Bullock v. Delaware, Lackawanna & Western Railroad

1. If there he no evidence to justify the assessment of exemplary damages against a defendant, the trial court may so instruct the jury. 2. Proof of asperities in colloquy between the conductor of a railway train and a passenger who resists the enforcement in good faith of a rule of the railway company, which asperities were induced by the behavior and language of the passenger, is not sufficient to justify the assessment of exemplary damages against the railway company.

On error to the Supreme Court. On the 28th of January, 1896, the plaintiff in error entered á train of cars of Ihe defendant, at its depot in Hoboken, with intent to travel in it to Mount Arlington, in Morris county. He was provided with a “ commutation ticket,” which stated that it entitled T. O. Bullock to sixty rides on continuous trains between Mount Arlington and Hoboken during the month of January, subject to the conditions on its back, to be signed by Bullock. Those conditions were in form of an agreement, in consideration1 of' reduced fare, that Bullock would conform to all rules and regulations of the company, and agree to specified conditions, among which was this, that he should be entitled to personal passage only. He took with him into the car two packages containing fourteen pounds of oatmeal, a pound and a half of bacon, two pounds of coffee and six candles. As he entered one of the cars, a brakeman in the employ of the defendant informed him that he could not take the packages in the passenger car with him. The plaintiff smiled and passed into the car and took a seat, placing one package on the floor between his feet, and the other’ on the seat beside him. The latter he covered with his overcoat. The brakeman followed him into the car and explained that the packages could not be carried there, and the plaintiff answered, “ I heard that before.” Evidently the brakeman then told the conductor of the train that the plaintiff had taken the bundles with him on the car, for, a few moments after the plaintiff was seated, the conductor entered the car-, and, not seeing the concealed packages, audibly asked the brakeman, ‘‘Where is he? Show him to me,” and upon the plaintiff being pointed out, addressed him, saying, “You will have to take those packages in the express car,” to which the plaintiff responded, “ Not to-day.” Then followed a colloquy between the conductor and the plaintiff, in a somewhat irritating strain upon both sides. Finally a detective and peace officer, commissioned by the governor of the state, but in the employment of the defendant in error, was called, and he, after contending with some resistance upon the part of the plaintiff, in which, it is claimed, the plaintiff’s coat was torn, took the packages from him, out of the passenger car to the express car. Later, the plaintiff told the conductor that he would leave the train at Dover, a station short of his journey, and that he would like to have his packages, and was told that they would be found at Dover, in the express office there. After two or three weeks, the plaintiff called at the express office, and, upon paying .the express charge for his packages, under protest, received them in damaged condition, mainly due to his delay in their redemption. At the trial at the Morris Circuit, before Honorable William J. Magie, Chief Justice, and a jury, the jury was charged that the plaintiff’s ticket constituted his contract of passage; that the conditions that he should be entitled to personal passage only restricted him from carrying anything but personal baggage, limited to articles of personal property that were reasonably appropriate for the purpose of the journey; that the oatmeal, bacon, coffee and candles contained in the packages could not be carried by the plaintiff under his contract; that the defendant had no right to take the plaintiff’s packages from him, but should either have prevented his entry into the car with them, or should have removed him from the car if he persisted in having the packages with him there, and that upon the evidence in the case there was no indication of that malice in connection with the transaction that would justify •other damages than those which would compensate the plaintiff for the loss of the value of the packages and the diminution of the value of the plaintiff’s coat, if the jury should determine that it had been torn. The verdict was for the plaintiff, in accordance with the charge.