Giles v. Teasley, Board of Registrars

The right of this court to review the decisions of the highest court of a State is, even in oases involving the gravity?of statements charging violations by the provisions of a state • constitution of the Fifteenth Amendment, circumscribed by the rules established by law, and in every case coming ■ to the court on writ of error or appeal the question of jurisdiction must be answered, whether propounded by counsel or not. Where the state court decides the case for reasons independent of the Federal right claimed its action is not reviewable on writ of error by this court. A negro citizen of Alabama and who had previously enjoyed the right to vote, and who had' complied with’, all reasonable requirements of the board of registrars, was refused the right to vote for, as he alleged,’ no reason other than his race and color, the members of the board having been appointed and having acted under the provisions of the state constitution of 1901. He sued the members of the board for damages for such refusal in an action, and applied for a writ of mandamus to compel them to register him, alleging in both proceedings the denial of his rights under the Federal Constitution and that the provisions of the state constitution were repugnant to the Fifteenth Amendment. The complaint •was dismissed on demurrer and the writ refused, the highest court of the State holding that if the provisions of the state constitution were repugnant to the Fifteenth Amendment they were void and that the board, of registrars appointed thereunder had no existence and no power to act and would not be liable for a refusal to register him, and could not be compelled by writ of mandamus to do so; that if the provisions were constitutional the registrars had acted properly thereunder and their action was not reviewable by the courts. Held that the writs of error to this court should be dismissed as such decisions do not involve the adjudication against the plaintiff in error of a right claimed under the Federal Constitution but deny the relief demanded on grounds wholly independent thereof.

ERROR TO THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF AUABAMA.. These cases are writs of error to the Supreme Court of the State of Alabama. In No. 337, the action was brought to recover damages in the sum of $5,000 against the board of registrars of Montgomery County, Alabama, for refusing to register the plaintiff as a qualified elector of the State." The substance of the coin-plaint is : The plaintiff is a. native of the State of Alabama;, a resident of Montgomery County for thirty yéars, and of the voting precinct for more than two years. lie applied forrég' istration, having theretofore enjoyed the right of voting in the State; -the application was made to the board of registrars on March 13, 1902; the plaintiff' complied with all reasonable requirements of the board, but was,arbitrarily refused the right of -registration for no other reason than his race and color. At the same time a large number of negroes similarly situated werelikewise ref used,’while all the white men were registered and’ given certificates, without denial, nor was any question raised as to their qualifications. The registrars required the plaintiff and all members of his race to furnish the testimony of two white men. as to their qualifications and refused to accept the testimony of colored persons, while all the whit - non were registered without any proof except the oath of the applicant. It is alleged that sections 180,181,183,184, 185, 186, 187 and 188 of article 8 of the constitution of the State of Alabama, which went into effect November 28, 1901, under authority of which the registrars were acting, wás intended, designed and enacted by the constitutional convention to deny and abridge the right of the plaintiff and others of his race in the State to vote, solely on account of race, color and previous condition of servitude. The convention of the State of Alabama was composed entirely of white men, although the population of the State is composed of 1,001,152 white and 827,545 colored persons. It is alleged that article 180 of said constitution is repugnant to the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments to the Constitution of the United States because sub- ■ divisions one and two of said section do not contain a statement of qualifications applicable to all, regardless of race, color and previous condition of servitude, but discriminate against negroes solely on account of race. Subdivision three is unreasonable and void, in not defining what character a good citizen -must have and what obligations he must understand under a republican form of government, and gives to the registrars a wide discretion and authority and invests them with arbitrary power. That section 181 of article 8 is repugnant to the said amendments to the Constitution of the United States in that, while it pretends to describe the qualifications of persons who shall apply