United States v. Nourse

United States, Plaintiff in Error v. Joseph Nourse

United States v. Nourse, 34 U.S. (9 Pet.) 8 (1835)

Court: Supreme Court of the United States
Decided: January 31, 1835
Judges: Marshall
Citations: 34 U.S. 89 L. Ed. 319 Pet. 81835 U.S. LEXIS 331

Cited by 35 1 descriptions by later courts

Headnotes

The treasury department of the United States, on the 14th of July 1829, issued a warrant of distress directed to the marshal of the District of Columbia, Commanding him to levy and collect, by distress and sale of his goods and chattels, a sum of money alleged to be due to the United States, on a treasury transcript, by Joseph Nourse, late register of the treasury. This warrant was issued in pursuance of the 3d and 4th sections of the act of May 15th 1820, “ providing for the better organization of the treasury department.” Under the provisions of the 4th section .of the act, Mr Nourse obtained án injunction from the chief justice ofthe.Districtof Columbia to stay all further proceedings on the said warrant. The bill presented by Mr Nourse to the chief justice of the District of Columbia asserted that the United States were indebted to him for compensation for extra services he had rendered to the United States; in a sum exceeding'the amount claimed by the United States: which claim was denied in the answer filed by the district attorney of the United States, both as to the legality and the amount of the claim. ■ The court determined that Mr Joseph Nourse was entitled to compensation for the extra services he had rendered to the government, in the agencies mentioned in the bill; and appointed auditors to ascertain the value of his. services and compensation, and to report thereon without delay. The' report of the auditors allowed to the complainant a commission of two and a half per cent, bn the sum of 943,308 dollars and 83 cents, disbursed by him ’ in the several agencies in which he had been employed, leaving a balance due to him from the United States. The report was confirmed, and the injunction made perpetual. The United States then instituted their suit against Joseph Nours.e in the circuit court for the District of Columbia,' in the county of Washington, on an account authenticated according to-law, by the proper accounting on-cers, being the same account, and claiming the same amount as in the warrant of distress, and on which the decree of the chief justice was pronounced. It was agreed that the defendant should have the benefit of the proceedings in that case, as if the same had been pleaded and given in evidence. The. circuit court adjudged the proceedings in the former action a bar to this action. By the Court. It is a rule to which no exception is recollected, that the judgment óf a court of competent jurisdiction, while unreversed, concludes the subject' matter as between the same parties. They cannot again bring it into litigation. ■ An execution is the end of the law. It givás the successful party the fruits of his judgment, and the distress warrant is a most effective execution. It may act on the body and estate of the individual against whom it is directed. It would excite some surprise if, in a government of laws-and of principle, furnished with a department whoso appropriate duty is to decide questions of right, not only between individuals, but between the government and individuals, a ministerial oificer might, at his discretion, issue this powerful process, and levy on the person, lands and chattels of the debtor, any sum he might believe to he due, leaving to that debtor no remedy, no appeal to the laws of his country; if he should believe the claim to be unjust. But •this anomaly .does not exist) this imputation cannot be cast on the legislature of the United States. Under the act of congress the chief justice of the District of Columbia had full jurisdiction over the case. After a reference to auditors; according to the course of courts of chancery in matters of account,a final decree was pronounced against the United States, and a perpetual injunction awarded. This decree is now in full force,' and was in force when this suit was instituted. The act of congress gave jurisdiction in the specific case to the district judge. He might have enjoined the whole or.a part of the warrant. His decree might have been for or against the United States for the whole or a part of the claim. On the sum which he found to be due, he is directed to assess the lawful interest; he ' may add such damages as, with the interest, shall not exceed the rate of ten per cent per annum on the principal sum. Had the district judge finally enjoined a part of the sum claimed by the United States, and decreed that the fesidue should be paid with interest, all would perceive the unfitness of asserting a claim in a new action to that portion of the debt which had been enjoined by the decree of the court.' And yet; between the obligation of a • decree against the whole claim, and against a part of it, no distinction is . perceived. . The relief which is given- by the act of congress, on which the warrant of distress may be issued by application to any district judge of the United States for an injunction to stay proceedings on such warrant, is notconfined to an officer employed in the civil, military or naval departments of-the government to disburse the public money appropriated for the service of those departments respectively, who shall fail to render his accounts, or,pay over in the manner required by law, any sum-of money remaining in the hands of such officer. When the legislature turns its attention to the individual against whom the warrant may issue, the language of the law is immediately changed. The word person is substituted for officer; and it declares, “ that if any person should consider himself aggrieved by any warrant issued under this act, he may prefer a bill of complaint, &c.,” and thereupon the judge may grant an injunction, &c. The character of the individual against may • entirely disregarded, by that part of the law. Be he whom he may, an officer or not an officer, á debtor or not a debtor,; if the warrant be levied on his.pérson or property, he is permitted to appeal to the. laws of his country, and to bring his case before the district judge, to be adjudicated by him. The district judge had full jurisdiction over the case, and his decision is final. The judgment on the warrant of distress, and the proceedings upon it aro, • consequently, a bar to any subsequent action for the same cause.

