and that the legislature of the state could not give the trustees, or any other person, any authority over the sixteenth sections. And the court deciding the case in favor of the first contention, made use of the language quoted by appellants. Appellants further contend that the words, “and provided further, that in all cases the money arising from the sales of lands within a particular township and district shall be appropriated for the use of schools within the town ship and district,” as appears in chapter 35, Acts of Congress, 1852 (Statutes at Large, Yol. 10, page 6), which act ratifies the sale or lease of the school lands theretofore made by the state, and authorizes further sale or lease of the remaining lands reserved for school purposes, shows that it was the intention of Congress that the money arising from the sale or lease of the lands granted the state of Mississippi in lieu of the sixteenth sections of the Chickasaw cession, should be used for the.schools in that territory independent of the question of townships; and that Congress did not attempt to prescribe the method of the distribution of the funds in said district of the county, and that distinct or county, meant the Chicksaw cession. It does not at all follow, that this was the congressional intent. In this act Congress ratified the sales already made by the state and authorized further sales, and the state was only given unlimited authority as to the manner in which the funds should be invested. It is expressly stipulated in this act that the funds should be used for the use and support of the schools within the several townships and district of county for which they were originally reserved, and for no other use or purpose whatever. What was the condition at that time? In a part of the state, the terms of the Georgia compact, and the provisions of the Act of 1803, had been complied with, and the sixteenth section of every township., or sections given in lieu thereof, had been reserved for the use of schools within said townships; hence Congress, by the act referred to, directs that the funds arising from these sections shall be used in the township for which they were originally reserved for school purposes and for no other use whatever. That as to the other school lands, that is to say, the lands granted the state by the United States in lieu of the sixteenth sections, sold in the Chickasaw cession, the funds arising from the sale of these lands could not be used for schools outside this district or territory, but the act nowhere abrogates the terms upon which the state took these “lieu” lands, and those terms had been made specific and definite by the Act of 1836, which provided that these lands were to be held by the same tenure, and upon the same conditions and terms, in every respect as tbe sixteenth section lands were held, and one of these terms and conditions was that the fund should be used “for the support of schools within the township.” The Act of 1852 does not give any method for the distribution of the fund, further than to provide that it must be used for schools within the district. This was not necessary; the terms had already been given in unequivocal language. Why should Congress make a distinction between the townships of the southern and the northern parts of the state? The same condition prevailed in both, and originally the same reservation for school purposes of the sixteenth section in every township had been made for the entire state. In construing the Act of Congress of 1886, by virtue of which these lands vested in the state of Mississippi, we should take into consideration not only the plain language of the statute itself, but also look to the title of the act, to ascertain the congressional intent. This act is entitled, an act to carry into effect, in the states of Alabama and Mississippi, the existing compacts with those states with regard to the five per cent, fund and the school reservations.” Thus congress states that by this act, it is intended to carry into effect the existing compact with the state of Mississippi regarding the “school reservations.” What was this existing compact? The state of Georgia, when it ceded the territory now comprising the states of Alabama and Mississippi, ceded the territory on certain conditions, one of which was that the sixteenth section of every township should be reserved for the support of schools within the township. Congress by the Act of 1803, in carrying out this compact, reserved the sixteenth section in every township for the support of schools within the same. By the treaty with the Chickasaw Indians, heretofore referred to] the United States violated this compact, and the sixteenth sections of the Chickasaw cession were all' sold; then to carry into effect the existing compact, Congress passed the Act of 1836, which provides that a certain amount of the public lands shall be selected, which amount shall be equal in area to one thirty-sixth part of the entire area of the lands ceded by the Chickasaws, and the lands thus selected shall vest in the state of Mississippi for the use of schools in said territory, and said lands shall be holden by the same tenure, and upon the same terms and conditions, in every respect, etc. What were the terms and conditions upon which the lands were originally reserved for school purposes. The only terms or conditions láid down in the original reservation, and in the Act of 1803, was that the sixteenth section is reserved for the support of schools within the township and if these were not the terms and conditions on which these lands were held, we are at a loss to know what terms and conditions were referred to. Whatever these terms and conditions were upon which these sixteenth sections were originally reserved, it is evident from the plain language of the Act of 1836, that Congress wanted the same terms and conditions imposed upon the lands granted in lieu of the sixteenth sections sold in the' Chickasaw cession as obtained on the original reservations thereof, for the Congress, after providing that these lands shall be held upon the same terms and conditions as the lands heretofore reserved for the use of school in the state, to make its meaning clear and emphatic, adds the words, in every respect. If the original compact, the Act of 1803, and the Act of 1836 are construed together, also taking into consideration the conditions which prevailed at the time, it is the manifest intention of Congress that the Chickasaw