Collins v. Collins

1. A bargain by a son to keep and maintain his father during life, in consideration of-a conveyance of real property, is, in the absence of fraud or undue influence, a valid agreement, and a conveyance made in pursuance thereof will be sustained. The fact that the father died before the expense incurred by the son for his maintenance equaled the full value of the property conveyed, is without significance, if the bargain, when made, was without fraudulent procurement. 2. The mere fact of kinship will not, in such a case, raise a presumption of undue influence; it is, at most, only a link in the chain, and may be rebutted by the other facts in the case. 3. Where a deed is legally executed by a grantor, and regularly recorded by the grantee, delivery will be presumed where the transaction would otherwise stand without rational explanation, unless such a presumption is repelled by the other proofs in the case.

On appeal from a decree advised by Vice-Chancellor Bird, who filed the following conclusions : Noah Collins died November 21st, 1881, leaving three children, Isaac, Andrew and John, him surviving. He was the owner of four lots of land ; but on November 15th, six days before his death, he made acknowledgments of two deeds, which purported to convey the said lots to the said John in fee. These deeds were not recorded until the day of the death of the grantor. They were recorded before midday, and the father died about six o’clock in the morning. The complainants file their bill, and ask to have these deeds declared void. The material allegations upon which this prayer rests, are undue influence and a want of consideration. At the time of the execution of these deeds, the father had been living with John about three months, and about four months at the time of the acknowledgment of them (they having been written, and perhaps executed, four weeks before they were acknowledged), he having gone to live with John some time in J uly. Previous to this he had been living with Andrew for about four months. John says that when his father came to him in J uly, he complained of cruel treatment at the hands of Andrew and his children, and added that he would be obliged to go to the poor-house unless he (John) would take care of him. John says that his father then said that, if he would take him in, he would deed all of his property to him. So far as the case shows, the land in question is about all of the estate that Noah was then possessed of, and was worth from $2,500 to $3,000 or $4,000. If there was more, I think it was incumbent on the defendant, John, to have shown it. This, I think, will appear more clearly when all the case is presented. Indeed, I think the burden of showing that these deeds were fairly obtained from the father, and without any undue influence on the'part of John, rests on John, before he can expect a decree in his favor on the insistment that the lands were given to him. This seems to be especially so from the circumstances of the case. The father was about eighty years old, and very feeble. He had been afflicted for many months previous, if not many years, with malaria. Andrew says that his father was not a lunatic, but had become very feeble-minded from the effects of this disease. A brother of Noah testified to the evil effects of this disease, and declared that, in his judgment, Noah had been unfit to do business for years. It is admitted, on behalf- of the defendants, that the father was feeble in body, but it is at the same time insisted that he was not weak or feeble in mind. John says that after he came to his house he was about a good deal; was not confined to the house all of the time. He says that he chopped wood at the door, and helped him husk corn. He also says that he was out of the house twice after the day (November 15th) on which the deeds were acknowledged, the last time being November 19th, only two days before he died. The father was very much averse to submitting to medical treatment, insisting upon prescribing for himself. But, as I understand John, a few days before the acknowledgment of the deeds, he took the responsibility of calling in a physician, but just how many days this was before the 15th of November, the day of such acknowledgment, is not shown. When the commissioner who took the acknowledgment called, on the 15th, for that purpose, the father was lying on a couch, and on that couch he remained, but in a sitting posture, while he acknowledged the deeds. He did not sign them then — they had been signed before; but how long, or under what circumstances, does not appear, nor is there any direct evidence that the deeds were ever delivered to John. It is true that there is the ordinary clause, “signed, sealed and delivered,” and also the acknowledgment of delivering the same as his “ voluntary act and deed,” but there is no other testimony of the actual delivery of these deeds. While it is true that John can claim the benefit of the presumption which the law attaches to such considerations, I think that I am warranted in calling attention to the fact that there is no proof to show that these instruments ever were handed to John by his father, or by his direction. The physician who was called just before the deeds were acknowledged was unable to attend in due time again, and therefore procured another to do so in his stead. The latter called on the 18th, and he was called as a witness. He says the father was a very feeble old man, and, in his judgment, was incapacitated to do any business. The physician who was called first was not produced as a witness. It would have been more satisfactory had the defendant, John, placed this medical expert on the witness-stand. The next day after the doctor made his last call the old man was out of doors, but died the second day thereafter. As already stated, he died about six o’clock in the morning, and before noon John carried the deeds to the clerk’s office, a distance of over three miles, and left them there to be recorded. Again, I say, how or when he got possession of them does not appear. As I understand the counsel of John, his insistment is, that the father intended to give these lands to John. If this view were fully supported by the proof, the court might find it somewhat difficult to resist the contention, were it to become satisfied that there had been a delivery. The cases all show that courts of equity do not interfere with such donations when understandingly made. Haydock v. Haydock, 6 Stew. Eq. 494, 7 Stew. Eq. 570; Huguenin v. Baseley, 2 Lead. Cas. Eq. 1156, and notes by the English editor, and American notes, 1192 et seq. But I cannot come to the conclusion that Noah intended to make a gift in this instance. The language used in the deeds repels any such view. In the one deed is this expression, “ in consideration of a claim of six hundred and fifty dollarsin the other is this, “ in consideration of support and of one dollar.” John says that these deeds were written in his house by his son, at dictation by his father, and that, too, a month or so before they were executed. Most clearly the father never intended to make a gift of these lands to John. John says that the $650 were to be paid by him in discharge of a bond and mortgage given by his father. But John has not discharged them, but procured an assignment of them to be made to his wife, upon her paying the amount due thereon with her own money, and she now claims to hold them in her own right. Clearly enough he has not paid the consideration expressed in that deed. In speaking of the other deed, John swears that the consideration was for services rendered to his father; but he also swears that, after his father’s death, he filed a claim with the administrator for services which he had rendered his father, which included the whole period of time his father was with him, being from about the middle of July until the acknowledgment of the deeds, being the 15th of November; and, when inquired of respecting the fact that the consideration in the deeds and the subject-matter of his claim were both for services, he said that the claim was for services rendered before the deed was acknowledged, and that the deed was for services to be performed afterwards. The services so rendered, after the deeds were acknowledged, were only of six days’ duration. It should be borne in mind that John swears that these lands were worthless. With these facts before me, I caunot conclude that John can hold these lands as a gift; nor can he hold them as a purchaser for a valuable consideration, for, so far as appears, he gave nothing for them; the mortgage which was to be paid by him he has not paid, and the support which he was to render, and did render, was so inconsiderable that it cannot be regarded, except in the light of being grossly inadequate. Nor can he claim that he is entitled to hold this title because of the risk which he took, for, according to his own statement, he never undertook any such risk at all until six days before, his father died, when, according to all the testimony, his father was in a very feeble condition. As intimated, these lands are worth at least $2,500, one witness fixing the value at $4,000, and one at $5,000, while John swears that they are of no value above the mortgage. I think John has utterly failed to show either a valid gift or a purchase which a court of equity can uphold. The complainants are entitled to a decree, with costs.