Brewer v. Dinwiddie

1. Where a judgment is regularly rendered against a defendant, the court can not at a subsequent term,'there being no irregularity, set the same aside and permit the defendant to file an answer.

Error to Morgan Circuit Court. I. The leave to file the answer was tantamount to a set ting aside of the judgment by default. No objection being made as to the time of filing the answer, or the answer itself, it was not competent to the court by a mere exercise of arbitrary power to defeat its own action and the rights of the defendant. To grant a party leave to file an answer within sixty days next succeeding the term at which the grant was given, and then requiring him to show cause why the judgment by default should be set aside at the term succeeding the expiration of the sixty days — the answer in the mean time having been filed without objection — is a mere mockery of the administration of the law. The answer shows a good cause of defence. I. The defendant in the court below, Dinwiddie, having suffered judgment to go against him for want of answer, the circuit court did not have authority to set aside that judgment at the succeeding term of the court. The order of the court allowing the defendant to file his answer was void and did not in any manner impair the original judgment, and there was no error in the subsequent action of the court in refusing to set aside the judgment by default. (Weenie v. Morris, 7 Mo. 6 ; Barry v. Johnson & Johnson, 3 id. 263; Le-compte and wife v. Wash, 4 id. 557; Keiby & Porter v. Caldwell, 10 id. 392; Field & Cathcart v. Matson, 8 id. 686.)