Davis v. United Automobile, Aerospace & Agricultural Implement Workers
Davis v. United Automobile, Aerospace & Agricultural Implement Workers of America
Opinion of the Court
Text extracted by OCR from a scanned original; check the original for exact wording.
C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied.
Dissent
Text extracted by OCR from a scanned original; check the original for exact wording.
Justice White,
dissenting.
The question presented is what statute of limitations to borrow in this suit against a union for an alleged violation of a former member’s rights under §101 of the Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act, 29 U. S. C. § 411 . The United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit held that in light of DelCostello v. Teamsters, 462 U. S. 151 (1983), the appropriate source from which to borrow a limitations period is not state law but § 10(b) of the National Labor Relations Act, 29 U. S. C. § 160 (b). 765 F. 2d 1510 (1985). Although not without support in other Circuits, see, e. g., Local Union 1397 v. United Steelworkers of America, AFL-CIO, 748 F. 2d 180 (CA3 1984), the Eleventh Circuit’s decision in this case conflicts with Doty v. Sewall, 784 F. 2d 1 (CA1 1986). Doty explicitly rejects the analysis of this case and Local Union 1397, supra, and holds that the usual practice of borrowing statutes of limitations from state law should be followed in a suit like this one. I would grant certiorari to resolve this conflict.
How later courts describe this case
Explanatory parentheticals written by citing courts — 10 in all; the most informative distinct ones are shown.
-
(holding that the licensor’s contingent duty to defend infringement suits was a material obligation)
-
(technology licensing agreement was executory contract because party had obligation to protect license from interference)
-
(contract is executory if performance is due to some extent on both sides)
-
(a contract is executory if the obligations of both parties to the contract are so far unperformed that the failure of either to complete the performance would constitute a material breach excusing the performance of the other)
-
(the debtor’s decision to reject an executory contract should be accepted by the court unless it is shown to be “so manifestly unreasonable that, it could not be based on sound business judgment, but only on bad faith, or whim or caprice.”)
-
(superseded by 11 U.S.C. § 365(n) on other grounds)
-
(applying section 10(b) limitations period to LMRDA claim)
Cited by 152 cases
View all citing references →- U.S. Courts of Appeals63
- Federal District Courts28
- Bankruptcy Courts54
- Federal Specialty Courts1
- State Highest Courts3
- State Appellate Courts3
Relies on it most ⓘ
- Hester v. International Union of Operating Engineers
- Ronald B. Paul v. Farmland Industries, Inc.
- 45 Fair empl.prac.cas. 169, 44 Empl. Prac. Dec. P 37,492, 45 Empl. Prac. Dec. P 37,649, 2 indiv.empl.rts.cas. 1175 Jimmie C. Washburn, Jr. v. Kansas City Life Insurance Co.
- Ervin Cole, Jr. v. Control Data Corporation
- Reed v. United Transportation Union
- Pruitt v. United Brotherhood of Carpenters & Joiners of America
Most recent
Citing references are not a citator: they show that a later opinion cites this case, not whether it followed, distinguished, or overruled it. Check negative history before relying on this case.