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Hughes v. Blake

Hughes v. Blake, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 453 (1821)
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Court
Supreme Court of the United States
Decided
March 10, 1821
Judges
Livingston
Citations
19 U.S. 4535 L. Ed. 3036 Wheat. 4531821 U.S. LEXIS 366
Cited by 55 1 descriptions by later courts
Headnotes
(Chancery.) A decree-cannot be pronounced, on the testimony of a single witness, unaccompanied by corroborating circumstances, against a positive denial, by the defendant, of any matter-directly charged by the bill, in the defendant’s answer, or answer in support of his -plea. A replication to a plea is an admission of the sufficiency Of the plea, as - much as if it had been set-down for argument and allowed; and all that the defendant Ijas to do, is .to prove it in point of fact, - and a dismission of the bill on the hearing is'then a matter of course. Under what circumstances a plea of a former judgment at law, for the cause of action, is a good bar in Equity. The defendant’s denial, in his answer in support of his plea, is conclusive.unless contradicted by the testimony of more than one witness, or one witness accompanied with corroborating circumstances. A replication to a plea is an admission of its sufficiency in point of equity, and all that the defendant has to do, is to prove it in point of fact.
Summary
Appeal from the Circuit Court of Massachusetts. The object of .the bill in equity filed in this case, was to recover from the defendant, Blake, a sum of money arising from the sale of a tract of land, called Yazoo Jands, alleged to have been made , in 1795, by thé. defendant, as agent of certain persons named in the bill, in which lands the plaintiff) Hughes, claimed an equitable interest, in common with the immediate, principals of the defendants, and, therefore, to be entitled to a proportion of the proceeds resulting from the sale. The bill also charged, that the defendant had rendered himself distinctly liable for a specific sum of money, in virtue of a certain order, having reference to the plaintiff’s interest in the lands, drawn by ope Gibson, in September, 1796, in favour of the plaintiff, and accepted by the defendant, with certain modifications and conditions, as parti-* cularly expressed in the acceptance. The defendant pleaded in bar, both to the relief andtjie discovery sought by the bill, a former verdict and. judgment at law rendered in his, favour, in the Supreme Court of Massachusetts, in the year 1810, upon-a suit commenced against him by the present plaintiffs, in 1804, being long, before the exhibition of the present bill, for the same cause of action. The plea averred, that the judgment at law was still in force j that the matters in controversy, and the parties in both suits, were the same ; that the whole merits of the case, as stated by the bill, were fully heard, tried, and determined in the action at law, and in a Court of competent jurisdiction.; and that the judgment was obtained fairly, and without fraud, covin, or misrepresentation, or the taking any undue advantage. It was also averred by the plea, that no evidence has come to the plaintiffs knowledge, since the trial at law, respecting any of the facts alleged in the bill, and which he did not, or might not have produced on such trial: and further, that the defendant has at no time, as alleged in the bill, obtained of a certain E. Williams, any allowance or payment, for, or on Account of his,.the defendant’s, being liable as bail for Gibson, in the plaintiffs bill mentioned, and for which liability he has claimed in the action at law an indemnity out of a fund on the credit of which he had accepted the order in favour of the pláíntiff. The defendant, then, without waiving his plea, proceeded to answer and deny the matters alleged by the bill; as circumstances of equity to avoid the efiect of the proceedings at law, and which he had already denied by the averment in his plea. To this plea and answer the'plaintiff filed a general replication in the-usuab form, and witnesses were examined by both parties.- i At the hearing, the Identity pf the Pauses of action Were sought , to be . established, without the aid of collateral .proof, from a comparison of the mátters set forth in the bill, with the averments containedlin the several. counts of. the plaintiff’s declaration; it appearing, moreover, that, in the trial at law, the plaintiff had submitted to the jury, in' support of these c0unts, the depositions of the same, witnesses, on : whose evidence heTelied, in support of his bill. The prineipal other question of fact related to the subject of the negotiation ^respecting the lands before mentioned, áHegéd in the plaintiff’s bill to have* taken place in' 1814, between the defendant and E. Williams, whose testimony respecting it, was insisted, by: the^ plaintiff not to be sufficient to otitWeigh the effect of the positive denials contained in his |déa and answeri .The cause being heard on the issue joined, and the proofs taken in it, the Court below decreed that the plea was sufficiéntly -proved, and therefore dis^ missed the bill With costs, and the cause was brought by appeal to this- Court, stated three questions for the consideration of the Court: (1.) Whether the plea was in itself sufficient, supposing its sufficiency to be now an open question ? (2.) Whether it has been proved? (3.) Whether its sufficiency,. supposing it to be proved, is now open for inquiry ? The first of these questions being answered negatively, and the third affirmatively, would produce a reversal of the decree: and let them be answered as they might, if the second be answered negatively, a reversal would equally follow. 