Summary

IN error lo the circuit cnuri of the United States of the .district of Columbia, for the county of Washington. This wits an action of assumpsit instituted by the United States in the circuit'court, on an account stated at the treasury of the United.States, against “Joseph Nourse, late register of the treasury of the United States.” The account was dated “auditor’s office, 28th of July 1829,” showing abalance in favour of the plaintiffs, of that day, of 11,769 dollars and 13 cents, and was duly and regularly certified, according to the provisions of the acts of congress, by the officers of the treasury. The -defendant pleaded non assumpsit. The cause was submitted to the circuit court on an agreement of the parties, stating that the suit was brought upon a transcript from the treasury, which was annexed to a record in a former proceeding, originating in the district court of the district of Columbia, and brought before the supreme court by appeal. It was also agreed, that the defendant should have . the benefit of the proceedings in that case, as if the same had been pleaded, or, as if given in evidence upon the trial. That Upon this statement judgment should be given as on a case -agreed, and that either party should be at liberty to refer to the printed record in the case of the United States v. Nourse, as if the same were fully incorporated in the record. .See 6 Peters 470.' The circuit court gave judgment for the defendant, and the United States prosecuted this writ of error. For the United States, the attorney-general said, that the only question in the case was whether the proceedings against the defendant, under the warrant of distress, and the decision of the district judge in that case, were conclusive, and a bar to further action by the United States. The court will examine particularly the case in 6 Peters 470. He contended, that the whole object of the act of congress ■of 1820, 3 Story’s- Laws U. S. 1791, in giving to a public debtor, “an officer” of the United States, who had. received public money, a right to apply to a district judge of the United States, when a .warrant of distress was issued against him; was to ascertain whether the United States were entitled to the summary process of a distress warrant to which they had resorted. This construction of this act will regulate the case before the court. An examination of the third section of the act, 3 Story 1794, will fully maintain, that if the United States do not think proper to avail themselves of that act, they may proceed against their debtors as in other cases. It is admitted by the plaintiff in error, that if this court had decided that the proceedings in the former case were judicial, they would be conclusive. But the contrary has been the decision ; and they have been held not to be judicial in their nature. The true view of the---law is, that in cases where it is perfectly clear, on the books of the treasury, that there is indebtedness by a public officer for public money received by him, the' proceedings by distress warrant may be resorted to ; and if the party submits to it, there is an end of the matter. But if he thinks piroper to apply to the district judge and satisfies him, the. judge may restrain the United States from proceeding further on the execution. Afterwards the United States may sue for the debt claimed by them in the usual form, and as if the distress warrant had not issued. By this construction of the law, both the United States, and the defendant in the suit,. have secured the right of a trial by a jury; while, by a different-version of the law, this right is entirely taken away. But supposing the proceeding in a proper case, and one which the law was intended to comprehend, may be final; the case set up in bar to this suit was not such a case. It does not appear that the person against whom the distress warrant issued, was “ an officer” within the act of 1820. The general rules as to the conclusiveness of judicial proceedings are perfectly settled. No one is to be twice vexed for the same matter, and former proceedings are a complete bar to all subsequent actions for the same cause of action.; and may be pleaded and given in evidence as an estoppel. This case may stand for the consideration of the court, as if the former proceedings had been regularly pleaded in bar. When in casés. of such a character, or resting on the plea of former proceedings, it appears that the merits have not been decided, as in cases of “ nonsuit” and “ retraxit,” the matters maybe examined and decided upon in a subsequent suit. Starkie’s Evidence, part 2, p. 198, and the cases referred to. It must distinctly appear that the merits were examined. 3 Wendall’s Rep. 27, 33 ; 8 Wendall’s Rep. 9. In the bill filed by the defendant in the case in 6 Peters» Mr Nourse took the ground that the money chargéd to him in the treasury transcript, had not been received by. him as “ an officer of the treasury,” but as a mere “ agent” of that department. He claimed in his bill that the term “offiber” in the act of congress, was applicable only to those who in such a capacity received the money charged to him, and which formed the items of the account. 