for registration after January 1, 1903, it was in truth and in effect enacted to apply to the plaintiff and all negroes of the State, and not to operate against and affect any' white persons in the State, and is a part of a scheme to disfranchise the negroes of Alabama on account of race, color and previous condition of servitude. By refusing to permit the negroes to register the board of registrars is forcing them to wait until January 1, 1903, when section 181 comes into effect.. It is charged that said board is composed exclusively of' white men, and the right of appeal given from the action of said board to the Circuit Court and thence to the .Supreme Court of the State was given to more effectually hinder the plaintiff and others of his race in their right to vote and not to accomplish their registration. The negroes are excluded from serving' on juries in the trial courts of the State and have been' for inany years, although qualified for the service, on account of race, color and previous condition of servitude. That on áp-. peal the plaintiff would encounter the same prejudice and obtain the same result as before the board of registrars. The defendants, well knowing the object of the constitutional provisions, were appointed by the State to administer the same, and while, so engaged did wilfully and wrongfully refuse to register the plaintiff and others-of his race for no other reason than their race and color, and thus (jeprived them of the right to vote as electors of the State, contrary to the provisions of the first section of the Fifteenth Amendment to the' Constitution of the United States. In No. 338, the petition for mandamus contains like allegations as to the right of the petitioner to be registered as a voter in the State of Alabama, and avers that he is a person of good character and understands the duties of citizenship under a republican form of government. The petitioner avers, as in his petition for damages, his application to be. registered March 13, 1902, which was arbitrarily refused for the reasons set forth in the petition for damages, contrary to the right of the petitioner. I-Ie repeats the allegations as to the registration of white persons, and avers that the denial of registration to him and others of his race was a denial by the State of Alabama of the equal protection of the laws and the denial of-his right to vote solely on account of his race, color and previous condition of servitude', and was in violation of the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments to the Constitution of the United States. Allegations are inserted as to the intent and purpose of the State in calling the constitutional convention and the adoption of the constitution September 3,1901. It is alleged that the sections 180, 181, 1S3, 184, 1S5, 186, 187 and 188 of article 8 of said new constitution were enacted with the intent and for the purpose set forth in the petition for damages. Allegations are set forth as to the exclusion of the negroes from representation, notwithstanding the part they compose of the population of the State. It is claimed that section 180" of article 8 is obnoxious and repugnant to the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments to the Constitution of the United States, in that it divides the inhabitants into three classes, viz': 1, soldiers’ class; 2, descendants of soldiers’ class; 3, a class not soldiers nor their descendants. .That-the class not soldiers or their descendants are under greater restrictions and given greater burdens than the other classes. That section three is void and unreasonable, failing to define what duties and obligations a citizen must understand under a republican form of government, and gives too wide a discretion to the registrars, amounting to vesting them with arbitrary-power. Subdivisions 1 and 2 do not contain a statement of qualifications which are applicable to all alike, but discriminate against the negroes of the State on account of race, color and previous condition of servitude. The petition in mandamus contains substantially the allegations of the petition for damages as to the manner in which the constitution.was adopted, and avers that section 181, describing the qualifications of persons who apply for registration after January 1,1903, was designed and intended to apply to petitioner and others.of his race and not intended to operate against and affect white persons in the State of .Alabama. It is charged that in the counties of • Alabama colored persons are refused registration, while, under the'same circumstances and possessing the same "qualifications, white men are registered without objection, thereby compelling colored men to wait until January 1, 1903, when the provisions of section 181 will be in operation, and compelling the colored men to have greater and different qualifications than are imposed upon the white men in the State, all of which, it is charged, was in pursuance of a design to evade the terms of