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Hanson v. Hoitt

Hanson v. Hoitt, Admr.

Hanson v. Hoitt, 14 N.H. 56 (1843)
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Court
Superior Court of New Hampshire · State Trial Courts
Decided
July 15, 1843
Judges
Parker
Citations
14 N.H. 56
Headnotes
In case of an appeal from the probate court, this court will not, on a motion to dismiss, which was not seasonably made, inquire into alleged non-compliances with statutory pre-requisites to air appeal. Such objections will be taken to have been waived by the delay. And so as to the invalidity of an alleged express waiver, even when the allegation of such invalidity is founded on a provision of the Constitution. Motions to dismiss a cause should, as a general rule, be made at the first term, or objections available in that form will he taken to have been waived. Pleading the general issue is, of itself, a waiver. A waiver of all informalities and irregularities, made by a counsellor who has the sole charge of a cause, is binding upon his client.
Summary
Appeal from the report of the commissioner of insolvency, on the estate of E. Hoitt, deceased. The appeal is dated April 28, 1838. The register certifies that the appeal and declaration were filed in the probate office t! on the 9th day of June, 1838, being within thirty days of the acceptance of the report of the commissioner.” The declaration filed with the appeal was in assumpsit, containing two counts, viz: as for goods sold and delivered, and for work and labor. A specification under these counts was filed at the August term, 1838. At the January term, 1842, the declaration was amended by filing another count upon an account annexed. At the January term, 1840, the defendant pleaded the general issue, and filed notice that he should rely upon the statute of limitations. At the same term an auditor was appointed, who made a report. At tho February term, 1842, the defendant moved the court to quash and dismiss the appeal, for the following reasons, viz :—1. For that the said appeal was taken and claimed in writing on the 2Slh of April, 1838, and the declaration was not filed in the probate office till the 9th of June, 1838. 2. For that an appeal in this case was not claimed in writing, and a declaration on the plaintiff’s claim filed in the probate office at any time within thirty days next after the acceptance of the report of the commissioner by the judge of probate.—3. For that notice of this appeal was never served upon or issued to the defendant, nor was he ever served with a copy of the declaration.—.4. For that the plaintiff does not produce a certificate of the judge of probate, that notice of said appeal was issued to said defendant, administrator as aforesaid, as is required by the statute. It appeared in evidence that Ira A. Eastman, Esq., was fully retained for the defendant, “in case an appeal should be taken,” but before the action on the appeal was entered ;—. that he was present at and consented to the entry of said action, and at that term had the sole charge of it, though Mr. Bartlett came in at the second term, and other counsel subsequently came in;—that while he had the sole charge of the case, there was an agreement between the plaintiff’s counsel and said Eastman, that no captious objections should be taken in the case on cither side, but that it should be tried upon its merits. Said Eastman testified that the action was entered on motion of the plaintiff’s counsel, as he thought, in October, 1838, at an adjournment of the August term; and that he probably should have filed the plea and set-off, according to the strict rules of court, had it not been for the understanding between said counsel and himself; but that having had a conversation with the opposing counsel as to objections on account of some irregularities in the probate court, or informality in the appeal, ho considered them all waived on the pari of the defendant, and at the time of entry so staled to (he court. Mr. Eastman could not say when he informed the defendant of the entry, but testified that, at some time subsequent, he did inform him of the entry, and that he had waived the objections, thinking them neither just or legal;—that he did not go into the details of the objections, and that the defendant expressed no dissatisfaction. Mr. Eastman ceased to be register of probate July 1,1839. At some previous time he made the order of notice on the appeal, and in January, 1839, furnished Hanson’s counsel with copies in the case ; but he could not testify whether or not he ever made out any papers to be served on Hoitt, nor whether any ever were served on him.

Syllabus and headnotes are prepared by the reporter or publisher, not the court, and are not part of the opinion.

Opinion of the Court — Parker

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Parker, C. J.

This motion to dismiss comes too late to allow us to inquire into the various questions raised by the counsel in argument. As a general rule, motions to dismiss should be made at the first term. 3 Met. R. 58, Carpenter vs. Aldrich; 1 Met. R. 510, 512, Simonds vs. Parker. And the omission to move at the proper time has been thought to be a waiver of even a constitutional defect. 2 Pick. R. 592, Ripley vs. Warren.

In the present case, a long period of time, supposed to extend from October, 1838, to February, 1842, including repeated terms of court, (and during which the party has employed various counsel,) has been allowed to pass without any intimation to this effect. On the contrary, though at intervals various steps have been taken in the progress of the case, such as the amendment of the declaration and the appointment of an auditor, the defendant took no means to avail himself of the alleged defects, omissions and non-compliances. Indeed, two years before the present motion was made, the defendant had pleaded the general issue and given notice of a defence of a totally different character. The plea of the general issue alone was of itself a waiver. 10 Mass. R. 176 , Cage vs. Gannett; 2 Pick. R. 592, Ripley vs. Warren; 21 Pick. R. 535, Carlisle vs. Weston ; 1 Met. R. 508, 510, Simonds vs. Parker; 9 N. H. Rep. 464, 467 , Smith vs. Whittier.

In addition to all this, there was in the present case an express waiver. On general principles, as well as upon the authority of 2 N. H. Rep. 520 , Alton vs. Gilmanton, and 5 N. H. Rep. 393 , Pike vs. Emerson, we have no hesitation in saying that Mr. Eastman, the counsel of the defendant, had in that capacity full power to waive, as he explicitly states he did, the matters which now form the ground of the motion to dismiss.

It is not necessary in order to bring us to a conclusion, but it is worthy of notice, that the defendant seems to have assented to and ratified the course of his former counsel.

Motion denied.

How later courts describe this case

No later court has written an explanatory parenthetical about this case yet.

1853–1854: 11875–1876: 11893–1894: 118532026peak 1853 · 1

Relies on it most ⓘ

  1. Beliveau v. Amoskeag Manufacturing Co.40 A. 734 (N.H. 1894)
  2. Brooks v. New Durham55 N.H. 559 (1875)
  3. State v. Richmond26 N.H. 232 (1853)

Most recent

  1. Beliveau v. Amoskeag Manufacturing Co.40 A. 734 (N.H. 1894)
  2. Brooks v. New Durham55 N.H. 559 (1875)
  3. State v. Richmond26 N.H. 232 (1853)

Citing references are not a citator: they show that a later opinion cites this case, not whether it followed, distinguished, or overruled it. Check negative history before relying on this case.

Authorities cited 4

DepthCaseCited by
Town of Alton v. Town of Gilmanton, 2 N.H. 520 (1823) 11
Gage v. Gannet, 10 Mass. 176 (1813) 8
Pike v. Emerson, 5 N.H. 393 (1831) 4
Smith v. Whittier, 9 N.H. 464 (1838) 2

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