Mueller v. Ehlers

Mr. Chiee Justice Waite del vered the opinion of the court.

It perhaps sufficiently appears from the bill of exceptions in this case, if it is to be taken as a part of the record, that the rulings complained of were excepted to in proper form at the time of the trial; but it does not appear that the bill of exceptions was filed, signed, tendered for signature, or even prepared, before the adjournment of the court for the term at which the judgment was rendered. No notice was given to the plaintiff of any intention on the part of the defendants to ask for the allowance of a bill of exceptions, either during the term or after. No application was made to the court for an extension of time for that purpose. No such extension of 'time was granted, and no consent given.

Upon the adjournment for the term the parties were out of court, and the litigation there was at an end. The plaintiff was discharged from further attendance; and all.proceedings thereafter, in his absencé and without his consent, were coram non judiee.

The order of the court, therefore, made at the next term, directing that the bill of exceptions be filed in the cause as of thé date of the trial, was a nullity. For this reason, upon the case as it is presented to us, the bill of exceptions, though returned here, cannot, be considered ns part of the record.

This case differs very materially from .that of United States v. Breitling, 20 How. 253 . There the bill of exceptions was prepared during the term, and presented to the court for allowance four days before the adjournment. It was handed back to the attorney presenting it, three days before the adjourn *251 ment,- with the request that he submit it to the opposing counsel. Delay occurred, and the signature was not actually, affixed until after the .term. Under the special circumstances of that ease, the signature, after the term, was recognized as ■. proper. The particular grounds for this ruling are not stated; but it was probably for the reason, that, upon the facts stated', the consent to further time beyond the term for the settling of the exceptions might fairly be presumed. That case went to the extreme verge of the law upon this question of practice, and we are not inclined to extend its operation. It was said by this court in Generes v. Bonnemer, 7 Wall. 565 , that “to permit the judge to make a statement of the facts on which the case shall be heard here, after the case is removed to this court by the service of the writ of error, or even after it is issued, would place the rights of parties who have judgments of record entirely in the power of the judge, without hearing and without remedy.” This language is substantially adopted, in Flanders v. Tweed, 9 Wall. 425 , where it was said “ the statement of facts by the judge is filed upon the 29th May, 1868, nearly three months after the rendition of the judgment. This is ah irregularity, for which this court is bound to disregard it, and to treat it as no part of the record.”

As early as Walton v. United States, 9 Wheat. 651 , the power to reduce exceptions taken at the trial to form, and to have them signed and filed, was, under ordinary circumstances, confined to a time not later than the term at which the judgment was rendered. This, we think, is the true rule, and one to which there should be no exceptions without an express order of the court during the term or consent of the parties, save .under very extraordinary circumstances. Here we find ho order of the court, no consent of the parties, and no such circumstances as will justify a departure from the rule. A judge cannot act judicially upon the rights of parties, after the parties in due course of proceeding have both in law and in fact been dismissed from the court.

The judgment is affirmed,.