the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments to the Constitution of the United States, and to deny to the plaintiff and others of his race the equal protection of the laws, and to deprive them of,the right to voté solelyon account of their race,’ color and previous condition of servitude. Petitioner repeats the allegations of the former petition for damages as to the composition of the board of registrars, and the remedy of appeal from their action to the courts of the State, and claims that if such appeal was prosecuted it could not be heard and determined ■ before the election, but the hearing of the cases would take many years. There are attached' to the petition as exhibits extracts from the speeches and debates in the convention of Alabama. The petition charges that the board, of registrars refused to register colored men, so that' not less than 75,000 of such persons were denied registration solely, on account of race, color and previous condition of servitude, although possessing the necessary qualifications of electors, while the white men were permitted to register without let or hindrance. Affidavits were filed with the petition setting forth the denial of the right of colored persons in various counties in the State of Alabama. The prayer of the petition is that the aforesaid sections of the state constitution be declared absolutely null and void as repugnant to the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments to the Constitution of the United States, and for a writ of mandamus commanding the board of registrars to register the plaintiff as a qualified voter of the State of Alabama, and to issue to him a certificate of the fact, and the like to all voters of his race in the State of Alabama who were such under the constitution of the State prior to the adoption of sections 180, 181, 183, '184, 185, 186, 187 and 188 of the new constitution of the State. And that said board be further commanded not to refuse to register said petitioner or other members of his race on account of their race or color and previous condition of servitude. To the petitions in both cases demurrers were filed in the court of original jurisdiction, which were sustained, and upon appellate proceedings in the Supreme Court of the State of Alabama the decisions of the lower court were affirmed. These writs of error seek to bring this action of the state courts in review here. The record clearly shows that nothing but a Federal question was therein presented to the higher" ourt of Alabama for decision, a,nd that its decision was absolutely necessary to the determination of the causes, and that the judgment rendered by the Supreme Court of Alabama could not have been rendered without deciding the Federal question. Johnson v. Risk, 137 U. S. 300; Wood Machine Co. v. Skinner, 139 U. S. 293. ■ It, íiowever, undertook to avoid the Federal question relying on cases cited in 17 Am. & Eng. Ency. Law (2d ed.), 727. This action has resulted in denying the rights claimed by the'plaintiff in error under the Constitution of the United States, and to uphold the suffrage provisions, of the constitution of Alabama, and the authority' exercised under them, which were drawn in question as being repugnant to the Federal Constitution, and it is well settled that this court has jurisdiction'in such cases to review the decision of a state court. Railway Co. v. Elliott, 184 U. S. 534. The political nature of the rights involved cannoj; be urged against the jurisdiction of this court. McPherson v. Blacker, 146 U. S. 23. Wiley v. Sinkler, 179 U. S. 58; Swafford v. Templeton, 185 U. S. 487, were suits for damages where political rights under the Federal Constitution had' been denied by virtue of an unconstitutional state statute. See also Kinneen v. Wells, 144 Massachusetts, 497. All the material facts alleged by the plaintiff in error were admitted by the demurrers. The purpose of framers of the suffrage provisions of the constitution of Alabama was repugnant to the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments of the Constitution of the United States, such purpose being to disfranchise the negroes without disfranchising any white man; Ah Kow v. Nunan, 5 Sawyer, 553; Cooley, Constitutional Limitations (3d ed.), p. 65; Goedell v. Palmer, 15 App. Div. N. Y. 86. Had'the constitutional .(convention been called for the purpose of establishing, an educational or a property qualification, or a qualification of good moral character for all the electors of Alabama, black an<d whíté alike, and had carried out such a’ purpose, the plaintiff in error and the negroes of that Commonwealth would .have made no complaint. ' But the convention made race and co(or the standard of qualification-by resorting to a trick or legerdemain of law in constitution making, as evidence by the addresses in the constitutional convention on this subject. The suffrage provisions of the constitution of Alabama are in themselves repugnant to the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments to the Constitution of the United States by their lan-' guage and meaning, they beings so artfully constructed as to evade the prohibitions of the Federal Constitution, so that white men alone can become electors and negroes can be excluded on account of their race and color and previous condition. Cox v. The State, 144 N. Y. 396; Colon v. Lisk, 153 N. Y. 188; People v. Albertson, 55 N. Y. 50. Not only were they constructed in defiance and in fraud of-the Federal Constitution, but with great ingenuity, so as to make it difficult to get the question of their constitutionality before the courts.