6 Peters-403. The other matters in the bill alleged that nothing was due to the United States, but that a balance was due to the complainant. Thus it appears that one of the material grounds for the application made, to the district judge, was . that the money was not received by Mr Nourse as an “officer.” In the case of Randolph,(a) which came before the chief justice, of this court and the district judge of the eastern district of Virginia, in the circuit court of that district, it was decided that it must appear in the account for which a distress warrant shall issue, that the money claimed has been received by the debtor to.the United States as an officer. The statute, it was held, should be construed strictly. It will be said that .the district judge proceeded, in the former case, on the ground that Mr Nourse was “ an. officerthat he took jurisdiction of the case upon that view of it; but it is submitted to this court that this must manifestly appear ;• it must be fully and clearly established, that in the decree; or opinion of the judge, he was an officer within the intendment of the statute ; and this is not the fact. In the former'case, a. reference of the accounts between the United States and the complainant in the bill, was made to auditors. The credits claimed' against the balance of the account stated at the treasury, were founded on items of expenditures made by Mr Nourse, as agent for their disbursement; and a perpetual injunction was awarded. It does not appear in the decree, what the decision of the judge was, as to the capacity in which Mr Nourse acted, in the receipt of the money; nor does he say any thing to negative or affirm the fact. Nor is it material to the claim of the United States that the proceeding is riot a bar to-this suit, that 'this did not appear. It is enough that the allegation was made by Mr Nourse,that he did not act a9 “ an officer,” in making the disbursements, and that the judge so decided the case. The judge says that the services were extra-official; that the sums due as an offset, were for services not official; and that the money received from the United States, was not received by him as register of the treasury. Because the United States submitted .to the proceeding, it. has snot validity. All the proceedings, after the warrant of seizure, would be illegal, if the government had riot a right to issue it: and no act of the officers of the United States could be of avail, to give it validity. Suppose the warrant had issued by direction of the solicitor of the treasury, who has no authority to order it, and no exception had been taken to it; would the proceedings under it have had a legal existence 1 As it nr ay be. considered that the decree was made by the district judge, on the allegation, in the bill for the injunction, that the money was not received as an officer, thÍ3 court will not infer that this was the point decided. contended that the whole proceedings in the case which is reported in 6 Peters, were judicial. Two grounds for relief were presented to the district judge. The judge ordered the accounts between the United States ¡and Mr Nourse to be audited, thus passing by one of the grounds, and considering Mr Nourse as “an officer;” and deciding the case, after the report of the auditors, in that view of it. As to the nature of such a proceeding, he cited 5 Dane’s Abridgement 223; “ where one acts as a judge, and the matter is within his jurisdiction, his sentence binds, until reversed.” In awarding the injunction, he acted judicially, and no other view can be taken of his action in case, and the decree are examined. In the case Of the Arredondo, Peters 709, 711, this court have said : the power to hear and determine a cause, is jurisdiction ; it is coram judice, whenever causé is presented which, brings this power into action; Peters 709. All questions arising in the case are to be decided ; Ibid. 700. By consenting to be sued, and. submitting the decision to judioiab action ; the United States bp.ve considered it as a purely judicial question ; Ibid. -711. Thé United States, by adopting the proceeding authorised by the act of congress of 1820, claimed that the party against whom the warrant issued, was within the act; and in the an-svver to the bill presented to the district judge by Mr Nourse, bis liability as all officer is reasserted. The district judge acted on this’state of things, and gave a final decree upon them thus presented to him. If the.decree in this case had'be'en in the form of chancery proceedings in Englánd, it would have been drawn up at large, and the whole audit of the accounts would then appear in the decree; and it would be seen that the very accounts upon which the United States have now instituted this action were the subject matter of the whole proceeding. In the case of the Bank of the United States v. Ritchie, 8-Peters 128, this court held, that although the décree did not set forth the whole of the matters in which it was given, yet a party on a bill of re-, view may take advantage of any thing appearing in the record. The application of this rule is asked to the case before the court; and the objections on the part of the United States, that the, character and object and purpose of this suit, and of the warrant of distress, are not shown tp be the same, will not be urged. . As to the position that it does not appear in the first proceeding that Mr Nourse was “ an officer” within the objects of the statute; it is sufficient to say, that however the money claimed by the United States came into his hands, he was entitled to a legal and valid set-off to. the claim. The United States proceeded against him as “an officer,” .claiming from him a balance for money he received as the register of the treasury; and he exhibited a set-off, beyond the whoie sum demanded by the United States, to the satisfaction of the auditors appointed by the district judge, which report was confirmed by his decree.