school funds are township funds, and, as in the sixteenth section funds., the integrity of the same as a township fund should remain inviolate, to the end not only that the youths of the state might be educated but that the entire country might bé more uniformly settled and developed. Appellants contend, in support of their fourth ground of demurrer, that the county is without authority to bring such suit, and that it should have been brought in the name of the state. The case of Jones v. Madison Co., 72 Miss. 777, cited by appellants, nowhere holds, as far as we have been able to ascertain, that the county is without authority to bring the suit; but it does hold as appellants contend that the state holds these lands in trust for the different townships. In the case of Robertson v. Monroe Go., 118 Miss. 520, also cited by appellants, the county had borrowed some of the sixteenth section funds and agreed to pay interest on the same, and if the interest were not used, to reinvest the same. The county neglected and refused, upon demand being made, to pay this interest, and the court at page 537 said: “Manifestly, the board of supervisors could not be a party defendant and a party complainant, and under the allegations of the bill, the board refused, when requested and directed to make payment to do so. We think in this case that the state had the right to bring the suit as trustee, etc.” Appellants again fall into the error of saying that the state heretofore, though its legislature and departments has distributed this money to the county as a unit and ignored the township. It is true that under chapter 56, Laws of 1856, and all laws passed by the legislature subsequent thereto, it is provided that the interest from the Chickasaw school fund should be paid to the county treasurer of each county in the cession at certain specified times ; but, as we have attempted to point out before, the fund is not distributed to the counties as a unit, nor is it distributed to the counties upon the basis of the number of educable children in each, for the above mentioned act provides specifically that distribution is to be made to the counties on an area basis upon the ratio therein set out. Under this act each county gets the amount of interest that the townships and fractional parts of the townships therein are entitled to, but no more, and each county is certainly entitled to no less. We contend that this method of distribution as far as it goes is correct and in accord with the terms and conditions of the trust, and the state has nothing to correct insofar as the county is concerned. Appellants say that if they are mistaken in the state’s power to bring this shit, then the state itself ought to be sued for the improper distribution of this fund, and not the city of Corinth and the Corinth separate school district. Appellants say, in this connection, the state made the appropriation thereof and turned the same oyer to the separate school district. Appellants say, in this connection. the state made the appropriation thereof and turned the same over to the separate school districts of Mississippi. And if this were an unlawful act, then the remedy should be against the state. Again appellants are mistaken; these funds are not turned over by the state to the separate school districts, but are paid directly into the county treasury, and is then paid out by the county treasurer. The statutes, regulating the right of the counties to sue are three in number. Section 4850, Code of 1906 (section 3170, Hemingway’s Code), provides: “The state shall be entitled to bring all actions and all remedies which individuals are entitled to in a given case, etc.” Section 4806, Code of 1906 (section 3171, Hemingway’s Code), provides that “any county may have like remedies to recover any property belonging to it, or damages for injury thereto; and actions may be brought in behalf of the county, either by a district attorney or some one employed by the board of supervisors.” The county has the right to sue for and recover any property belonging to it, and we contend that the term property belonging to it, is broad enough in its scope and meaning not only to cover property, the ownership of which is absolutely in the county, but also property in which the county has a qualified ownership,, or of which it has possession, or has under its control. Section 309, Code of 1906 (section 3682, Hemingway’s Code), provides, that “any county may sue and be sued by its name, and suits against the county shall be instituted in the court having jurisdiction of the amount sitting at the county site; but- suit shall not be brought by the county without the authority of the' board of supervisors, except as otherwise provided by law. And section 310, Code of 1906 (section 3683, Hemingway’s Code), provides that, suit may be brought in the name of the county, where only a part of the county or of its inhabitants are concerned, and where there is a public right of such party to be vindicated. In the case of Warren <Jo. v. Cans, 80 Miss. 76, 31 So. 539, it was held that the county could bring suit or an action in replevin for logs cut for sale from sixteenth section lands leased in 1834 for ninety-nine years. If the-county had the right to sue in a case of replevin for logs cut from a sixteenth section, why should it not have the right to sue for a misappropriation of the Chickasaw school fund, after the same has been paid into-the county? We take it that appellants will not contend that the state revenue agent is without authority to bring this suit if the county is entitled to sue, even if suit is not authorized by the board of supervisors, for section 7056, Hemingway’s Code gives him this authority. In the case of Robertson v. Monroe Go., 70 So. 187, it was held by this court that the state revenue agent may sue a county for the use and benefit of a city, then the converse of this proposition must also be true that the state revenue agent may sue a city for the use and benefit of the county. If we are correct in our contention in this case that the county has such an interest in the Chickasaw school fund, as would give it the right to sue for a wrongful disposition of the same, after it has been paid into the county treasury, then the court below was correct in overruling appellants special demurrer under the authority of Town of Crenshaw v. Panola Go., 76 So. 741. We respectfully submit that the case should be affirmed and remanded for an accounting.