- Sübd. 1 and 2, § 180, art. 8 are not such a statement of qualifications as are applicable to and attainable by all alike, regardless of race, color or previous condition, but were framed purposely to discriminate against the negroes of Alabama, and to deny them the same rights as electors given to white men. Subd. 3, § 180, art. 8 is made so general and indefinite as to invest the registrars with arbitrary power,' so that they could discriminate against negroes and favor white men. The citizen is left to conjecture as to what kind of good character is meant, whether good moral character, or good character for' peace or violence, or for honesty and fair dealing, or for truth and veracity: Likewise is a citizen at a.loss to know what or-which of the manifold duties and obligations of citizenship he is required to understand in order to meet the requirements of this subdivision. Section 186 of the suffrage article is repugnant to the Federal Constitution, in so far as the registrars were given the discretion and power of a cóurt, with the right of appeal from their decision to the Circuit .Court, thence to the Supreme Court, in view of the purpose the convention sought to accomplish by giving such discretion and power and in view of the admitted manner in which the registrars have used such discretion in the discharge of the duties of their office. The admitted facts showing the suffrage provisions of the Alabama constitution in actual operation estabiish that prac-' tically all white men in the State were admitted to the electorate and given life certificates, while practically all the negroes were denied registration on account of their race and color and previous condition, which alone would render them unconstitutional, no matter what the intent was at the time of their enactment,-and no matter in what form of language the}T were expressed. Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U. S. 356; Davis v. Mckeeby, 5 Nevada, 396. Section 181 of the suffrage article is a part of one entire scheme to evade the Fifteenth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States, and to subject the negroes of Alabama to a different test than that required of white citizens, and should also be declared null a)id void, since it is admitted that practically all the white men have been admitted to the electorate for life under section 180, or the temporary plan, and practically all the negroes have been refused. To.allow section 181 to stand would be to sanction the discrimination against negroes, and force them to submit to an educational and property qualification test not required of white men, in contravention of the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments to the Federal Constitution. United States v. Reese, 92 U. S. 214. Fair and equal treatment as a citizen is all that the. plaintiff in error and the negroes of Alabama are contending for' in this litigation, which treatment will be accorded wherever the Fifteenth Amendment to the Federal Constitution is held in proper esteem. The Fourteenth Amendment of the Constitution and the statutes to enforce its provisions relate only to civil rights. Either to the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; or, the right' of life, liberty and property, unless taken away by “ due process ¡of law; ” or, the equal protection of the laws. Slaughter House Gases, 16 Wall. 36; Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U. S. 303-306; Gibson v. Mississippi, 162 U. S. 566; Virginia v. Rives, 100 U. S. 313; Williams v. Mississippi, 170 U. S. 213. The provisions of same amendment all have reference to state action exclusively, and not to any action of private individuals. Virginia v. Rives, 100 U. S. 318. While under the fifth section of the Amendment Congress may enforce the prohibitions whenever they are disregarded by either the legislature, the executive, or the judicial department of the State, it is plain that the action of Congress to enforce a limited power canribt extend beyond the power granted. The Fourteenth .Amendment not only does not undertake to deal with political rights, but in the second section expressly contemplates that the privilege of voting may be denied at the pleasure of' the State, attaching, however, a penalty in the way of a reduction of representation. The prohibitions of section one of the Amendment have no reference to political