Borough of Longport v. Max & Sarah Bamberger Seashore Home

On appeal from the Supreme Court, in which the following per curiam was filed: “The property of the respondent was assessed for taxes, by the assessor of the borough of Longport, in the sum of $60,-129, from which assessment the respondent appealed to the Atlantic county board of taxation, on the ground that the institution maintained by the respondent was a charitable institution and exempt from taxation by virtue of chapter 278 of Pamph. L. 1913, p. 570. “That board determined that the property was not exempt and sustained the assessment. The respondent then appealed to the state board of taxation, which determined that the property in question was actually used for charitable purposes on May 20th, 1915, and ordered the assessment canceled. “Section 4, chapter 278 of the laws of 1913 exempts from taxation all buildings and land owned by charitable institutions actually used for charitable purposes, at the time fixed by law for the assessment of taxes. “The testimony shows that the petitioner acquired title to its lands in Longport in the early part of 1914; that buildings were erected thereon and completed before December 31st, 1914; that the institution was not actually opened and in use until July 1st, 1915. “The inquiry, therefore, is as to the construction of the words ‘actually used for charitable purposes’ contained in the act of 1913. “However we might feel predisposed to favor the claim for exemption in this case, we cannot but be mindful of the fact that our solution of the inquiry is not at all fancy free, but that our judgment must be guided and controlled upon the principle of stare decisis, which, brings us inevitably to a denial of the validity of the respondent’s claim. “The act of 1913, under which the tax is laid, and upon the terms of which the exemption must be demanded and supported, is not before us for the first time. “The case of Holy Angels v. Fort Lee, 80 N. J. L. 545, settled the construction of the act adverse to the contention of the respondent, and the rule was there laid down that ‘where a building is in course of erection, intended to be used for a charitable purpose, but not actually used therefor, it is not exempt from taxation.’ “This court there dealt with the construction to be given the words ''actually used/ as contained in the act of 1903, and since the language is the same in the act of 1913, the disposition of the application now before us must be made upon the ruling in that case. “The facts in this ease make it apparent that the building of the respondent, on May 20th, 1915, was not in actual use as a charitable institution, and, therefore, the rule applied in the former case leaves no basis for construction here.