Dominion Hotel, Inc. v. Arizona

Under the equal protection clause, a State may do what it can to prevent what is deemed an evil and stop short of those cases in which the harm to the few concerned is thought less important than the harm to the public that would ensue if the rule were made mathematically exact. P. 268. A law of Arizona (Penal Code, par. 717), placing restrictions upon the hours of labor of women in hotels, with penalties upon hotel-keepers for infractions, excepts in part railroad restaurants or eating-houses upon railroad rights of way and operated by or under contract with any railroad company. Held, that the court cannot say, upon its judicial knowledge, that the legislature had no adequate ground for the distinction; possibly one might be found in the need of adjusting the service in the excepted restaurants to the hours of trains. Id.

ERROR TO THE SUPREME COURT OP THE STATE OP ARIZONA. The case is stated in the opinion. The classification bears no relation to the purpose of the law. The undeniable effect of the statute, as it was construed by the Arizona courts, is to impose upon some employers of female labor a restriction on their right to contract with their employees that is not imposed upon all employers of the same class. The plaintiff in error was held to be and now is guilty of a misdemeanor if it permits its waitresses to serve meals from 7 a. m. to 10 a. m., from 12 m. to 2 p. m., and from 6 p. m. to 8:30 p. m., since those hours of work cover a greater period than twelve hours; but a railroad eating-house, which may be a competitor, catering to the same class of trade and located just across the street, can permit its waitresses to work the same hours without fear of prosecution, since it comes within the class favored by the law. To avoid prosecution the plaintiff in error is compelled either to hire an extra shift of waitresses to serve one meal, to employ less efficient and more expensive male employees, or to close its plant for a part of the few customary meal hours during which it is operated. It has been repeatedly determined that one of the essential elements of classification as distinguished from discrimination in legislation is that the classification shall be based upon a distinction having reference to the subject-matter of the legislation. Gulf, Colorado & Santa Fe Ry- Co. v. Ellis, 165 U. S. 150; Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. Matthews, 174 U. S. 96, 105; Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U. S. 356; Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. Vosburg, 238 TJ. S. 56, 59. An application of the rule to a set of facts somewhat similar to those existing in the present case was recently made in the case of State v. Le Barron, 24 Wyoming, 519. The nature of the employment of waitresses in railroad restaurants is not different from that in other restaurants. And under the facts of the present case, the plaintiff in error might be said to operate a railroad restaurant except for the single question of ownership. A railroad restaurant caters to the same class of persons and at the same horns as the plaintiff in error. The plaintiff in error served transients arriving on an evening train and departing on a morning train. Moreover, as plaintiff in error offered to show, it operated its restaurant at the horns complained of by the State, for the convenience of these transients. We further offered to show that the restaurant in question was located near the railroad station. On the. question of whether ownership alone constitutes a sufficient ground for the classification of restaurants, see Vandalia R. R. Co. v. Stillwell, 181 Indiana, 267, in which the Supreme Court of Indiana declared that “the character of the employment, and not the character of the employer, must be the trué test.” That case was affirmed without opinion by this court. 239 U. S. 637. The law does not apply to all members of the same class. As we have already shown, the law divides restaurants into two divisions — railroad restaurants and all others. But that such a sub-classification cannot be legally made has been repeatedly decided by the courts. Barbier v. Connolly, 113 U. S. 27; Soon Hing v. Crowley, 113 U. S. 703; Powell v. Pennsylvania, 127 U. S. 678; State v. Julow, 129 Missouri, 163; State v. Miksicek, 225 Missouri, 561; Schmalz v. Wooley, 56 N. J. Eq. 655; Block v. Schwartz, 27 Utah, 387; Randolph v. Wood, 49 N. J. L. 85; Bedford Quarries Co. v. Bough, 168 Indiana, 671; Johnson v. St. Paul &c. R. R. Co., 43 Minnesota, 222.