rights, and the authority of Congress, given by the fifth section, is limited by the second section. The" Fifteenth Amendment is limited to a single matter and the power of Congress to enforce the same, by appropriate legislation, is also restricted to that item. The prohibition of this amendment also refers to governmental action of the United States or by the State, and not to any action of. private individuals. Virginia v. Rives, 100 U. S. 318; Slaughter House Cases, 16 Wall. 37, 77, 126. The Fifteenth Amendment itself can never be violated except by a State or the United States, and not by them until there is a denial or restriction by some law of the right to vote. To bring a statute within the operation of the Constitution it must appear to be passed under a grant of power contained therein, United States v. Harris, 106 U. S. 35, and to bring a case within a statute of the United States, it must appear that. the right, the enjoyment of which is interfered with, is one granted or secured by the Constitution or the laws of the United States. Everything essential to make out a case must-be charged positively and not inferentially. United States v. Cruikshank, 92 U. S. 549, 555. On. every writ of error to a state court the doctrine of res judicata is called in question. It must, appear by all the certainty and according to the principles of res judicata, that a Federal right was directly or necessarily involved and decided adversely to the plaintiff in error claiming such right. If there are several questions involved upon one or more of which judgment may rest without the decision of a Federal question, this'court is without jurisdiction to hear the case. New Orleans v. New Orleans Waterworks, 142 U. S. 84; 12 Notes to U. S. Rep. 64; Capital Bank v. Cadiz Batik, 172 U. S. 425; Russell v. Place, 94 U. S. 606. There is a single exception to the rule that this court will adopt the state construction of its statutes and constitution, and that is “when it has been called upon to interpret the contracts of States,” etc. Mobile & Ohio R. R. v. Tennessee, 153 U. S. 492, 493; Jefferson Bank v. Kelly, 1 Black, 436, 443. But if this court is not so restricted in this case, nevertheless a view of the nature of the proceeding is conclusive that the registrars were acting judicially. They were judges, and their action judicial, and not to be called in question by a suit against them personally for damages. 17 Ency. of Law (2d ed.), pp. 726, 727, 728; Flournoy v. City of Jeffersonville, 79 Am. Dec. 468; Bradley v. Fisher, 13 Wall. 335; 7 Notes to U. S. Rep. 712; Busteed v. Parsons, 54 Ala. 393, 401. Neither the Fourteenth nor Fifteenth Amendments, or statutes enforcing their provisions, overturn the rule that a judge is not liable civiliter for judicial conduct. Virginia v. Rives, 100 U. S. 318; Harrison v. Nixon, 9 Pet. 503; United States v. Harris, 106 U. S. 639; Hemsley v. Myers, 45 Fed. Rep. 283; construing these amendments make it impossible to suppose that § 1979, Rev. Stat., was intended to take away from state courts the right to pass judicially on questions before them and within their jurisdiction. No Federal question was raised in the case and adversely decided. It is impossible to discover the adjudication of any Federal question in the state court adversely to the righclaimed, which is a swie qua non to the jurisdiction of this court. Ins. Co. v. The Treasurer, 11 Wall. 208; Capital Bank v. Cadiz Bank, 172 U. S. 430; Rev. Stat. § 709; Scott v. Jones, 5 How. 375; Michigan Central R. R. v. Michigan S. R. R., 19 How. 379. The demurrer in the state court which disposed of the case did not controvert any Federal right. It only raised questions of procedure as to sufficiency of pleading and of general jurisprudence as to the individual liability of persons acting officially. If a dismissal may rest upon one of several grounds thére is no right to confine it to any particular ground, and if an appeal must be based on á decision of a particular ground, when other questions equally may have been the point decided, the predicate of appeal is wanting. Connecticut, etc., v. Woodruff, 153 U. S. 689; Hammond v. Johnston, 142 U. S. 73; New Orleans v. New Orleans W. W. Co., 142 U. S. 79; Delaware Nav. Co. v. Reybold, 142 U. S. 636. The Rev. Stat. § 1979, under which the action is brought, is unconstitutional, and there is no basis for the suit, and if not unconstitutional has no application to this suit. United States v. Harris, 106 U. S. 629, Baldwin v. Franks, 120 U. S. 678, held that Rev. Stat. § 5519, punishing violations of the third clause of § 1980, was unconstitutional, and in United States v. Reese, 92 U. S. 214, Rev. Stat. §§ 2007, 2008, and 5506, were held to be unconstitutional as too broad for the powers given by the Constitution to Congress; that they were not- appropriate legislation. Section 1979, however, has no application to this case. Holt v. Indiana Mfg. Co., 176 U. S. 68; Wiley v. Sinkler, 179 U. S. 58; Swafford v. Templeton, 185 U. S. 