Summary
ERROR TO THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF MARYLAND.
This is a writ of error to the Court of Appeals of the State of Maryland, to review its judgment affirming that of the Circuit Court for Montgomery County, which affirmed the proceedings of the board of registry of election district No. 7 of that county, refusing to register petitioner as'a legal voter on the ground of his non-compliance with the Maryland law making it neces.sary for 'a person coming into the State, with the intention of residing-therein, to register his name with the clerk of the Circuit Court of the proper county, and thereby to indicate the intent of such person to become a citizen. and resident of .the State. . • •
The act in question was passed March 29,1902, as chapter 133 of the laws of that year, and as an. amendment and supplement to the public• General Laws of the State, title "Elections,” sub-title "Registration,”.as section 25b, and.it is reproduced in the margin.1 •
■Plaintiff in error, on September 29, 1903, presented his application to the board of registry of election district No. 7, Montgomery County, Maryland, then sitting at a place within such district, to be registered and-, entered as a qualified voter on the registry of voters of that election district, which application the board refused and declined to comply with, for the sole reason that he had not complied with this law of Maryland. Thereafter the plaintiff presénted a sworn petition to the Circuit Court for Montgomery County, in the State of Maryland, praying that court to enter an order to revise the action of the board of registry, and to order and direct that the name .of the petitioner should be entered as a qualified voter on the registry of voters of the election district already named.' In that sworn petition he alleged that he had on June 7, 1902, with his wife and child, removed from the city of Washington, District of Columbia, into Montgomery County, in the State of Maryland, “having then had and ever since and now having the intention of making the State of Maryland the permanent domicil of himself and his family, and of becoming a citizen of said State; and ever since said June 7, 1902, petitioner has resided in the subdivision of Otterbourne, near Chevy Chase, in said Montgomery. County, and in the seventh election district of said 'county.”
The petitioner further showed in his petition that he had made application to the proper board of registry in the election district mentioned, and the b'oard had refused to enter his name as a qualified voter on the ground already stated, of non-compliance with the Maryland statute.
The petitioner admitted “that he did not within a year prior to said application for registration as a qualified voter, or at any time during the year 1902, in any manner, make or register, in thé office of or before the clerk of Montgomery County, Maryland, or in a record book kept by said clerk, a declaration of intention to become a citizen and resident of Maryland, such as is required by the aforesaid law to be made by persons who remove into ¡the State of Maryland after March 29, 1902, as a condition precedent to subsequent registration of such persons as qualified voters:. ■ Petitioner, however, claims and asserts that said section 25b of article 33 of the Code of Public. General Laws of Maryland affords no justification for said refusal to register your, petitioner as a .qualified voter', because said alleged law contravenes and is repugnant to the Constitution of the United States and the constitution of Maryland, and is, therefore, null and void.”
The petitioner then asserts and sets forth in his petition several grounds which, as he therein .alleges, render the.state law a,violation of .the constitution of the.State of Maryland, and he also specially sets .up and claims that the law is a .violation of the Constitution of the United States in the particulars named by him, and which,áre as follows:
. “Said law is repugnant to that portion of section 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment of' the Constitution of the United States, which declares that ‘ all persons born, or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the Jurisdiction thereof, are
citizens of the United States and of the State wherein they reside/ because by said law it is in effect ordained that, male citizens of the United States of the age of twenty-one years and. upwards, removing into the State of Maryland after March 29, 1902; .with the intention of making said State their permanent domicil, shall not be treated as citizens or residents of Maryland-, or- given the rights' and privileges of citizens of Maryland, until they have been naturalized in the mpde prescribed by said law. ■
“Said law is also repugnant..to that portion of section 1 of said Fourteenth. Amendment to the Constitution'of the United States which prohibits a State from denying any person within its jurisdiction the ‘ equal protection of the laws, because said law operates an unjust and unreasonable discrimination against • citizens of the United States coming into the State of- Mary-, land to permanently reside therein after March 29, 1902, who may desire to become qualified voters therein.
“Said law is also repugnant to the general spirit of the Constitution of the United States and the. fundamental rights of citizens of the United. States, which deny to a" State the power to attach unreasonable- or burdensome conditions to the free movement of citizens of the United States out of, hito and settlement within the confines of. any State,; District or Territory within the United States.” .