Syllabus and headnotes are prepared by the reporter or publisher, not the court, and are not part of the opinion.

Opinion — Marshall

Mr Chief Justice Marshall delivered the opinion of the Court.

The United States had instituted their suit against Joseph. Nourse in the circuit court for the District of Columbia, in the county of Washington, on ah account authenticated according to law, by the proper accounting officers., The cause being at issue .on the plea of non assumpsit, the following cáse was agreed between the parties.

“In this case it is agreed that the suit is instituted upon a transcript from the treasury of the United States, which is annexed to the record hi a former proceeding originating in the district court of the district of Columbia, and brought before the supreme court by appeal. And it is farther agreed, that the defendant shall have the same benefit of the proceedings,in said case as if the same had been pleaded, or as if given in evidence upon the trial of the general issues-; and upon this statement judgment shall be given as upon a case agreed, and either party be at liberty to refer to the printed record in said case of Nourse v. The United States, as if the same were fully incorporated into this record.”

The case referred to in this special statement grew out of a warrant of distress, issued by the treasury department on the 14th day of July 1829, directed to the marshal of the district of Columbia, commanding him to levy and collect the sum of 11,769 dollars and 13 cents, by distress and sale of the goods and chattels of Joseph Nourse, late register of the treasury. This warrant was issued in pursuance of the act of May 15th, 1820, “providing for the better organization of the treasury department.” The third section of this act enacts in substance that “if any officer employed in the civil, military or naval departments of the government to disburse the public money appropriated for the service of those departments respectively, shall fail to render his accounts, or pay. over in the manner required by law any sum of money remaining in the hands of *26 such officer, it shall be the duty of the officer charged with the revision of the accounts of such officer, to cause the same to be stated to the agent of the treasury, who is required to proceed against the delinquent in the manner directed in the preceding section.” That section directs the agent of the treasury to iásue a warrant of- distress against such delinquent officer and his sureties, directed to the marshal, who shall proceed to levy .an.d collect the money remaining due by distress and sale of the goods and chattels of such delinquent officer, having given ten days notice of such intended sale; and if the goods and chattels be not sufficient to satisfy the said warrant, the same may be levied on the person of such officer, &c.

The fourth section provides 'that if any person shall consider himself aggrieved by any warrant issued under the act, he may prefer a bill of complaint to any district judge, setting forth the nature and extent of the-injury of .which he complains, and .thereupon the judge may grant an injunction to stay proceedings on such warrant altogether, or for so much thereof as the nature of the case requires; and the same proceeding shall be had on such injunction as in other cases, except that no answer shall be required on the part of the United States.

Under the authority given by this section, an injunction was awarded by William Crancb, chief justice of the district of Columbia, arid judge of the court of the United States for that district, to stay all farther proceedings on the said warrant..' In his bill, the complainant states that his public accounts as register of the treasury of. the United States, and agent of the treasury department in disbursing certain funds, .and- settling certain accounts of contingencies and other miscellaneous'matters, and as agent for the joint library committees of- congress, have been settled at the treasury since,his removal from office ; upon which settlement a pretended balance has been found against him. for the sum of 11,230 dollars and 26 cents, for which a warrant of distress has been issued by the agent of the treasury, which has been levied on his lands, tenements, goods and chattels by the, marshal of the district. That the said account is unjust and illegal, and so far from any balance being due thereon to the United States, a considerable balance should have been struck thereon in favour of the complainant:

*27 as appears by an account annexed to the bill, which he declares to be just and true.