1. The plaintiff’s allegations must be taken to be true, except so far as the averments in the plea, and the answer in support of the plea, deny, them.a And if the plea does anot deny whatever is alleged, and if true, would make: the plea no>bar, it is no plea.b The result of an examination of the allegations in the bill will be. found to.be, that the defendant was the legal owner of the notes taken for the sale of the lands, by taking and holding them in his own name ; that the plaintiff, and the other persons interested, were cestui que trusts according to their respective interests,-explained and known.to the defendant ;. that the defendants conditional .acceptance of the order in the plaintiff’s favour, so far as it affected to authorize him to apply the plaintiff’s interest as an indemnity for his liability as Gibson’s bail, being without the plaintiff’s consent, did not destroy the defendant’s character of trustee. . That when he after-wards sold the plaintiff’s interest, (it being still a merely, equitable one in the view of . Chancery, the conditional acceptance beings of no force in equity,') in order to apply the money to the wrongful purpose of the conditional acceptance, the defendant still remained answerable, in equity, upon the foundation ef the original trust. That the defendant knew all the material facts charged in the bill, out of which arose the trust, and breach of trust, and his alleged continuing accountability. That the defendant, insisting upon thus misapplying the money, the plain* tiff, mistaking the proper forum, sued the defendant at law, and a verdict and judgment passed against him; and the bill charges the defendant’s breaches of trust, and abuse of his power as legal owner in taking advantage of the plaintiff, and fhe impossibility of his obtaining a full and fair trial of the whole merits at law, as reasons why the verdict and judgment should not be suffered to prevent relief in equity. The defendant, notwithstanding all this, pleads the verdict and judgment in bar of the relief and discovery. The plea leaves uncontradicted whatever in the bill showed a mere equitable trust, and undue advantage taken of the defendant’s character of legal owner and holder of the fund. Since, then, the plaintiff could obtain relief no where, but upon the mere trust, which was properly cognizable in Chaneery; and even if it were barely possible that a Court of law could relieve, and that great difficulties only stood in the way arising out of the nature of the subject, his miscarriage at law ought not to oust a Court of equity of its power of relief in a matter appertaining to its jurisdiction. It cannot, be denied on the other side, that a judgment at law .may be relieved against in equity upon eqúitable inducements of various kinds. Cases of this sort furnish the familiar and ordinary business of the Court of Chancery.a The only question, therefore, is, upon what grounds will it relieve ? I admit, with Lord Chancellors Eldon and Redesdale, that mere inatten-tjonj omission, or neglect, however fatal the consequences may be, shall not of itself be a ground of equitable relief against a judgment at law.b But where the matter is cognizable in equity, although also cognizable at law, and effectual cognizance has not, and cannot be taken at law, Chancery will relieve against a judgment at láw ; especially if the matter is better adapted to equitable cognizance, and forms a favourite subject of that jurisdiction. The instances put by Lord Redesdale of cases iq which equity will interfere, although a.verdict and judgment have been obtained- at law, are only put by way of example.c They conclusive,’not only as to the matter actually adjudged, hut as to every matter which might have been litigated and decided.a In1, the. action at law, the judge’s charge might have been, excepted' to,. if’ erroneous, and a new trial granted, which is in itself a sort of equitable right 5 but if the charge was correct, no injustice has been done.. The present bill avows it to be for .the same cause of action, and does not allege any incómpeteneyin the jurisdiction of the Court of law. It sets up no new right, but merely contends, that the plaintiff-had a right then, on matter discovered since, but existing at the time. The question now is, not as to the goodness of the count? in the plaintiff’s declaration, but whether the merits have been substantially tried upon them: not intending, however, to admit', that the counts were not sufficient. The regular course of the Court of Chancery, in such a case, is to refer them to the master to report whether the cause of action be substantially the same.a As to the principles which govern Courts of equity in setting aside verdicts as against equity it must be shown that at the time of the. trial at law some material fact existed, within the defendant’s own knowledge, different from the finding of the jury.b Here there is no such fact: and even if there had been* if it was also within the plaintiff’s knowledge, he should have filed a bill of discovery, lite pendente, to obtain the defendant’s answer on oath. Supposing the testimony of E. Williams to be true, it establishes no fact existing at'the time, which is essential to enriie the plaintiff to relief in equity.c But his testimony is explicitly Contradicted by the defendant’s answer: and the plea must therefore stand, being supported by the answer, and contradicted by the testimony of a single witness only, unsupported by circumstances to strengthen its credibility.a .The transactions between the parties took place more than twenty years ago. The plaintiff had an opportunity of establishing his pretended claim in the tribunal which he had elected, and in which he failed; and the defendant has a just right to avail himself of that failure as a bar-to any further proceedings in a case where, besides the solemn trial which has aL ready been had at law, be has now purged his conscience of the allegations of fraud, which have been made against him without the slightest foundation in the facts and circumstances of the case.

