TaiLexi AI U.S. Case Law

Amoskeag Bank v. Moore

Amoskeag Bank v. Moore & als.

Amoskeag Bank v. Moore, 37 N.H. 539 (1859)
Download
Format
Include

Star paging (*137) is kept for pin cites.

Court
Supreme Court of New Hampshire · State Highest Courts
Decided
January 15, 1859
Judges
Sawyer
Citations
37 N.H. 539
Headnotes
An agreement between tbe bolder and indorser of a promissory note, made before its maturity, tbat tbe time of payment shall be extended, is a waiver by tbe indorser of demand and notice; and in such case no demand is necessary at tbe expiration of tbe extended time.
Summary
Assumpsit against the defendants, as indorsers of a promissory note signed by Paige & Young, payable to the defendants, or order, in ninety days, with interest, and indorsed by the defendants, “waiving notice.” Plea, the general issue. It appeared that the note was discounted by the plaintiffs at the request of the indorsers, and that a few days before it matured they applied to the hank to have the day of payment extended for sixty days. It was agreed between the bank and the indorsers that it should be extended, and the following’ memorandum was written below the note, and signed by the defendants: •“ September 25, 1855. We hereby agree that the above note may be extended for sixty days from this date.” On said 25th of September the makers paid to the bank the interest in advance, for the sixty days, and it was indorsed upon the note as interest paid for that time. No demand was made upon the makers, either at the maturity of the note or at the expii-ation of the extended time. Both parties offered evidence in relation to promises made by the defendants subsequently to the expiration of the extended time to pay the note; to which evidence several exceptions were taken, which are unnecessary to be stated. A verdict was taken for the plaintiffs, subject to the opinion of the court upon the question whether the evidence in relation to such subsequent promise is not material.

Syllabus and headnotes are prepared by the reporter or publisher, not the court, and are not part of the opinion.

Opinion of the Court — Sawyer

Text extracted by OCR from a scanned original; check the original for exact wording.

Sawyer, J.

The application made to the bank by the defendants, a few days before the maturity of the note, for an extension of the time of payment, and the arrangement which resulted, giving sixty days further time, furnished sufficient ground for the understanding on the part of the plaintiffs that demand of payment of the makers at the maturity of the note would be unnecessary. They must be supposed to have considered that it would be an idle step to demand payment in order to charge the indorsers, when the indorsers themselves had previously made an arrangement with the holders, assented to by the makers, as appears from their payment of the interest for the extended time, that payment should not then be made. The omission to make the demand is consequently to be attributed to this interference of the indorsers, and they cannot be permitted to assume the ground that they have obtained a discharge from their liability as indorsers, by reason of the omission to make a demand which their own proceedings have rendered idle, and therefore unnecessary to be made. The ground upon which a demand of the maker is held to be a pre-requisite to the liability of the indorser, is that it is to be presumed that the maker has provided himself with funds to pay the note upon presentment at maturity; and the indorser should not be resorted to for payment until the maker, the parly primarily liable, has had opportunity, by such presentment, to apply the funds provided for that purpose in satisfaction of the debt-. But where the parties have agreed that payment shall not then be made by the maker, tire occasion for presentment is removed. The indorsers, by their application for the extension, and the agreement which followed, have fur *544 nished the holders with a valid excuse for not making the presentment. This constitutes a waiver by them of demand and notice, precisely as if they had expressly indorsed with such waiver; and thereby tbe contingent character of their liability as indorsers, depending upon the demand of payment upon the maker, and notice of non-payment, is converted into one of an absolute character as of guarantors. Their liability being thus fixed and absolute at the maturity of the note, by reason of their indorsement and waiver of demand and notice, the fact that no demand was made at the expiration of the extended time is immaterial, as is also the evidence offered in relation to their subsequent promise to pay. Tbe indorsement and waiver render them liable to pay, with or without a subsequent promise, and with or without a demand upon the maker at any time. The verdict may well he sustained upon this ground; and as nothing appears in the-case tending to exonerate them from their liability as indorsers who have waived demand and notiee, there must be Judgment on the verdict.

How later courts describe this case

No later court has written an explanatory parenthetical about this case yet.

1868–1869: 118682026peak 1868 · 1

Relies on it most ⓘ

  1. Sheldon v. Horton53 Barb. 23 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1868)

Most recent

  1. Sheldon v. Horton53 Barb. 23 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1868)

Citing references are not a citator: they show that a later opinion cites this case, not whether it followed, distinguished, or overruled it. Check negative history before relying on this case.

Authorities cited 0

No citations to other opinions in this database were found.

Keyboard shortcuts

/Focus the search box
j kNext / previous result
EnterOpen the selected result
xAdd / remove the selected result from the download list
n pNext / previous search term in a case
cCopy the citation of the current case
+ −Larger / smaller reading text
?Show this list