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Gandy v. Marble

Gandy v. Marble, 122 U.S. 432 (1887)
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Court
Supreme Court of the United States
Decided
May 27, 1887
Docket
No. 277
Judges
Blatchford
Citations
122 U.S. 4327 S. Ct. 129030 L. Ed. 12231887 U.S. LEXIS 2121
Headnotes
On a bill in equity filed under § 4915 of the Revised Statutes, to obtain an adjudication in favor of the grautrag of a patent, the plaintiff must allege and prove that a delay of two years and more in prosecuting the application after the last action therein of which notice was given to him was unavoidable, or the application will be regarded as having been abandoned, within the provision of § 4894.
Summary
APPEAL FROM THE SUPREME COURT OF THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA. This was an appeal by the plaintiff in a suit in equity brought in the Supreme Court of the District of Columbia against the Secretary of the Interior and the Commissioner of Patents, from a decree of the general- term of that court dismissing the bill. The suit was brought by Maurice Gandy against II. M. Teller, as Secretary of the Interior, and E. M. Marble, as Commissioner of Patents. The bill was founded upon § 4915 of the .Eevised Statutes, which provides as follows: “ Sec. 4915. Whenever a patent on application is refused, either by the Commissioner of Patents or by the Supreme Court of the District of Columbia upon appeal from the Commissioner, the applicant may have remedy by bill in equity; and the court having cognizance thereof, on notice to adverse parties and other due proceedings had, may adjudge that such applicant is entitled, according to law, to receive a patent for his invention, as specified in his claim, or for any part thereof, as the facts in the case may appear. And such adjudication,, if it be in favor of the right of the applicant, shall authorize the Commissioner to issue such patent on the applicant filing in the Patent Office a copy of the adjudication, and otherwise complying with the requirements of law. In all cases, where there, is no opposing party, a copy of the bill shall be served on the Commissioner; and all the, expenses of the proceeding shall be paid by the applicant, whether the final decision is in his favor or not.” The facts of the case were these: On the 1st of December, 1877, Gandy filed in the Patent Office an application for a patent for “ improvements in belts or bands for driving machinery.” The application was rejected on the merits. ' After due proceedings, an appeal was taken to the Commissioner of Patents in person, who, on the 7th of April, 1879, affirmed the decision rejecting the application. Gandy appealed to the Supreme Court of the District of Columbia, which, on a hearing, and on the 30th of January, 1880, dismissed the petition of Gandy, and directed that a copy of its decree be transmitted to the Commissioner of Patents. The bill stated that the ground of the action of the Patent Office and of the Supreme Court of the District of Columbia in rejecting the application was, that the invention was not patentable, having been anticipated in prior patents. The bill alleged that the application was erroneously rejected, and prayed that the court would hear and determine the right of the plaintiff to a patent for what he claimed, or for such parts thereof as he might' be justly entitled to, and would decree accordingly. The bill was filed on the 3d of May, 1883. A subpoena was issued upon it, and served upon the Secretary of the Interior and the Commissioner of Patents, on the 5th of May, 1883. On the 19th of October, 1883, the solicitor for the plaintiff served on the Secretary of the Interior and the Commissioner of Patents, in person, a notice that he would, on the next day, move the court for leave to enter their default in the case, and thereupon to proceed with the cause ex parte to final hearing. On the 20th .of October, 1883, the court made an order setting forth, that the process of the court and a copy of the bill had been duly served upon the defendants, that they had not appeared or answered, and that, on proof of service of the above named motion, no' one appearing for the defendants, it was ordered that the plaintiff have leave to enter the default of the defendants and to proceed with the cause ex parte, and that he have sixty days to take and put in his proofs. It also specified the officers before whom proofs might be taken. Documentary and oral proofs were put in, the former including a copy of the proceedings in the Patent Office; by which it appeared that the date of the last proceeding in the application was the making of the decree of January 30, 1880, by the Supreme Court of the District of Columbia. No one appeared for the defendants on the taking of any of the proofs. On the 14th of April, 1884, the Supreme Court, in special term, no one appearing for the defendants, made an order that the cause be heard in the first instance by the general term. On the 30th of April, 1884, Benjamin Butterworth, having succeeded Mr. Marble as Commissioner of Patents, moved the court, in general term, to dismiss the bill and set aside the order entering the default of the defendants, and for leave to maleé a defence in the cause, assigning as grounds for the motion that the Secretary of the Interior was not a proper party to the suit; that Mr. Butterworth had succeeded Mr. Marble as Commissioner of Patents; and that the application for the patent had been abandoned by reason of the failure to prosecute the same within two years after the last action thereon, of which notice was duly communicated to the applicant. The court in general term made an order allowing the plaintiff to amend his bill, striking out the name of the Secretary of the Interior as a defendant and adding as a defendant the successor in office of Mr. Marble. On the same day, the court in ^general term made a decree, on a hearing of-counsel for bothxparties, dismissing the bill, with costs. Prom that decree the.plaintiff appealed to this court.

Syllabus and headnotes are prepared by the reporter or publisher, not the court, and are not part of the opinion.

Opinion — Blatchford

Mr. Justice Blatchford, after stating the case as above reported, delivered the opinion of the court.

We are of opinion that this decree must be affirmed. It is provided by § 4894 of the Bevised Statutes as follows: “ Sec.