■ To this, petition there was a general demurrer, which was sustained by the court, which thereupon entered judgment dismissing the petition with costs to the defendants. .
Thé deprivation of a political right or privilege dependent upon a state constitution, if such deprivation be grounded upon an abridgement of á right or privilege conferred by the Constitution of the United States, presents a Federal question entitling this court to review the judgment of a state court. Boyd v. Thayer, 143 U. S. 135.
State citizenship is a right, privilege or immunity'of a citizen of the United States. § 1, Fourteenth Amendment; Slaughter House Cases, 16 Wall. 36, 80. By the express terms of the Fourteenth Amendment, a State may not abridge the same.
The first sentence of the Fourteenth Amendment is in effect a national naturalization law; and the acquisition of United States and state citizenship is solely regulated by it. The common law and general law of evidence in force at the time • of the adoption.of the Amendment determine what is residence and how it may be acquired. United States v. Wong Kim Ark, 169 U. S. 654; United States v. Palmer, 3 Wheat. 630; United States v. King, 34 Fed. Rep. 306.
Section 1, Art. I, of the constitution of Maryland confers the voting franchise upon adult' male citizens of the United States who have resided in the State one year. The general assembly of Maryland cannot add to these qualifications. Southerland v. Norris, 74 Maryland, 326. The term “resident,,” as employed in the clause of the state constitution referred to is. synonymous with'“citizen.” Art. 7, Maryland Bill of Rights: Anderson v. Watt, 138 U. S. 702.
It is a privilege of a citizen of the United States, of his own volition, instantly to transfer his citizenship from one State to'another. Morris v. Gilmer, 129 U. S. 315; Slaughter House Cases, supra. Unlike citizenship of the United States, (in the case of a. foreign born person,) no “declaration of intention” is required.
The Federal privilege of state citizenship acquired by plaintiff in error on his removal into Maryland was clearly abridged by the statute here assailed, which operates only against persons, after their removal into the State of Maryland, when, by force of the Constitution of the United States/ many such persons immediately on removal become residents of the State of Maryland. ' The statute dates the residence and citizenship fxorh the time of the making of the declaration of intention required by the statute, thus in effect annulling the residence and citizenship acquired by force’ of the Constitution of the United States, and compelling the acceptance of citizenship under the state law.- Further, the requirement of attendance at the county seat to make the declaration in question — no matter how far removed from the residence of the would-be-voter, or how great may be the pecuniary injury sustained by loss of time and money, outlay for railroad fares, etc. — is an oppressive and onerous burden, not imposed upon other citizens of the State. It deters and hinders citizens from establishing and exercising such right. See No. 61 of The Federalist, by Alexander Hamilton, p. 281. The statute necessarily abridges the Federal right and privilege, and is therefore unconstitutional. Crandall v. Nevada, 6 Wall. 36; Henderson v. Mayor, 92. U. S. 268; Vance v. W. A. Vandercook Co., 170 U. S. 438; Connolly v. Union Sewer Pipe Co., 184 U. S. 558.
■ The declaration of intention required by the Maryland law-is a condition and qualification for the acquisition of the right to vote, and not a mere rule of proof. § 2165, Rev. Stat.; Vance v. W. A. Vandercook Co., 170 U. S. 438, 455; Sinnot v. Davenport, 22 How. 227, 241.
It is-immaterial to the right of the plaintiff in error to claim the benefit of the Federal privilege that the statute was enacted before his removal into the State. Southern Pacific Co. v. Denton, 146 U. S. 207, and cases cited.
On the transfer of residence from one State to another a citizen of the United States is vested “with the same rights as other citizens of that State.” Slaughter House Cases, supra. This necessarily includes the right, not to be arbitrarily discriminated against in the acquisition and enjoyment of political rights, because of his removal from another State. The statute may, therefore, properly be held also to be repugnant to the second section of the fourth article of the Constitution of the United States. Blake v. McClung, 172 U. S. 249.
So far as the act is claimed to be contrary to the constitution of the State the question is finally set at rest by the decision of the Court of Appeals and that question is not subject to review by this court. ”
It has long been an established doctrine of this court that the' construction by the courts of the several States of their constitution and laws is binding upon this court in all cases except where a Federal question is involved. Guthriqpn 14th Amendment, 44; Brannon on 14th Amendment, 395, 419; Slaughter House Cases, 16 Wall. 66; Louisiana Pilsbury, 105 U. S. 294; Gibson v. Mississippi, 162 U. S. 582; Forsyth v. Hammond, 166 U. S. 519, and cases cited.