487; Logan v. United States, 144 U. S. 293. If the constitution of Alabama were a violation of the Federal Constitution the effect would be to nullify and discharge the entire registration program. Ex parte Yarborough, 110 U. S. 651, 665; Giles v. Harris, 189 U. S. 475. This court can only act upon the cases made by the pleadings, and the case here simply discloses a judgment which must necessarily rest upon grounds not touching the construction of the constitution of Alabama or any right claimed in opposition to its terms. And it is accepted, as an undeniable proposition, that the “ Denials of equal rights in the action of the judicial tribunals of the State aré left to the revisory powers of this, court.” Virginia v. Rives, 100 U. S. 322; Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U. S. 310; In re Wood, 110 U. S. 278; Gibson v. Mississippi, 162 U. S. 565, 583. And, therefore, if the right in this case sought to be vindicated ■rested upon a statutory declaration of a liability on the part of judges, it would make no difference, for a statute holding them liable civiliter would not be “ appropriate legislation.” As to the clauses of the state constitution objected to while the history and circumstances of the enactment of Constitutions may be looked at, it is only for the purpose of understanding and applying the Avords themselves Avhere there is obscurity or doubt about the real meaning. Bleaker v. McPherson, 146 U. S. 27; Ogden v. Saunders, 12 Wheat. 332; Lake County v. Rollins, 130 U. S. 670. No legislative body can be held responsible for individual declarations of members Avhen it is not evident from the laAvs themselves that the particular matter has been incorporated in the enactment. The corpus delicti is wanting and there can be no conviction, Avhen the laAV does not disclose “ the bloody deed.” Fletcher v. Peck, 6 Cranch, 87; Maxwell v. Dow, 176 U. S. 601; Dodge v. Woolsey, 18 How. 374; United States v. Des Moines, 142 U. S. 545; Downes v. Bidwell, 182 U. S. 254; Williams v. Mississippi, 170 U. S. 222; Lake County v. Rollins, 130 U. S. 670. The third class comprises, “ All persons Avho are of good character and Avho understand the duties and obligations of citizenship under a republican form of government.” This is a provision under Avhich any citizen of any race or color or previous condition of servitude worthy to be admitted as an elector may be registered. It has been held by this court that provisions of exclusion predicated on bad character, or admission to privileges on “good character,” ai’e not discriminations against races. Williams v. Mississippi, 170 U. S. 222; In re Wood, 140 U. S. 284; In re Jugiro, 140 U. S. 291, 298. If defendants committed any Avrong or error in the administration of the law, the law-cannot be blamed for the administration; and their wrong, whatever it may have been, can only be corrected by the revisory powers of this court, in the original suit or application for registration. Where the objection is not founded on defects of the law itself, but relates to its administration only, the remedy is only through the revisory powers of the courts of the United States after the state courts have decided against the claim or right founded on the Constitution and laws of the United States. In re Wood, 140 U. S. 284; Gibson v. Mississippi, 162 U. S. 583; In re Frederick, 149 U. S. 77; Virginia v. Rives, 100 U. S. 321. The bad administration of other persons, if there has been such, defendants in error are not accountable for ; nor is the law itself to be blamed for administration not traceable to its words. Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U. S. 356, distinguished. It is suggested as a solution of the whole difficulty that if the plan of registration under the Constitution of Alabama is in violation of the Fifteenth Amendment of the Constitution, the law is simply void and is not in the way of voting when ballots may be offered, and that until a ballot is offered and refused, there is no ground for a private citizen to ask judicial action against the validity of the void law of registration, since until then he is not injured. Turpin v. Lemon, 187 U. S. 51; Tyler v. Judges of Registration, 179 U. S. 405. And, on the other hand, if there was only-bad administration of a valid law, the objection should have been made in the course of an appeal provided for in cl. 6 of § 186 of the Constitution. It must be presumed the state court would have corrected any abuse whatever. There was, therefore, no occasion -for or right to a mandamus. Independently of' all other questions, application for the mandamus could not be awarded after the defendants have long since been out of officé by expiration of their term, and could not possibly obey the -judgment, which this court, it seems, must judicially know here to be the case. Case No. 338 should abate. United States v. Boutwell, 17 Wall. 604; Mills v. Green, 159 U. S. 651, 657; Century Dig. col. 33, col. 2132, sec. 52; col. 2151, sec. 60.