Syllabus and headnotes are prepared by the reporter or publisher, not the court, and are not part of the opinion.

Opinion — Livingston

Mr. Justice Livingston delivered the opinion of the Coürt, and after stating the pleadings, proceeded as follows:

In. examining whether there be any error in the decree of the Court below, we shall have to inquire whether the plea of the respondent is proved; and if so, whether any other decree, except that of dismissing the bill, could have been made by the Court below.

In examining the question of fact, that is, whether the plea were proved or not, it will be borne in mind, that no decree can be made against a positive denial of the defendant, of any matter directly charged in the bill, on the testimony of a single witness, unaccompanied by some corroborating circumstance.

*469 There is no pretence that there is any thing untrue in any of the averments which the plea contains on the subject of the proceedings at law — such as that a judgment was obtained by the respondent — that the same is in full forcé, &c. The first averment in the plea, which will require a more particular consideration, is the one denying that the respondent had at any time obtained from E. Williams, any allow.ance or payment, for* or on account of his being bail for Gibson, in an action brought against him by one Evans. The respondent had been permittéd, as appears by the facts of thé case, to retain out of a fund, on which the appellant had a claim, a considerable sum to save him harmless against this responsibility, and which was, in all probability, allowed to him, on the trial at law. If, therefore, it could have been shown that Blake had been fully indemnified, or paid for this liability from any other quarter, and that this fact had come to the. appellant’s knowledge since the judgment at law, it would seém no more, than equitable, notwithstanding these proceedings, thus far to open the account between them. But has this been done ? The allegation of the bill in substance is, that Blake has been twice indemnified for the same loss, or, in other words, that he had been twice reimbursed the moniés which he paid as the bail of Gibson. This fraud, which is so unhe^ sitatingly charged upon the respondent, is not made out by any testimony in the cause. Independent of Blake’s positive and absolute denial, which is equivalent to the testimony of one witness, there is nothing in the deposition of Williams, who is the only *470 witness to this point, to establish the fact as stated in the bill. This gentleman has been twice examined, once in the year 1805, as a witness in the trial at law; and again, as a witness in this cause. On his first examination, he stated that he was inform-, ed by Blake that he held in his hand about 6,300 dollars, which had been received of Henry Newman, as an indemnity for his having become bail for Gibson in an action by some person whose name he did not recollect, on which pretence Blake refused to pay him this sum. In his second deposition, which was taken in this cause, he swears that he was informed by Blake, that he had received from Newman about 6000 dollars, which he should retain, in consequence of his liability to Evans, as the bail of Gibson; and that he, Williams, allowed the respondent to apply this money for that purpose. Now, admitting that Blake retained these monies, and with the consent of Williams, who, it appears however, had no interest in, or control over them, with intent to apply them in this way, where is there any proof whatever, m contradiction of Blake’s answer that he ever did make that use of them. He might have securities of Gibson of various kinds, the avails of which he might have a right to retain for the same object, but if he actually made only one appropriation for such object, no one could complain. That the fund spoken of by Williams, which arose out of Newman’s note, was not applied to the indemnity which has so often been mentioned,appears not only by an averment in Blake’s plea to that effect, but bv the testimony of Gibson *471 himself,, a witness of the. appellant, who declares, that the note of Newman was.subject to his order ; that-no privity existed between .Williams and Blake respecting the sames and that it had not been placed in Blake’s, hands as an indemnity for becoming his bail. It follows, therefore, that -Blake could not have obtained from Williams, any allowance or payment on account of this responsibility ; arid we accordingly find, from the bill itself, that on'a settlement which took place between Blake and Gibson, in.November, 1796, about two months after the acceptance in favour- of the appellant, the former fell in debt to the latter a sum exceeding two thousand dollars,, the payment of which, by'Blake, is one süb-ject of complaint in' the appellant’s bill. Now, it is more thari probable, that in this. settlement, Gibson received a credit for the very moriey of which Williams speaks, as Gibson acknowledges it to have been a final settlement of all the accounts between him and Blake. The Court, therefore, is entirely satisfied, that the averment in the respondent’s plea, which it has just been considering, is fully established, and that the proof is such as to leave no room whatever to believe, that Blake was ever repaid the moneys he advanced as the bail of Gibson, from any other fund than that which the appellant had consented should stand pledged for that purpose. As little truth is there in the allegation that what Williams could testify on this subject, was unknown to Hughes during the pendency of the action at law; for Williams, who is examined as a witness for the *472 plaintiff in this suit, swears to the very fact, which he had been produced to prove in the action at law respecting the declarations of Blake concerning Newman’s note ; and this he does without any variation from his former testimony, materially affecting the present suit. The other averment, therefore, in the plea, that no new evidence has come to the appellant’s knowledge respecting the matters in litigation, is fully and satisfactorily established.

