Shaffroth v. Tribune

Lib el — N ewspapers — C omplaAnt — Insufficiency. Libel Per Se — Newspaper Article — Construction of Language. 1. Words used in an alleged libelous newspaper article must be susceptible of but one meaning to constitute libel per se, and the libelous matter may not be segregated from other parts of it and construed alone. Same — Complaint—Insufficiency. 2. Under the above rule, held that the complaint in an action for libel which alleged that in the heading of an article was published the fact that P. S. (the plaintiff) had admitted a theft, and that in the body of it appeared the statement that one G. S. had done so and was awaiting sentence for grand larceny, did not state a cause of action. 2. Significance of head-lines or titles in determining whether article is libelous, see notes in 13 Ann. Cas. 375; Ann. Cas. 1914D, 96. Identity of name as giving right of action for libel where publicación was not intended to refer to plaintiff, see note in 16 Ann. Cas. 168.

Appeal from District Court, Cascade County; II. H. Ewing, Judge. Action by Fred Shaffroth against “The Tribune.” Judgment for defendant. Plaintiff appeals. In Landon v. Watkins 61 Minn. 137, 63 N. W. 615, the court said that in determining whether a publication is libelous per se, the head-line of the article should be considered. The headline of an article or paragraph, being so conspicuous as to attract the attention of persons who look casually over a paper without carefully reading all its contents, may in itself inflict very serious injury upon a person, both because it may be the only part of the article which is read, and because it may cast a graver imputation than all the other words following it. There is no doubt that in publications concerning private persons, as well as in other publications which are claimed to be libelous, the head-lines directing attention to the publication may be considered as a part of it, and may even justify a court or jury in regarding the publication as libelous when the body of the article is not necessarily so. (Allen v. Pioneer Press Co., 40 Minn. 117, 12 Am. St. Rep. 707, 3 L. R. A. 532, 41 Ñ. W. 936; Hayes v. Press Co., 127 Pa. St. 642, 14 Am. St. Rep. 874, 5 L. R. A. 643, 18 Atl. 331.) In Brown v. Independent Publishing Co., 48 Mont. 380, 138 Pac. 258, the court said: “In determining whether the language complained of is libelous per se it must be construed in its relation to the entire article in which it appears, and the entire printed statement must be viewed by the court as a stranger might look at it, without the aid of special knowledge possessed by the parties concerned.” (Denny v. Northwestern Credit Assn., 55 Wash. 331, 25 L. R. A. (n. s.) 1021, 104 Pac. •769.X It must appear from the complaint the plaintiff was referred to in the alleged libelous publication. The court is referred to the case of Hanson v. Globe Newspaper Co., 159 Mlass. 293, 20 L. R. A. 856, 34 N. E. 462. In this case A. P. H. Hanson complained of an article published of and concerning “H. P. Hanson, a real estate and insurance broker of South Boston,” and the court held that the plaintiff could not recover; that it appeared that there was no intention to refer to him, and that it was necessary for plaintiff to show that his name was used, and that he was the person who was intended to be referred to. In the case of Harvey v. Coffin, 5 Blackf. (Ind.) 566, the supreme court of Indiana has held that if the language used is such as to render uncertain the name of the person referred to, the action is not maintainable. In this case the court quotes with approval from the ease of Wiseman v. Wiseman, Cro. Jac. 107, as follows: “For words actionable ought to purport in themselves precise slander without ambiguousness so that everyone who hears them might know of whom they are spoken.”