*439 4894. All applications for patents shall be completed and prepared for examination within two years after the filing of the application, and in default thereof, or upon failure of the applicant to prosecute the same within two years after any action therein, of which notice shall have, been given to the applicant,- they shall be regarded a§ abandoned by the parties thereto, unless it be shown to the satisfaction of the Commissioner of Patents that such delay was unavoidable.” The applicant failed to prosecute his application within two years after the last action therein, of which notice was given to the applicant. The decree of the Supreme Court of the District -of Columbia was made on the 30th of January, 1880, and this bill was not filed until the 3d of May, 1883. No excuse for the laches' and delay is set up in the bill and none is shown in the proofs, nor is it alleged in the bill that the delay was unavoidable. Al-. though, as was said by this court in Butterworth v. Hoe, 112 U. S. 50, 61 , (citing Whipple v. Miner, 15 Fed. Rep. 117;

Ex parte Squire, 3 Ban.

& Ard. 133; and Butler v. Shaw, 21 Fed. Rep. 321,) the .proceeding by bill in equity, under § 4915,' on the refusal to grant an application for a patent, intends a suit according to the ordinary course of equity practice and procedure, and is not a technical appeal from the Patent Office, nor confined to the case as made in -the record of that office, but is prepared and heard upon all competent evidence adduced and upon the whole merits, yet the proceeding is, in fact and necessarily, a part of the application for the patent. Section 4915 declares that the judgment of the court, if in favor of the right of the applicant, is to be a judgment that the applicant “is entitled, according to law, to receive a patent for his invention, as specified in his claim, or for any part thereof, as the facts in the case may appéar; ” and that, if the adjudication be in favor of the right of the applicant, it shall authorize the Commissioner to issue the patent, on the filing in the Patent Office by the applicant of a copy of the adjudication and on his “ otherwise complying with the requirements of law.” One requirement of law is, by § 4894, that the application shall be regarded as abandoned if the applicant fails to prosecute the same--within two years *440 after any action therein of which notice shall have been given to'him, “ unless it be shown to the satisfaction of the Commissioner of Patents that such delay was unavoidable.” All that the court which takes cognizance of the bill in equity, .under § 4915, is authorized to do is to adjudge whether or not “ the applicant is entitled, according to law, to receive a patent,” and, after an adjudication in his favor to that effect, the Commissioner is not authorized to issue a patent unless the applicant otherwise complies with the requirements of law. In the present case, there would be no compliance' with the requirements of law, in view of the delay for more than two years, unless it be shown to the satisfaction of the coprt' that the delay was unavoidable. The jurisdiction of the application being transferred, pro tanto, to the court, by virtue of the bill in' equity, it cannot adjudge that the applicant is entitled, ac- • cording to law, to receive a patent, unless .he shows to the satisfaction of the court that the delay was unavoidable, under an allegation to that effect in the bill. The presumption of abandonment, under § 4894, unless it is shown that the delay in prosecuting the application for two years and more after the last prior action, of which notice was given to the applicant, was unavoidable, exists as fully in regard to that branch of the application involved in the remedy by bill in equity as in regard to any other part of the application, whether so much of- it as is strictly within the Patent Office, or so much of it as consists of an appeal to the Supreme Court of the District of Columbia under § 4911. The decision of the court on a bill in equity becomes, equally with the judgment of the Supreme Court of the District of Columbia on a direct appeal under § 4911, the decision of the Patent Office, and is to govern the action, of the Commissioner. It is, therefore, clearly a branch of the application for the patent, and to be governed by the rule as to laches and delay declared by § 4894 to be attendant upon the application.

Deoree affirmed.

How later courts describe this case

Explanatory parentheticals written by citing courts — 3 in all; the most informative distinct ones are shown.

Cited by 55 cases

View all citing references →
1894: 11895: 21896: 11897: 21906: 11907: 11908: 11909: 21910: 21911: 31913: 11915: 11918: 11921: 21923: 11924: 21926: 11927: 11930: 21931: 11934: 31935: 11938: 21940: 11941: 21942: 11943: 21945: 21948: 11950: 21954: 11956: 31988: 12009: 12010: 12012: 12018: 118942026peak 1911 · 3

Relies on it most ⓘ

  1. Tomlinson of High Point v. Coe123 F.2d 65 (D.C. Cir. 1941)
  2. Hyatt v. Doll576 F.3d 1246 (Fed. Cir. 2009)
  3. Dover v. Greenwood177 F. 946 (D.R.I. 1910)
  4. Hyatt v. Kappos625 F.3d 1320 (Fed. Cir. 2010)
  5. Cleveland Trust Co. v. Berry99 F.2d 517 (6th Cir. 1938)
  6. Nantkwest, Inc. v. Iancu898 F.3d 1177 (Fed. Cir. 2018)

Most recent

  1. Nantkwest, Inc. v. Iancu898 F.3d 1177 (Fed. Cir. 2018)
  2. Kappos v. Hyatt566 U.S. 431 (2012)
  3. Hyatt v. Kappos625 F.3d 1320 (Fed. Cir. 2010)
  4. Hyatt v. Doll576 F.3d 1246 (Fed. Cir. 2009)
  5. Air Products & Chemicals v. Quigg709 F. Supp. 1 (D.D.C. 1988)
  6. Robert C. Watson, Commissioner of Patents v. Chester H. Bruns239 F.2d 948 (D.C. Cir. 1956)

Citing references are not a citator: they show that a later opinion cites this case, not whether it followed, distinguished, or overruled it. Check negative history before relying on this case.

Authorities cited 1

DepthCaseCited by
Butterworth v. United States ex rel. Hoe, 112 U.S. 50 (1884) 138

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