That besides his regular duties as register, he was, from the year 1790 till his recent dismission from office, employed by the proper department of the- government in the separate business of special agent for the disbursement of the contingent funds of the treasury department, and for the settlement of the ■ numerous accounts connected therewith. These duties dé-volved upon him great labour and responsibility, and occupied a great portion of his private hours. When he undertook this branch of public employment, no stipulation was made for the precise .amount of compensation. The usage of the treasury and other departments of the government has invariably bee'n to allow commissions not only to unofficial persons so employed; but to official persons and clerks of the departments, when such duties were distinct from the stated duties appertaining to their offices. That he has regularly made out and presented his account to the proper accounting officers of the treasury1; charging his commission at .the rate of two and a half per cent on the .amount of his disbursements; which, if allowed, would leave the United States indebted tb him in the sum of 9886 dollars and 24 cents, which he believes to be justly due to him.

The complainant further states , that he is advised that the act of congress under which the said'warrant of distress is pretended to have been issued, being a law in derogation of common right, ought to be construed with the utmost strictness ; but that on no reasonable construction can this complainant or his accounts, either as register of the treasury, or as agent of t he joint library committees of congress, be brought within the description of persons over whom that act gives jurisdiction to the agent of the treasury. The bill prays for an injunction and for further relief.

The United States in their answer refer to and rely on tire general account of the complainant settled by the proper officer of the government, by which he was found indebted in the sum of 11,769 dollars and 13 cents. They admit that the complainant hail rendered an account charging a commission of two and a half per cent on all the moneys which had passed through his hands in the different agencies in which he Had acted, exhibiting a balance in his favour of 9367 dollars and *28 87 cents. They deny the right of the complainant to a commission on the moneys disbursed by him; and contend that they were authorised by law to enforce the payment of the balance due to the government .by warrant of distress. They therefore pray that the injunction may be dissolved, and that they may be permitted to pursue their legal remedies for the sum due to them.

The court determined that the said Joseph Nourse was entitled to- compensation for the extra services he had rendered to the government, in the agencies mentioned in the bill; and appointed auditors to ascertain the value of his services and compensation, and to report thereon without delay. The report of the auditors allowed to the complainant, a commission of two and a half per cent, on the sum of 943,308 dollars and 83 cents, disbursed by him in the several agencies in which he had been employed, leaving a balance due to him from the United States.

The report was confirmed and the injunction made perpetual, - Some farther proceedings were .iad in that cause which do not affect the case now before this court.

This suit is instituted on the same account on which the distress warrant was issued, and against which the decree of the district judge was pronounced. The defendant relies, on that decree as a bar to the action. The circuit court adjudged it to be a bar; and that judgment is now to be revised in this court.

It is a rule to which'no. exception is recollected, that the judgmént of a court of competent jurisdiction, while unreversed, concludes the subject matter as between the same parties.' They cannot again bring it into litigation.

An execution is the end of the law. It gives the successful party the fruits of his judgment, and the distress warrant is a most effective exécution. It may act on the body and estate of the individual against whom it is directed.

It would bxQite some surprise if, in a government of laws and of principle, furnished with a department whose appropriate duty it is to decide questions of right, not only between individuals, but between the government and individuals; a ministerial officer might, at his discretion,, issue this powerful *29 process, and levy on the person, lands and chattels of the debtor, any sum he might believe to be due, leaving to that debtor no remedy, no appeal to the laws of his country, if he shoidd believe the claim to be unjust. But this anomaly does not exist; this imputation cannot be cast on the legislature of the United States. While it was perceived that the public interest required a prompt remédy against public defaulters, the legislature was not unmindful of the rights of individuals, and provided that this remedy should not be used oppressively. The party who thinks himself aggrieved may appeal from the decision of the treasury to the law, and prefer a bill of complaint to any district judge of the United States, setting forth therein the nature and extent of. the injury ;■ who may grant an injunction to stay proceedings on such, warrant altogether, or for so much thereof as the nature of the case requires. And the same proceedings shall be had on such injunctions as in other cases, except that no answer shall be required on the part of the United States.

Joseph Nourse, in pursuance of the permission given by this section, did file his bill of complaint, alleging among other things, that he owed nothing to the United States, and praying the judge to enjoin all farther proceedings on the warrant. The injunction was granted, and the whole cause thus transferred before the district judge, who was directed to proceed therein as in other cases. He had consequently full jurisdiction over it. After a reference to auditors, according to the course of courts of chancery in. matters of account, he pro-, nounced his final decree against the United States, and awarded a perpetual injunction. This decree is now in full force, and was in force when this suit was instituted. The act of congress gave jurisdiction in the specific case to the district judge. He might have enjoined the whole or a part of the warrant. His decree uiight have been for or against the United States, for the whole or a part of "the claim. On the sum which he found to be due, he is directed to assess the lawful interest; he may add such damages as, with the interest, shall not exceed the rate of ten percent per annum on the principal sum. Had the district judge finally enjoined a part of the sum claimed by the United States, and decreed, that the residue should be paid with interest, all would perceive the unfitness of asserting *30 a claim in a new action to that portion of the debt which ha i been enjoined by the decree of the court. And yet betweei i the obligation of a decree against the whole claim, and against a part of it, no distinction is perceived.