The writ of error should be dismissed because it is no longer within the power of the defendants do register the plaintiff, as the registration books are not now and never will or can be in their possession or custody or subject- to their control. Maryland Code, Art. 33, §§ 29, 30.. The case is now a mpai case. Mills v. Green, 159 U. S. 653; Schilling v. Summerson, 94 Maryland, 582, 591.
The act does not affect or impair any fundamental and inalienable rights “of the plaintiff as a citizen of the United States secured or guaranteed to him by that Amendment.” Residence in its legal' sense is made up of two distinct elements: first, the physical, tangible fact of removal into the State; and second, the quo animo or intent with which such removal is made. Mitchell v. United States, 21 Wall. 350.
As to how to prove that a resident is entitled to vote, see Fenwick v. State, 63 Maryland, 241; Fisk v. Chester, 8 Gray, 508; Cooley’s Const. Law (7th ed. 1903), 524; 11 Am. & Eng. Eny. of Law (2d ed.), title Evidence, page 550, and cases-there cited; 6 Am. & Eng. Ency. of Law (2d ed.), title Constitutional Law, page 950, and cases there cited.
The Court of Appeals have decided in several cases that legislation of this sort relating to persons abandoning their homes in Maryland and removing from the State into other States, is constitutional and valid. Act of 1890, ch. 573, see. 14; Act of 1901, ch. 2; Code, Art. 33, title Elections, § 25a; Shaeffer v. Gilbert, 73 Maryland, 70, 72; Southerland v. Norris, 74 Maryland, 326; Sterling v. Horner, 74 Maryland, 573; McLane v. Hobbs, 74 Maryland, 166; Bowling v. Turner, 78 Maryland, 595; Thomas v. Warner, 83 Maryland, 20; Howard v. Skinner, 87 Maryland, 559.
By their judgment in the present case they have decided that this section 25b is nothing but a lawful regulation of the evidence necessary to prove what constitutes “residence.” Citizenship and suffrage are by no means inseparable; the latter is not one of the universal, fundamental, inalienable rights with which men are endowed by their Creator, but is altogether conventional. Suffrage is not a right of property or absolute personal right. Anderson v. Baker, 23 Maryland, 531, 629; Cooley’s Principles of Constitutional Law, 276; Gougar v. Timberlake, 148 Indiana, 38; Black’s Constitutional Law, 466; Story on Constitution, § 581; Kinneen v. Wells, 144 Massachusetts, 497; Stone v. Smith, 159 Massachusetts, 413; 16 Alb. Law J. 272; United States v. Susan B. Anthony, 11 Blatch. C. C. 202; Van Valkenburg v. Brown, 43 California, 43; Minor v. Happersett, 21 Wall. 178; United States v. Reese, 92 U. S. 214; United States v. Cruikshank, 92 U. S. 542.
Since the Fifteenth Amendment the whole control over suffrage and the power to regulate its exercise is still left with and retained by the several States, with the single restriction that they must not deny or abridge it on account of race, color or previous condition of servitude. United States v. Harris, 106 U. S. 636, 644; James v. Bowman, 190 U. S. 127.
There are, it is true, the two provisions, first, that while “the times, places and manner of holding elections for Senators and Representatives shall be prescribed in each State by the legislature thereof, the Congress may at any time by law make or.alter such regulations except as to the places of choosing Senators.” Constitution,- Art. I, sec. 4; Ex parte Siebold, 100 U. S. 371; Ex parte Clarke, 100 U. S. 399; Ex parte Yarbrough, 110 U. S. 651; In re Coy, 127 U. S. 731; Logan v. United States, 144 U. S. 263.
As § 25b' does not conflict with the Fifteenth Amendment but in express terms applies to “all persons,” it does not impair, abridge, affect, or even touch any privilege or immunity of the plaintiff in error which is covered by the guaranty of the Fourteenth Amendment. Williams v. Mississippi, 170 U. S. 213; Gibson v. Mississippi, 162 U. S. 582; Giles v. Harris, 189 U. S. 475; James v. Bowman, 190 U. S. 127. And see also Scott v. Sandford, 19 How. 393; Ward v. Maryland, 12 Wall. 418; Neale v. Delaware, 103 U S. 370; Amy v. Smith, 1 Litt. (Ky.) 326; Lanz v. Randall, 4 Hill. 425; Short v. State, 80 Maryland, 401.