A replication to a plea is an admission of its sufficiency in point of equity, and all that the defendant has to do, is to prove it in point of fact.

The truth of the plea being thus made out, what is to be the consequence ? If the rule of Courts of equity in England is to be. applied, there can be no doubt. If a plea, in the apprehension of the complainant, be good in matter, but not true in fact, he may reply to it, as has been done here, and proceed to examine witnesses in the same way as in case of a replication to an answer: but such a proceeding is always an admission of the sufficiency of the plea itself, as much so, as if it had been set down for argument and allowed ; and if the facts relied on by the plea are proved, a.dismission of the bill on the hearing is a matter of course. Whatever objection there may be to adhering strictly to this course of proceeding in every description of cases, it is considered ás the long and established practice of a Court of equity, which ought not lightly to be departed from. It is not perceived, that any serious mischief can arise from it. Counsel will generally be able to decide on the merits of any defence which may be spread pn a plea, and if insufficient, it is not probable they will do otherwise than set it down for argument, *473 Nor will they ever take issue on it, but in a case which presents a very clear and sufficient defence, if the facts be proved. If a replication should be filed inadvertently, the Court would have no difficulty in permitting it to be withdrawn. But if the plaintiff will persevere in putting the defendant to the trouble and expense of proving his plea, it must be from an entire conviction that it contains a substantial de-fence, and in such case there is no hardship in a Court’s considering it in the same light. But without applying the rule which has been mentioned, to the present case, the Court has no difficulty in saying, that the matters set forth in this plea, which has been drawn with great care and judgment, constitute a complete defence to the present action, and that the appellant has failed in showing any good cause why the judgment at law should not be conclusive on all the matters stated in the bill. Whatever claim he may at one time have had on Blake for one fourth of 75,000 dollars, secured by Barrel’s notes, if Blake knew at the time of taking them of his interest to that extent, or for not taking a note for that amount in the name of Hughes himself, it is very certain, that with a full knowledge on his part, that Blake utterly denied a liability to account with any one but Gibson, he came to a settlement with him, by allowing him to accept of Gibson’s draft, in his favour, in such way as to charge the fund on which it was drawn with so many deductions as entirely to exhaust it. And when he is apprised of this conditional acceptance by his agent, or the person who *474 presented the draft, instead of returning it, or making any complaint, he acquiesces in it for seven or eight years, and then brings an action to enforce this very contract of. acceptance, which he rmist have known put it in the power of the acceptor to make all the deductions from the fund in his hands,, which were designated in the act of acceptance. * After, six years litigation in a .Court of law, it is now attempted to revive the same controversy, at least in part, on an allegation that Blake received, a compensation in some other way than out of the fund, on which the bill in his favour was drawn, for one of the liabilities mentioned in the acceptance. That this was not the case, is abundantly proved. But if Blake had other funds of Gibson, besides the note of Barrel, which he also considered as tinder Gibson’s exclusive control, out of which his indemnity as bail might have been obtained, what right has Hughes now to complain, that such other, funds were not applied in that way, after he had agreed or consented that this indemnity should come out of those funds of Gibson in the hands of Blake, out of which he was to be paid. Having come into the arrangement, Blake, might well think himself at liberty, as it seems he did, to apply the other funds of Gibson in any other way which he and Gibson might think proper. Whether Gibson be liable to the appellant for the subtraction of any part of his fund for the payment of his debt, is a question not before the Court; but we cannot see that an application of them in express conformity with the agreement of *475 the parties to this suit, can give the appellant any claim on the respondent, At any rate, the plea having denied all the allegations which were relied on as grounds for removing the bar which it was anticipated would be interposed to the appellant’s bill, and all the matters stated in the plea, on which issue was talien, having been fully proved, the Court is of opinion, that the decree of the Circuit Court must be affirmed, with costs.

Decree affirmed.

a a Vide 1 Mason's Rep.

515. S. C.

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