Aware of the difficulty of maintaining an action on a claim on which a court of competent jurisdiction has passed a judgment, still in force; the attorney-general questions the jurisdiction of the district court, and rests his argument for the reversal of the' judgment of the circuit court chiefly on this point. He contends, that Joseph Nourse-was not an officer contemplated by the act providing for the better organization of the treasury department; that the warrant of distress could not legally be issued against him; and consequently, that this is not a case in which the district court can exercise jurisdiction. He refers to the bill of complaint, which is drawn with a double aspect. It alleges that the. complainant, is not indebted to the United States ; and that, were it otherwise, he is not an officer contemf lated by/the act against whom a distress warrant can legally 1 e issued.' This argument has been considered.

Did the case depend upon the question whether Joseph Nourse, in any of the characters in which, he is charged in the account accompanying the warrant, was an officer subjected by law to this process, some difficulty would exist in finding in the record sufficient information on which to decide it. The following are the items of the account. To balance due, As agent for the joint library committee of congress, $2,502 55 As-agent for paying the , expenses of stating and printing the public; accounts, 934 98 As agent for paying the superintendent and watchmen of the buildings occupied by the state and treasury departments, 1,325 41 As agent for paying the expenses of'printing certificates of the public debt, 1,011 29 As agent for paying the contingent expenses of the treasury department. 5,994 90 $11,769 13 Whether in any or all of these agencies, Joseph Nourse acted *31 as an officer against whom a distress warrant could legally be issued, for any sum in which he might be found a defaulter, the record does not furnish the means of deciding clearly. But the district court took ho notice of that part of the bill which suggests this objection. - It acted on the merits of the case, and decreed against the United States on those merits.

Still,, however, the attorney-general contends, that in so doing, it transcended its jurisdiction, and has taken cognizance of a case which could not legally be brought before it. This is founded entirely on the assumption that the warrant ivap issued against a person not liable to it.

Let-this be conceded.

It woujd be strange indeed if the legislature, intending to give a prompt , remedy against a particular class of debtors, should carefully guard that class against any abuse of the remedy; and yet leave all other persons, whether debtors or not, exposed to that abuse: that an officer liable to the process should be enabled to correct it, if it issued injuriously, by appealing to the law : and yet that an individual not liable- to the process, should .be compelled to submit to the oppression and to suffer the wrong.

The act is not chargeable with this inattention to the rights of individuals.

The sections which regulate the proceedings of the treasury department on the warrant, contemplate, the officer against whom it may be issued, and confine it to him: but whén the legislature turns its attention to the individual against whom it may issue, the language of the law is immediately changed. The word person is substituted for officer, and the act declares “ that if any person should consider himself aggrieved by any warrant issued under this act, he may prefer a bill of complaint, &c., and thereupon the judge may grant an injunction, &c.”

The character of the individual against whom the warrant may be issued is entirely disregarded by this part, of the act. Be he whom he may, an officer or. not an officer, a debtor or not a debtor; if the warrant be levied on his person or property, he is permitted to appeal to the laws of his country, and to bring his case before the district judge, to be adjudicated by him.

*32 The district court then had complete jurisdiction over this case, and its decision is final. The judgment is consequently a bar to any subsequent action for the same cause. The judgment of the circuit court is affirmed.

This cause came on to be heard on the transcript of the record from the circuit court of the United States for the district of Columbia, holden in and for the county of Washington, and .was argued by counsel;

on consideration whereof, it is adjudged and ordered, that the judgment of the said circuit court in this cause be, and the same is hereby affirmed.

How later courts describe this case

Explanatory parentheticals written by citing courts — 1 in all; the most informative distinct ones are shown.

(explaining English and American reporters “abound in cases exemplifying [the] principle” that a want of jurisdiction rendered “the whole proceeding . . . coram non judice[] and void”)

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