. The protection designed by the clause of the Fourteenth Amendment declaring that no State shall, make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States, as has been repeatedly held, has no application to a citizen of the State whose laws are complained of. Bradwell v. State, 16 Wall. 130; In re Taylor, 48 Maryland, 28; In re Maddox, 93 Maryland, 728, 729.
As to the privileges and immunities belonging' to the citizens of a State, these “must rest for their security and protection where they have heretofore rested,” that is, with' the State in which the. citizen resides. Slaughter House Cases, 16 Wall. 74; Presser v. Illinois, 116 U. S. 266; Short v. State, 80 Maryland, 401.
By removing into Maryland the plaintiff became a citizen of that State and voluntarily subjected himself, to the operation of her laws. Why then shall he not be bound by them?
As to equal protection of the laws the equality extends only to civil rights as distinguished from those that are political oíanse from the form of the government and its mode of administration. Field, J., Ex parte Virginia, 100 U. S. 637. Equal protection of the laws is a pledge of the protection of. equal laws. Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U. S. 369.
The clause is not violated by any. diversity in the jurisdiction in the several courts, as to subject matter; 'amount or finality of decision, if all persons within the territorial limits of their respective jurisdictions have an equal right in like cases and under like circumstances to resort to them for redress. Missouri v. Lewis, 101 U. S. 30; Wurts v. Hoagland, 114 U. S. 615. Class legislation discriminating against ’ some and favoring others is prohibited, but legislation, which, in carrying ott. a public purpose is limited in its application if within the sphere of its operation it affects alike all persons similarly situated, is not within the Amendment. Munn v. Illinois, 94 U. S. 134; Chicago R. R. Co. v. Iowa, 94 U. S. 163; Barbier v. Connolly, 113 U. S. 27, 32; Soon Ling v. Crowley, 113 U. S. 703; Missouri Pacific R. Co. v. Humes, 115 U. S. 523; Kentucky R. R. Tax Case, 115 U. S. 337; Presser v. Illinois, 116 U. S. 266; Hayes v. Missouri, 120 U. S. 71; Dow v. Biedelman, 125 U. S. 691; Missouri R. R. Co. v. Mackey, 127 U. S. 209; Powell v. Pennsylvania, 127 U. S. 687; Walston v. Nevin, 128 U. S. 582; Minnesota R. R. Co. v. Beckwith, 129 U. S. 29; Home. Ins. Co. v. New York, 134 U. S. 606; Marchant v. Pennsylvania R. W., 153 U. S. 389; St. L. & San Fran. Ry. v. Mathews, 165 U. S. 24; Gulf, C. & S. F. R. W. v. Ellis, 165 U. S. 155; Orient Ins. Co. v. Daggs, 172 U. S. 557; Ins. Co. v. Warren, 181 U. S. 73; Ins. Co. v. Mettler, 185 U. S. 308; Billings v. Illinois, 188 U. S. 97; Kidd v. Alabama, 188 U. S. 730; Farmers’ Ins. Co. v. Dobney, 189 U. S. 301; Short v. State, 80 Maryland, 402; Brannon on 14th Amendment, ch. 16; on Equal Protection of the Laws, 315, 380; Guthrie on 14th Amendment, 106, 142.
Tests, qualifications, disqualifications, denials, abridgments, distinctions, inequalities, may still lawfully be made at, the pleasure of 'the States, provided only they do not discriminate against the negro. , ,
If they apply equally, impartially and uniformly to white and black citizens alike, they are not condemned by the letter or the spirit of the. Thirteenth, Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments.. They may perhaps cost the States a reduction in their Congressional representation in the proportion in which the number of adult males disfranchised by such state legislation bears to the whole, number of its adult male population. But this is- the only legal consequence, and there is no warrant for the contention that the Federal judiciary can also declare such legislation absolutely void.
Syllabus and headnotes are prepared by the reporter or publisher, not the court, and are not part of the opinion.